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This thesis aims to understand the effects of “financialisation” on the 
strategy and governance of the contemporary UK professional services 
firm (PSF) and the lived experience of its partners. The study is placed in 
the context of change, externally in the regulation and competitive 
environment of PSFs, and internally in terms of the commercialisation of 
the PSF and the adoption of financial logics. In an ethnographic case study 
undertaken within a cultural economy perspective this thesis reveals firstly 
how PSF strategy has been financialised. Secondly, it identifies how an 
ecology of strategic and tactical measures are put to use in support of the 
firm’s strategy, exemplifying the role of accounting as the agent of 
financialisation and as the enabler of financial governance. Thirdly, 
complementing accounting, HRM technologies are shown to be employed 
to make partners and potential partners known, calculable, comparable 
and governable. Working together, accounting and HRM technologies 
create an ecology of power which offers partners a subjectivity privileging 
and supporting the financialised strategy of the PSF, and rendering each 
partner a tool of strategy implementation and thereby financialisation. 
Fourthly, this thesis investigates the lived experience of partners in the 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
This thesis explores and aims to understand the effects of 
“financialisation” on the strategy and governance of the contemporary UK 
professional services firm (PSF) and the lived experience of its partners. 
Financialisation is a phenomena reflecting the dominance of financial 
measures and outcomes as key imperatives, or a guiding logic (Epstein 
2005; Martin 2002), said to translate as the pursuit of shareholder value 
by corporations (Krippner 2005) and profit per equity partner (PEP) in 
PSFs (Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009). 
 
In an ethnographic case study of a UK PSF this thesis reveals how 
financialisation manifests in the firm. Firstly, it shows how the strategy of 
the PSF has been financialised by the adoption of a narrative of strategic 
purpose which combines a strategic vision, or narrative, with a set of 
metrics, or numbers, by which strategic success is measured (Froud et al. 
2006). Secondly, it identifies the range of metrics put to use in support of 
the firm’s measures of strategic success, and exemplifies the role of 
accounting as the agent of financialisation and as the enabler of financial 
governance (Foucault 1973; Townley 1994; Miller & Power 2013). Thirdly, 
complementing accounting, human resource management (HRM) 
technologies are shown to be employed to make partners and potential 
partners known, calculable, comparable and governable (Foucault 1977; 
1978; Townley 1993a; 1994). Working together, accounting and HRM 
technologies create an ecology of power which offers partners a 
subjectivity privileging and supporting the financialised strategy of the 
PSF, and rendering each partner a tool of strategy implementation and 
thereby financialisation. Finally, the thesis completes its work by 
investigating the experience of partners in the financialised PSF. It shows 
how partners, in their quest for a desired career related identity (Grey 
1994), engage with accounting and HRM processes, and the offered 
subjectivity, as a means of achieving that identity. In so doing fears, 
anxieties, tensions and contradictions (Thornborrow & Brown 2009; Costas 
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& Grey 2014; Gill 2015; Putnam et al. 2016) are revealed as professional 
logics meet financial logics. 
 
Background and the road to the research aim and questions 
 
The starting point for the research was my personal background presented 
here to give readers some insight into the “biases” or “spins” (Watson 
2000, p.502) that inform or affect the account, or exercise in 
“ethnographic fiction science” (Watson 2000, p.502), that follows. 
Likewise, I should debunk the all too often presented myth that what this 
thesis presents was fully planned out in advance, and delivered “on time 
and on budget” (cf. Nokes & Kelly 2007; Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009). 
Rather, much like strategy when seen through Mintzberg’s lens (Mintzberg 
1994), what follows emerged over time as intentions have come into 
contact with outside forces; tracing the development of my thoughts over 
time as influenced by the supervision and review processes of Lancaster 
University, and the express or implied preferences of the individuals 
tasked with executing them. Nevertheless, following academic writing 
conventions, the account that follows is largely presented as an exercise in 
post hoc rationalisation, or sensemaking (Weick et al. 2005). 
 
Before commencing my doctoral studies I practiced in one of the 
traditional professions for 22 years, with 13 years as a partner, and 
latterly as Managing Partner, of a UK PSF. During my tenure as Managing 
Partner I undertook a masters degree in business administration, seeking 
knowledge across a range of academic disciplines, in search of the answer 
to the question: how should this firm be managed? In so doing I had 
cause to reflect on how, over my 22 years in practice, I witnessed 
significant changes affecting the firm. Externally change occurred in terms 
of neoliberal re-regulation which opened up the market to greater 
competition, the information technology (IT) revolution, and the rise of 
client knowledge and resulting shift in the balance of power between 
professional and client. Moreover, the 2008 financial crisis, and the fall out 
that followed, led to a number of long standing and apparently profitable 
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firms going to the wall (e.g. The Lawyer 2010; Hyde 2013), rocking 
hitherto solid assumptions of firm longevity and profitability, and allowing 
law firm managers to pursue a financialised agenda which privileged 
financial metrics over other hitherto valued outcomes. Internally change 
occurred by way of the adoption of ever more formal managerial 
hierarchies, the employment of functional management, and an increasing 
focus on financial results. The power held by senior management 
increased as a result of (a) the commercial ethos adopted within the firm 
(promoting the “management’s right to manage”) (b) the perceived 
expertise of functional management (following the rhetoric “they are the 
experts, we must listen to them”) and (c) the spectre of firm failures after 
the financial crisis ( hence legitimising managerial intervention as a means 
to secure the future of the firm). Such power was manifest at its most 
extreme in staff redundancy programmes, restructuring of the partnership 
remuneration model, the “de-equitisation” of some partners, and the 
removal of others, each seen as measures needed to ensure that the firm 
remained appropriately profitable, and so as to retain “top performers”. 
Other long standing firms who failed to take such steps were characterised 
as “dinosaurs”, with prophecies of doom as to their future prospects, some 
of which came to pass in further firm failures. Such failures further 
reinforced the view of senior management as prescient analysts, 
underpinned their role as grand strategists (Knights & Morgan 1991), and 
lent support to the view that actions taken were so taken in their role as 
protectors of the firm’s future. This stood in contrast to when I first 
became a professional and then a partner, when the partnership model 
adopted by the firm largely followed collegial and participatory forms of 
organisation and decision-making (Greenwood et al. 1990), functional 
management was little more than administrative support, partners tended 
to be partners “for life”, and financial results were an outcome rather than 
a driver of decision-making. 
 
My exposure to academia led me to conclude the firm with which I was 
connected had been caught up in a wider transformation of professional 
services which marked a shift from professional logics to those associated 
with neoliberalism, managerialism and commercialisation (Freidson 2001; 
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Harvey 2005; Alvesson & Sveningsson 2011; Hanlon 1999). I found 
myself lamenting the perhaps “purer” form of professionalism I had 
pursued in the earlier years, and mused over what had been lost as a 
result of the changes, and whether other partners also experienced some 
tension between traditional professional logics and those associated with 
the changes. I questioned whether such changes, including those of the 
nature I myself had played some role in introducing in my capacity as 
Managing Partner, were always positive. Academia appeared to offer a 
means to explore the possible tensions in an intellectually rigorous and 
challenging way, leading me to explore possible titles for doctoral 
research. To that end an early statement of my research aim was: to 
explore the organisation of the contemporary PSF, specifically with regard 
to the interplay of managerial and financial, and professional logics. My 
focus was to have been on the management and experience of partners, 
who own the firm, and with that status traditionally demanded, and been 
given, autonomy and participation in decision-making (Freidson 2001). 
Hence, in this group I saw an ambiguous relationship with the logics and 
technologies of managerialism, reflecting the contingent nature of 
managerial authority in PSFs (Empson et al. 2013). However, as the twin 
pillars of literature review and data collection proceeded, sometimes 
together and sometimes apart, financialisation emerged as the dominant 
theme, resonating loudly in the data, but being clearly less well empirically 
explored in the literature on the professions. As such, and applying the 
lens of hindsight, my research aim was gradually re-stated as: to explore 
the effects of financialisation on the strategy and governance of the 
contemporary PSF and the lived experiences of its partners. 
 
From that broad aim, and the literature review that informed it, four 
research questions were established: 
 
1. Has PSF strategy been financialised? More specifically, and following 
Froud and colleagues (2006): do PSFs adopt “narrative and 
numbers” and if so, are there performative effects? 
 
 5 
2. How do the logics of financialistion enter and take effect in the PSF? 
In particular, and following Miller and Power (2013): does 
accounting act as the agent of the financialisation of the PSF and if 
so how? 
 
3. How are professionals managed to deliver the financial imperative 
implied by financialisation? More specifically, and following Foucault 
(1977; 1978) and Townley (1993b; 1994), do the technologies of 
HRM, operating alongside metrics, proffer partners a financialised 
subjectivity that redefines professionalism in the PSF? 
 
4. How do partners experience the financialisation of the PSF? In 
particular, do partners engage with the financialisation of the PSF 
and if so how do they experience the co-existence of financial and 
professional imperatives? 
 
Outline of the Thesis 
 
After establishing a research aim, all theses require to situate the 
knowledge generated within existing literature. With that in mind, and to 
inform both the choice and application of the research questions, it was 
decided that the literature review should be in three parts: (1) professions 
and professionalism (2) financialisation and (3) power, control and 
identity. 
 
Chapter 2 examines literature on the professions and professionalism. This 
sets context for the study by reviewing how views on the professions 
developed over the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, moving 
from a functional view (Carr-Saunders & Wilson 1933) to a critical view 
(Freidson 1970; Larson 1977; Abbott 1988) and thereafter to a more 
balanced view (Freidson 2001; Scott 2008). From that base Chapter 2 
notes the concept of professionalism has borne explanatory fruit, including 
being used to conceptualise change in the professions. In particular 
“commercialised professionalism” (Hanlon 1994; 1997; 1999; 2004) has 
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been used to encompass the commercialisation of professional imperatives 
in the PSF and public services, and contrasts with “traditional 
professionalism”, embodied in the logics associated with the use of 
esoteric knowledge for the “public good” (Carr-Saunders & Wilson 1933; 
Freidson 1970). “Organisational professionalism” (Faulconbridge & Muzio 
2008; Evetts 2013) has been used as a means to theorise the connection 
between the individual professional with the imperatives of the PSF, 
thereby linking commercialised professionalism with the firm. Further, 
professionalism as a component of identity (Ibarra 1999; Brown & Lewis 
2011) and subjectivity (Foucault 1982), leaves open a means by which 
professionalism can be seen as a means of control (Covaleski et al. 1998; 
Grey 1998). 
 
Chapter 3 explores the concept of financialisation (e.g. Epstein 2005; 
Krippner 2005; Froud et al. 2006) across a range of perspectives. It 
concludes by choosing a cultural economy perspective to facilitate an 
examination of how strategy and operational controls are influenced by 
financial and market discourses, and how that becomes performative 
within the PSF (MacKenzie & Millo 2003; MacKenzie 2006). In particular 
Froud and colleagues (2006) concept of the “narrative of strategic 
purpose”, and its relationship with metrics as measures of success to form 
“narrative and numbers”, is seen as having explanatory potential 
alongside Miller and Power’s (2013) critical accounting framework as a 
means to look at the role of accounting in the financialisation of the PSF. 
Further, in order to understand the effect of the specialised press and 
rankings agencies, the concept of financialisation is expanded to include 
the effects of firm rankings as quasi-metrics (Sauder 2008; Sauder & 
Espeland 2009). 
 
Chapter 4 responds to a call from Townley (1994) and Legge (2005) that 
accounting requires to be considered alongside literatures that view HRM 
techniques as Foucauldian mechanisms of control, rendering the 
professional the object and subject of power (Townley 1993a; 1994; 
1995a; 1997; Legge 2005; Foucault 1977; 1978). This connects to 
commercialised and organisational professionalism (Hanlon 1994; 
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Faulconbridge & Muzio 2008) to suggest a review of the creation of the 
subjectivity of the performing and contributing partner as a means to 
promote financial and metricised objectives of the financialised PSF 
alongside the management’s right to manage.  In turn, Grey’s (1994) 
theory of career as a project of the self is seen as a means to understand 
how partners react to processes of discipline and control. Finally, literature 
complementary to this, examining fear, anxiety, tension and contradiction 
(Thornborrow & Brown 2009; Costas & Grey 2014; Gill 2015; Putnam et 
al. 2016) is reviewed to explain partner experience. 
 
Taking these literature reviews together with the research aim led to the 
research questions specified above and to the adoption of the 
methodology and methods set out in Chapter 5. In particular value is 
placed on an exposure of the researcher to (a) management practices “in 
action” (b) less formal meetings where participants reflected on events (c) 
the personal reflections of managers and partners, and (d) firm 
communications and documents, as part of the discursive practices of the 
firm. Ethnography and case study are compared and combined in the 
“ethnographic case study” (Watson 2001), and I reflect on my 
positionality with regard to my background and experience. 
 
Chapter 6 introduces the case study firm, and then addresses the first 
research question. It notes the firm’s “narrative of strategic purpose” 
(Froud et al. 2006) and explores “narrative and numbers” (Froud et al. 
2006) as used in discourse during the study, constituting the firm and its 
success in terms of chosen metrics, exemplifying the performativity of 
metrics in the PSF, and the connection with narrative. 
 
Chapter 7 is an empirical exploration of how accounting acts as the agent 
of financialisation within the case study firm, supporting the firm’s 
measures of strategic success. Adopting Miller and Power’s (2013) 
framework it explores how accounting informs the metrics used within the 
firm and structures the firm to enable a focus on performance in terms of 
those metrics. In so doing it addresses the second research question. 
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Chapter 8 builds on Chapter 7, and answers the third research question, 
by examining how HRM practices operate alongside accounting to form an 
ecology of power which renders partners the object and subject of power 
and as such the tools of strategy implementation. Foucault’s (1977; 1978) 
technologies of objectification and subjectification are combined with his 
two systems of comparison, namely taxinomia and mathesis (Foucault 
1973; Townley 1994) to discipline and shape the individual to fit the 
subjectivity of the performing and contributing partner, one who supports 
the delivery of the firm’s metricised measures of success. 
 
Chapter 9 answers the final research question thereby addressing the 
experience of the partners, and identifying fears, anxieties, tensions, 
contradictions and unintended consequences that arise in the experience 
of partners as financial imperatives manifest, and financial logics meet 
traditional professions logics. It explains the motivations and reactions of 
the partners with reference to Grey’s (1994) theory of the career as a 
project of the self alongside work on status and identity by Costas and 
Grey (2014) and Gill (2015). 
 
Chapter 10 summarises the thesis and the key findings and contributions 
made with reference to the research aim and questions. It then notes 
limitations, evaluates the thesis and suggests areas for future research 
before concluding with some final thoughts. 
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Commentators are in agreement that there have been material changes 
affecting the professions in the past three decades (for example, Cooper 
et al. 1996; Powell et al. 1999; Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009; Greenwood 
& Laura 2003; Lawrence et al. 2012; Brock 2008). This represents the 
context for deeper consideration of the professions and the most common 
vehicle through which professional services are offered: the professional 
services firm (PSF). This thesis aims to address change in the PSF by 
adopting a premise broadly stated by scholars such as Faulconbridge and 
Muzio (2009) and Alvehus and Spicer (2012), that a driver of change in 
the PSF is financialisation. The purpose of the literature review contained 
in this chapter and the two chapters that follow is to review literatures and 
select theories and perspectives that will illuminate the research aim: to 
explore the effects of financialisation on the strategy and governance of 
the contemporary PSF and the lived experiences of its partners. 
 
In order to frame this aim, and before the following chapter addresses 
what financialisation is, this chapter sets context by addressing literature 
on the professions more generally, moving from a review of change to the 
sociology of the professions, and then to the concept of professionalism. 
In so doing this chapter introduces theoretical perspectives that are 
utilised in the thesis, and which inform the analysis in the literature 
reviews contained in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Change in the professions 
 
Over the last three decades, successive governments have sought to 
promote change in the professions. They have given increasing priority to 
managerial, market and financial logics, following an increasingly 
hegemonic neoliberal ideology bent on promoting market competition as 
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the means of delivery of value to the public, and opportunity to 
entrepreneurs and finance (Kirkpatrick et al. 2005; Clarke & Newman 
1997; Harvey 2005; Crotty 2005; Peck 2010). In the public service 
professions that has led to the introduction of measures to change the 
culture of public services from one of administration and service, under a 
professional bureaucracy (cf. Mintzberg 1989), to one of financialised 
managerialism, with a focus on efficiency and value-for-money, enforced 
through reorganisation, management-by-objectives, and a programme of 
outsourcing (Kirkpatrick et al. 2005; Clarke & Newman 1997; Massey 
1993; Willmott 2011). 
 
Governments have not stopped with the public service professions. They 
have also sought to pursue a programme of neoliberal inspired re-
regulation designed to open up private sector professions to market 
competition, including the removal of professional control of entry into and 
the training of professionals (Abel 2003) and the opening up of the PSF to 
non-professional ownership (Mayson 2009). At the same time PSFs have 
faced greater calls from increasingly managerialised and powerful 
corporate clients (Hanlon 1997) to transparency of pricing and alternative 
pricing models (Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009; Lawrence et al. 2012); more 
use by those clients of competitive pricing mechanisms and beauty 
parades; and the increasing media transparency of financial results 
leading to public comparison of firm performance (Abel 2003; Ackroyd & 
Muzio 2007; Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009; Muzio & Kirkpatrick 2011). 
Some commentators go as far as to suggest these changes have resulted 
in the commodification of professional work: “Professional work is defined 
as service products to be marketed, price-tagged and individually 
evaluated and remunerated; it is, in that sense, commodified” (Svensson 
& Evetts 2003, p.11).  
 
PSFs have not stood still in the face of such changes, but rather have 
pursued a series of internal changes designed to respond to external 
stimuli (Evetts 2011). Internal changes include: the adoption of 
managerial hierarchies; the employment of functional management; the 
adoption of managerial “best practice”; a focus on financial metrics; the 
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embracing of new technology; the introduction of knowledge management 
systems; greater specialisation; and changes to management structures 
and control mechanisms (Powell et al. 1999; Brock 2006; Scott 2008; 
Lawrence et al. 2012). The result might be said to be the reconfiguration 
of professionalism as “the ideology/discourse of managerialism [has] risen 
to ascendency…[resulting in] the blurring of the boundaries between 
professionalism and managerialism” (Dent & Whitehead 2002, p.1). This is 
said to have resulted in “the clear erosion of the ethos of professionalism 
in large professional service firms” (Bévort & Suddaby 2016, p.17). 
 
The field of law and law firms is an exemplar for change in the PSF. The 
external and internal changes referred to above are reported as having 
affected law firms in the past three decades (Hanlon 1997; Brock et al. 
1999; Empson & Chapman 2006; Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009; Mayson 
2009). Corporate clients, operating within managerialised structures, have 
changed the nature of relationships with professional providers, seeing 
them as the same as other suppliers of goods and services, and hence 
changed depending on the value proposition (Hanlon 1997). In response 
law firms have adopted hierarchical management structures and functional 
management led by non-legal professionals (Hanlon 1997). 
 
Some commentators suggest that this has had a profound effect on the 
outlook of large US and UK PSFs, some of which have converted into 
transnational firms (Muzio & Faulconbridge 2013), such firms becoming 
infused with market and commercial rationalities, and selling their services 
in a manner informed by a wider understanding of commerce (Hanlon 
1997; 2007; Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009). At the same time, increasing 
financial analysis within and outside of law firms means partners, and law 
firm leaders, are more aware of the relative financial contributions of 
individual fee earners and partners, emboldening law firms and partners 
alike to consider hiring partners from other firms, or moving for greater 
returns (Hanlon 2007; Galanter & Henderson 2008). 
 
In response, large and geographically dispersed law firms, less able to rely 
on cultural “glue” to bind partners to the firm and each other, are reported 
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to have restructured their partnerships to replace cultural ties with 
economic ones (Galanter & Henderson 2008). They have introduced new 
tiers of non-partner lawyers, as well as “fixed share” or “salaried” 
partners, hence retaining “equity”, or profit-sharing status, to a smaller 
“core” of partners who possess the most lucrative client connections, and 
greatest revenue generation capabilities, such core known as “rainmakers” 
or “stars” (Ackroyd & Muzio 2007; Galanter & Henderson 2008). On the 
flipside, those in equity partnership within such firms are said to occupy 
their place on economic grounds, rather than as a mark of legal 
knowledge and accomplishments, and retain that status only so long as 
they remain rainmakers or stars (Galanter & Henderson 2008; Hanlon 
1997). Hence, as predicted by Hanlon (1997) in the context of UK law 
firms, the “tournament” between lawyers for the goal of partnership has 
become “elastic”, lasting their whole career rather than ending with a 
tenured partnership, such that partners exist with the continuous threat of 
de-equitisation or removal (Galanter & Henderson 2008). 
 
However, in order to frame a consideration of financialisation of the PSF it 
is necessary to put these changes in their wider context, starting with the 
sociology of the professions. 
 
Sociology of the Professions 
 
The sociology of professions has been the subject of scholarly work that 
goes back well into the last century (Carr-Saunders & Wilson 1933; Scott 
1965; Johnson 1972; Larson 1977; Abbott 1988; Freidson 2001; Evetts 
2006; 2011). Early work on the professions took a functionalist bent, 
viewing professions as having certain defining characteristics akin to a 
Weberian “ideal-type” (Macdonald 1995). The ideal-type profession was an 
organised body, with practitioners applying esoteric knowledge, in 
accordance with a code of ethics, for the public good (Carr-Saunders & 
Wilson 1933; Abbott 1988). Professions also had the function in assisting 
the formation and development of the state (Scott 2008; Parsons 1939). 
The characterisation of a profession was elaborated through seeing 
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professional status as an “end state” (Abbott 1988, p.5) – to be aimed for 
through a sequential process of professionalisation (Wilensky 1964; 
Abbott 1988). The claim to such status was reliant on the “asymmetry of 
expertise” (Abbott 1988, p.5) between client and professional and the 
requirement for trust and respect, underpinned by professional self-
regulation through codes of conduct and ethics (Macdonald 1995). In sum, 
professions, and hence the professionals within them, were regarded as 
performing a societal function through work seen as a social good. 
 
Arguably also falling within the functionalist paradigm, professions are 
regarded by institutional theorists as a form of institution, being controlled 
by social rules of licensing and shared education, through which a social 
expectation has been created that professionals should be called upon to 
undertake “professional work” (Meyer & Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 
1983; Suddaby et al. 2010). This has at times been further 
institutionalised by state-granted monopolies (Meyer & Rowan 1977; 
Abbott 1988). These forces have, according to some institutional theorists, 
led to the structuration of professional fields: recognition by PSFs, clients 
and regulators of the field of expertise and those within it, leading to high 
levels of interaction among providers and clients (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983). 
 
By the 1970s, aside from the institutional theorists, writers began to move 
away from the functionalist view and took a more critical approach to the 
professions (Macdonald 1995). This has been characterised by Scott 
(2008) as the “conflict view”, and Macdonald (1995) as simply “post-
functionalist”. Focusing on medicine and law, this approach sought to 
redefine the seeking of professional status by professions as an exercise in 
power, fuelled by a desire to monopolise the market and dominate 
alternative service providers, achieved through state granted market 
closure (Freidson 1970; Johnson 1972; Larson 1977). In this view 
professional status is seen as “a way of controlling knowledge towards 
occupational advantage and reinforcing claims to autonomous working” 
(Waring & Currie 2009, p.758). 
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Hence professional status was redefined by critical scholars as a 
“professional project”, designed to serve professional self-interest under 
the guise of a social good (Larson 1977; Abbott 1988). Following this 
view, much of UK re-regulation of the professions sought to remove or 
restrict professional monopolies as a means of correcting the perceived 
power-imbalance between the professions and the client (Abel 2003; 
Macdonald 1995). This was also driven by the changing nature of the 
client base, moving from business or high-worth families to the wider 
public through the expansion of home ownership sponsored by the 
Thatcher government (Abel 2003; Macdonald 1995). Put another way, this 
can be seen as re-regulation driven by a governmental agenda which 
increasingly sought to give primacy to market logics over the logics of 
professionalism (Abel 2003; Freidson 2001). 
 
Since the turn of the century, commentary on the sociology of the 
professions became less critical and more balanced, perhaps in response 
to recognition of the effects of neoliberal re-regulation (Abel 2003; Mayson 
2009; Kirkpatrick et al. 2005) and wider exogenous change (Muzio & 
Kirkpatrick 2011; Faulconbridge & Muzio 2012). For example, Freidson 
(2001) published his defence of professionalism, Bourgeault, Benoit and 
Hirchkorn (2009) described the professions and professionals as at the 
heart of knowledge production, and Scott (2008) referred to the 
professions as institutional agents, creating and maintaining the 
institutions through which society operates, including the principles and 
mechanisms for regulation and enforcement. 
 
Around the same time many scholars began to move away from 
considering the professions as collectives, to a consideration of their 
manifestation through the concept of professionalism (e.g. Freidson 2001; 
Evetts 2006; 2011). Sommerlad (2004), for example, problematizes the 
understanding of occupational change in the professions using the notion 
of professionalism. She advocates an approach which neither assumes 
professionalism as a social good, nor as self-serving rhetoric. Rather, she 
suggests researchers should look to how professionals themselves view 
professionalism, and how that plays a role in the process of occupational 
 15 
change, referring to the notion of “commercial professionalism”, an 
expression earlier used by Hanlon (1994; 1997; 1999), as having led to 
professionals working very long hours as a proxy for commitment and 
excellence. 
 
Looking at professionalism addresses criticism that earlier writers tended 
to “dislocate [the] relationship between professionals and organisations, 
shifting the locus of debate to power and labour markets” (Hinings 2005, 
p.487; in Muzio & Kirkpatrick 2011, p.391). Rather, professionalism can 
be seen as active connection between a professional and her/his work, 
and by extension to the organisation within which that work is 
undertaken. It therefore provides a lens through which to consider the 
professional’s experience of work and by extension his/her experience of 
financialisation. However, to begin we must answer the question: what is 
professionalism? The next sections examine the varied uses of the concept 
of professionalism in academic literature and how these inform the study. 
 
Professionalism as embodied in the individual 
 
There can be no professionalism without the individuals who in some 
sense embody it, or through which it finds expression, hence it is 
considered that any exploration of the research aim must include the 
individual partners to whom it applies. This leads us to another view of 
professionalism, seen as something embodied by an individual. 
Professionalism in this view has several key tenets: the mastery of an 
esoteric body of knowledge, a public service ethos, and conduct in 
accordance with a normative set of behaviours (Scott 1965; Abbott 1988; 
Macdonald 1995). Hence professionalism in this conceptualisation is not 
found solely in the certification of professional bodies, albeit that may be a 
necessary qualifier, but is also related to such things as following the 
values of the profession, and the external exhibition of the behaviours that 
are determined as required by society, or the organisation; in other words 
professionalism includes an element of role “playing” rather than “being” 
(Goffman 1969; Kosmala & Herrbach 2006). 
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Explaining the element of role playing in professionalism, Anderson-
Gough, Grey and Robson (2000) highlighted the importance to early stage 
accountants of “behaving” professionally. They found that “the process of 
becoming a professional entails considerably more than passing exams – it 
is also…the accomplishment of ways of behaving and understandings of 
the world… linked to a process of organizational socialization” (Anderson-
Gough et al. 2000, pp.1154–1155). Ibarra (1999) goes further, finding 
that early career professionals use the mechanisms of experiment and 
feedback to construct boundaries around what may be regarded as 
professionalism and alter their behaviours as a result. Such early career 
individuals are seeking to perform as a professional would in order to be 
accepted as one within the organisation. As Ibarra suggests “[a]cting the 
part…facilitates passage through the firm’s inclusion boundaries” (Ibarra 
1999, p.764). However the result is not only acceptance by others, it also 
works on the individual through the “internalization of corresponding 
identities”. 
 
Ibarra’s (1999) reference here to identity allows us to see the defined 
elements of professionalism, and behaviours in particular, as components 
of a professional identity influenced by a socialisation process that goes 
beyond primary socialisation through university education and professional 
qualification, and into secondary socialisation carried out within the PSF 
itself. This views professional identity as a “process of becoming” that is 
not finished at the point of professional certification. An analogy can be 
drawn here with Faulconbridge & Muzio's (2008) concept of 
“organisational professionalism”, that being professionalism redefined 
through the organisation’s preferred set of values and behaviours, 
potentially in addition to, or distinct from, the wider principles of the 
professional association. 
 
This begs the question: what values and behaviours are expressly and 
implicitly defined by the PSF as being appropriate? Studies of junior fee 
earners, or those more senior but within employed positions, have found 
the imperative for professionals in the PSF has become the production of 
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“chargeable hours” as the means of producing revenue, seen as the 
substitution of hours for excellence or quality (Karreman & Alvesson 2004; 
Brown & Lewis 2011; Alvehus & Spicer 2012). Whereas this work is 
insightful in the context of financialisation, it does not necessarily translate 
to the partner role, and risks giving a one-dimensional understanding of 
professionalism and its reinterpretation in the PSF. In order to properly 
understand the effects of financialisation it is necessary to understand how 
it affects those at the highest level of the firm, and its owners and 
principal workers, the partners. 
 
Widening out the question posed at the beginning of the last paragraph to 
partners in the PSF, Hanlon (1997) identified the four main functions of 
the partner in a large law firm as being fee earning, practice development, 
management and deployment of staff, and management at firm level. This 
is said to be a manifestation of “commercialised professionalism”, the term 
used by Hanlon to describe the outcome of state sponsored re-regulation 
and reordering of priorities designed to “redefine professionalism so that it 
becomes more commercially aware, budget focused, managerial, 
entrepreneurial and so forth” (Hanlon 1999, p.121). Within the PSF 
commercialised professionalism manifests in the shift from valuing PSF 
partners primarily for their technical skill and experience, to valuing them 
primarily for their business winning, revenue generation, and managerial 
skills, with technical skills taken for granted (Hanlon 1994; 1997; 1998). 
This shift reflects the wider changes already described, and client 
demands for competitive tendering and efficiency (Hanlon 1998). 
However, to enrich the picture for a consideration of the effects of 
financialisation, it is necessary to seek to understand how these features 
manifest across the PSF in its strategic aims and operational technologies, 
and how that acts so as to redefine the range of normative expectations 
placed on partners, what professionalism means for them, and their 
resulting subjectivities. 
 
Reference to the subjectivity of partners, and normative expectations set 
by the firm (cf. Faulconbridge and Muzio’s (2008) “organisational 
professionalism”) provides a link between professionalism as embodied in 
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the individual as a set of behaviours, identity and subjectivity, and 
mechanisms of control. In order to do justice to this link the following 
section examines literature which, inspired by the work of Foucault (1977; 
1978), reflects on professionalism as a discourse and means of control. 
 
Professionalism as a discourse and means of control 
 
The discourse of professionalism is the language or set of statements that 
work together with practices, and within the relevant historically situated 
context, to provide a “way of representing” the socially constructed 
meaning of professionalism (Hall 2006; Foucault 1977). This has been 
used as a tool to support the interests of the profession in discussions with 
government (Evetts 2003), for example in seeking recognition and 
monopoly. Such use relies on the ideologies of professionalism, which 
promote professionalism as the undertaking of knowledge work, governed 
by professional associations, stemming from shared education and codes 
of ethics, which collectively give rise to the trust required in allowing (and 
demanding) practitioner control of work systems (Evetts 2011; Alvesson 
2001). 
 
However the discourse of professionalism can also be linked to Foucault’s 
(1978) conceptualisation of power, relevant in this case to the potential 
for managerial appropriation of the discourse of professionalism as a 
control mechanism (Doolin 2002; Hodgson 2002; Clarke et al. 2009; 
Brown & Lewis 2011). Professional control is not a new notion, clan control 
having been recognised by Ouchi (1980) as a largely unsaid form of 
organisation adopted by professionals applying professional logics 
(Freidson 2001), and examined further below under Professionalism as a 
logic and means of organising. However, the focus here is on the more-or-
less deliberate use of the discourse of professionalism by firm 
management as a control mechanism, tied to a managerial hegemony 
focusing on control, efficiency and standardisation, and its manifestations 
in certain technologies of control. This juncture, where discourse and 
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managerial technologies are tied together, provides a focus for the 
examination of the effects of financialisation in the PSF. 
 
Several studies have employed a Foucauldian analysis to inform our 
understanding of professionalism as a means of control of professionals 
(e.g. Covaleski et al. 1998; Fournier 1999; Anderson-Gough et al. 2000; 
Grey 1994; 1998). Covaleski et al. (1998) looked at the development of 
junior partners in the then “Big Six” accountancy firms, and, following the 
work of Townley (1993, 1994), examined the discursive processes 
adopted as forms of management control. The first, management-by-
objectives, is a process by which objectives are set for the professional 
which thereby define her/him in terms of performance against those 
objectives, while rendering the professional “calculable” and hence 
measurable against others. The second, mentoring, is characterised as a 
form of Foucauldian self-examination (“avowal”) which is used to tie the 
individual to the discourse of professionalism as defined by the firm. This 
description is a pertinent demonstration of the Foucauldian perspective: 
the expectations passed on by the firm as to “what professionalism means 
here” are vocalised by the subject in objectives, and mentoring sessions, 
and thereby internalised, having a strong impact in shaping subjectivity 
(Covaleski et al. 1998). An analogy can be drawn here with Courpasson's 
(2000) “soft bureaucracy”, where managerial domination of professional 
elites is achieved through careful definition of professionalism, reinforced 
by HRM processes – including what is regarded as success and failure – 
coupled with the reflexive choice of those subjected to that definition to 
comply. 
 
Grey (1998) applied Foucault in looking at the Big Six accountancy firms, 
finding that expectations for professional conduct were set within a 
discourse of the “demanding client”, reified within the firm as 
unchallengeable fact outside the control of firm management. This set a 
normative standard for conduct which was detached from those 
perpetuating the discourse, but used by them for their own ends. Hodgson 
(2002), in a study of the professionalisation of project management, 
exposed professional status as both a disciplinary mechanism and a basis 
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for providing subjective security and material reward to project managers 
(cf. Alvesson 2001; Knights & Clarke 2013; Gill 2015). This dualism makes 
professionalism attractive as a tool for control: it is at the same time both 
the carrot and the stick. Hodgson (2005) builds on this work, 
demonstrating the effect of such discourse by virtue of the aversion of 
project managers to being seen to be “a cowboy”, negatively associated 
with those practices defined by management as unprofessional. Hence, by 
appropriating the discourse of professionalism, management exerted 
normative control through a focus on what is considered “good practice”. 
 
As can be seen, the examination of the use of a discourse of 
professionalism, or “what professionalism means here”, alongside certain 
managerial tools of HRM, has generated insights into how organisations 
engage with and seek to control professionals. That perspective may 
provide insight into how the imperatives of financialisation are reflected in 
managerial choices and the discourses they use, and inform an 
assessment of how certain management technologies, including 
accounting and HRM practices, mediate financial imperatives into firm 
discourses and used as a means of control. 
 
The foregoing review leaves open three related concepts which require 
further elaboration, control, power and identity, which are further 
considered in the literature review contained in Chapter 4. It also leaves 
open an alternative conceptualisation of professionalism as a logic and 
means of organising, discussed below. 
 
Professionalism as a logic and means of organising 
 
Professionalism has been conceptualised as a “logic” (Freidson 2001), 
where the professional occupation retains control over work “rather than 
consumers in an open market… or functionaries of a centrally planned and 
administered firm or state…” (Freidson 1994 p.32). In this 
conceptualisation, Freidson (2001) lends support to professionalism as 
having occupational value, something which should be preserved for its 
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inherent properties as the expression and application of expert knowledge 
for valuable purpose. In essence, Freidson (2001) argues there is a place 
for professionalism as a distinct means of organising work that privileges 
professional discretion in how work is discharged, in other words 
exercising “autonomy” (Heydebrand 1973; Ritzer & Walczak 1986; 
Meiksins & Watson 1989). Bailyn defines autonomy as “the freedom to 
choose problems on which to work and to pursue them independently of 
directives from anyone except the precedents of (professional) discipline” 
(Bailyn 1985, p.132). Hence autonomy involves two elements, namely, 
the choice of what to work on, and the freedom to determine how that 
work should be discharged. 
 
Crucially, the privileging of professional autonomy and discretion informs 
what is meant by “organising” and “control” in this conceptualisation of 
professionalism. Both are to be contrasted with references to control in 
the previous section, as is demonstrated in the following analyses of clan 




In ground breaking work on the organisation of professions, the autonomy 
and discretion granted to professionals was part of a system of work 
termed by Ouchi (1980) “clan control”, something which, like Freidson 
(Freidson 1994; 2001), Ouchi compared with two other systems of work, 
that of the “market” and the “bureaucracy”. In a market, relationships are 
characterised as exchanges, where people are valued according to output 
or usefulness (Ouchi 1980; Hanlon 2004). Relations are set out in express 
or implied contracts which specify obligations, but are open to 
opportunistic abuse by parties when competitive pressures are absent 
(Ouchi 1980; Hanlon 2004). In a bureaucratic organisation, a 
rational/legal basis of control is adopted, where employment relations 
legitimise relationships of superior and worker, and operate “according to 
a system of hierarchical surveillance, evaluation, and direction… [in which] 
each superior… [has] a set of standards to which he can compare 
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behaviour or output to provide control” (Ouchi 1980, p.134). Autonomy is 
therefore limited based on a lack of trust in staff (Hanlon 2004). However, 
bureaucracies are said to fail where tasks are unique, and definitive 
standards inapplicable. According to Ouchi (1980) these failures or gaps 
are, in the case of professions, filled by “clans” which assume autonomy 
will be used for the good of all (Hanlon 2004). 
 
Drawing on Durkheim’s “organic solidarity” (Durkhiem 1933, p.365), 
“clans” are contrasted with markets and bureaucracies by dint of clan 
members having a community of objectives and mutual dependence, 
called “goal congruity” (Ouchi 1980, p.136). This is brought about by 
socialisation and inclusion, such that values and beliefs are shared, and 
rewards are not based on measured performance, to the effect that group 
interests are seen to operate to serve individual interests, and 
opportunistic behaviour is excluded (Etzioni 1965; Freidson 1970; Kanter 
1972; Alvesson & Lindkvist 1993; Anderson-Gough et al. 2000; Hanlon 
2004; Turner & Makhija 2006). The result is that clans operate through 
implicit rules (traditions) which replace the codified regulation of exchange 
and employment relations (Ouchi 1980; Kirsch et al. 2010), and enable a 
high degree of autonomy, a mainstay of professionalism as a logic under 
the clan structure. 
 
By the end of the 1980s scholarly work on the organisation of PSFs began 
to move beyond the wide lens of the bureaucracy, the market, and the 
clan, and into the operational models of PSFs. Early work focused on 
identifying dominant forms and structures, referring to these as 
“archetypes” (Kaiser & Ringlstetter 2011). 
 
Structures as proxies for control and changing logics in the PSF 
 
Based in institutional theory, archetype theorists posited that PSFs tend 
toward a uniform method of organising, expressed through strategic, 
market-financial and operational controls (Greenwood & Hinings 1988; 
1993; Greenwood et al. 1990; Cooper et al. 1996). According to 
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institutional theory, institutions are “enduring rules, practices and 
structures that set conditions on action” that are “built into the social 
order, and direct the flow of social life” (Lawrence & Shadnam 2008, 
p.2288). Those who operate within the rules and structures are regarded 
as legitimate, and those who do not incur costs arising from the reduction 
of resources that are available outside the protection of legitimacy 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Hence institutions constrain action by imposing 
rules and structures that are socially recognised, and enable action by 
providing meaning and legitimacy (Lawrence & Shadnam 2008). These 
rules and structures spread as an effect of isomorphism, being in this 
context the process by which a dominant way of operating is adopted by 
all players in a field, as a means to gain legitimacy and the resources that 
accompany it (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Greenwood & Hinings 1993). 
Hence Greenwood and Hinings (1988) asserted that the adoption of the 
dominant archetype was an inevitable consequence as firms succumb to 
institutional pressure. 
 
Although arguably Mintzberg’s (1989) “professional bureaucracy” was the 
forerunner of archetypes, it lacked specification in terms of the workings 
of governance, and focused more on public sector forms of 
professionalism. The first fully developed conceptualisation of the PSF 
archetype was the “P2 form” (Greenwood et al. 1990). P2 represented the 
fusion of professionalism with the organisation structure of partnership, 
described as a structure within which professionals applied “esoteric 
knowledge…to public interest activities…organized through the medium of 
partnership…as a form of representative democracy” (Cooper et al. 1996, 
p.627). In this structure partners, as both owners and the principal 
workers within the PSF, were found to exercise a high degree of decision-
making autonomy (Brock 2006). Hence P2 firms were characterised as 
having “weak” strategic, financial and operational control over how 
professionals go about their work (Greenwood et al. 1990; Cooper et al. 
1996), and, in hindsight, those within firms adopting the P2 form appear 
to have been little affected by financialisation. 
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However, from the early 1990s, scholarly work found the operating 
models of PSFs were changing, adopting more bureaucratic and rational 
forms of governance (Bévort & Suddaby 2016), aping the board and 
hierarchical management structures of City corporations, and appearing to 
follow commercial logics in preference to professional logics (Brint 1994; 
Cooper et al. 1996; Hanlon 1994; Leicht & Fennell 1997; Faulconbridge & 
Muzio 2009; Lawrence et al. 2012). In particular, Cooper, Hinings, 
Greenwood and Brown (1996) identified a new PSF archetype, the 
managed professional business (“MPB”), and anticipated its emergence as 
the dominant archetype in place of P2. As the name implies, the MPB was 
characterised as first and foremost a managed business, evidenced by the 
adoption of stronger strategic, financial and operational controls, 
apparently exercised through hierarchical management structures, and 
assisted by a new cadre of functional management in areas such as 
finance and marketing. 
 
Arguably some of the building blocks for the influence of financialisation 
on the PSF appear here, in particular the use of a finance function, the 
effect of which is examined further in Chapter 3. In addition to a focus on 
structures, strategy and systems, Cooper and colleagues (1996) used the 
concept of the “interpretive scheme” in an attempt to link structures and 
systems with the meanings, principles and values of the partners. This 
represented the beginnings of a move beyond a structurally dominated 
view to a more holistic perspective recognising the role of values (Powell 
et al. 1999, p.3). Hanlon (2004) picked up the theme, noting the 
centrality of values to the conduct of business within the PSF. 
 
By looking at structures and systems, archetype theorists sought to 
explain this change in functional terms, referring to changes in firm 
structures and systems as proxies for professional acceptance of changed 
logics (e.g. Greenwood et al. 1990; Cooper et al. 1996; Brock et al. 
1999). Cooper and colleagues (1996) used the geological metaphor of 
sedimentation to describe the change process: new structures are layered 
on top of existing interpretive schemes, resulting in partial incoherence as 
the attitudes and interpretive schemes of partners lag behind the change.
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As a result, vestiges of the old archetype, and associated interpretive 
scheme, become apparent which “points to the persistence of values, 
ideas and practices, even when the formal structures and processes seem 
to change, and even when there may be incoherence” (Cooper et al. 1996, 
p.625). Hanlon (2004) described the change as the product of three 
features: 
 
The changes in organizational form have a dialectical relationship with 
changes in the marketplace and changes in interpretive scheme. All 
three areas are important to the structuring of these institutional 
spaces. (Hanlon 2004, p.205) 
 
These analyses of change are interesting as they envisage the emergence 
of tensions between new forms of governance and existing partner values, 
something which merits further consideration in the context of the 
research aim and is returned to in the review in Chapter 4. 
 
After the turn of the century, scholars began to criticise the work of 
archetype theorists as being overly attentive to the macro and institutional 
level to the exclusion of individual firms (Bévort & Suddaby 2016), or 
being dominated by organisational forms, and thereby forgetting the 
individual (Faulconbridge & Muzio 2007). Although the concept of the 
interpretive scheme represents an attempt to introduce values and beliefs, 
its operationalisation in archetype theory largely looked to structures and 
systems as proxies for belief systems (Powell et al. 1999; Faulconbridge & 
Muzio 2007). As such it is largely a functional analysis based on flawed 
unitarist assumptions (Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd 2003). Indeed, in examining 
the UK legal profession Ackroyd and Muzio (2007) argued that the claim 
that the MPB was dominant in UK law firms was overstated, finding “little 
evidence…for the emergence of a managerial cadre” (Ackroyd & Muzio 
2007, p.731), and citing evidence of a reduction in administration posts. 
They argued that collegiality and autonomy, core principles of professional 
logics (Thornton et al. 2012), remained part of the fabric of UK law firms, 
drawing a distinction between accountancy and law. This view was 
consistent with the findings of Pinnington & Morris (2002) in relation to UK 
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architects, and Kaiser & Kampe (2007) in relation to German corporate 
law firms. 
 
So what does archetype theory offer the study? The systems and 
structures identified as the building blocks of archetypes are helpful in 
framing the consideration of PSF governance, change in which may be 
relevant in considering the effects of financialisation. However, exclusively 
focusing on them reflects a tendency of scholars from Mintzberg (1989) 
onwards to conflate organisational forms with the adoption of commercial 
and market logics. Rather, there are “problems with the idea that 
managerial procedures can be added to professionalism without the one 
challenging the raison d'être of the other” (Ackroyd & Muzio 2007, p.744). 
The lesson here is that, whereas it is right to look for the effects of change 
in firm strategy and processes, it would be wrong to assume that such 
logics have simply been accepted by senior professionals by dint of that 
finding. As suggested by Bevort and Suddaby (2016), while key 
influencing factors in prompting archetype change occur at the macro 
level, the means and mechanisms play out, and are best understood, at 
the micro level; hence studies should pay more attention to the 
experience of individual professionals. We must ask: How have they 
experienced the change? Have they accepted financial logics, and if so, 
why? Is any tension or contradiction revealed? Such questions are 




This chapter has reviewed literature on the professions and their 
evolution, with a focus on the “turn” to professionalism, the various 
conceptualisations of that term, and the logics with which it is associated. 
Four key concepts that are taken forward in the study relate to 
professionalism. Firstly, “traditional professionalism”, used here as a 
combination of two aspects of the sociology of the professions: the idea 
that professionals apply esoteric knowledge for the public good (Carr-
Saunders & Wilson 1933; Abbott 1988); and that they demand and 
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deserve a high degree of trust and autonomy (Bailyn 1985; Freidson 
2001; Hanlon 1998; Evetts 2013). Conceptually, this fusion is represented 
in the concepts of “professional logics” (Freidson 2001) and “values” 
(Evetts 2013; Hanlon 2007), and form a point of comparison when 
considering the effects of change. 
 
Secondly, and standing as a counterpoint to traditional professionalism, 
the concepts of commercialised professionalism (Hanlon 1994; 1997; 
1999; 2004) and organisational professionalism (Faulconbridge & Muzio 
2008; Evetts 2013) are carried forward. These are taken to constitute the 
“state of the art” in terms of scholarly work on the organisation of 
professionals within the PSF. 
 
Thirdly, and providing a different angle or lens, professionalism as a 
component of identity (Ibarra 1999; Brown & Lewis 2011) and subjectivity 
(Foucault 1982) is used, as is the influence on each of organisational 
processes of socialisation. Here the effects of financialisation can be 
examined in the context of how that affects such processes of socialisation 
and what subjectivity may result. This allows the problematisation of the 
focus of existing literatures on the role of professionals solely as producers 
of chargeable hours (Karreman & Alvesson 2004; Brown & Lewis 2011; 
Alvehus & Spicer 2012). 
 
Fourthly, and related to but informing the third component, is a 
Foucauldian view of professionalism as a means of control (Covaleski et al. 
1998; Grey 1998). This opens up a view of accounting and HRM 
technologies as control mechanisms, and central to the operationalisation 
of financialisation within the PSF. 
 
Key questions are left unanswered by the foregoing review. First: what is 
financialisation? Chapter 3 looks at the literature on financialisation, 
defining and operationalising it as an explanatory tool in the consideration 
of the effects of finance and metrics on the PSF. Second: what is identity 
and subjectivity, and how do power and control affect them? Chapter 4 
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looks at these and considers how they inform our view of the experience 
of partners in the financialised PSF. 
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Chapter 2 explored literature dealing with change in the professions, and a 
shift in PSFs from structures reflecting the logics of professionalism, giving 
primacy to autonomy and expertise, to hierarchical management 
structures reflecting the logics of commerce and finance. Building on the 
foundations laid by Chapter 2, this chapter reviews literature which 
theorises and explains the concept of “financialisation”, following recent 
work which adopts financialisation as an explanatory tool through which to 
explain change in the PSF (Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009; Alvehus & Spicer 
2012). It begins by exploring how financialisation has been conceptualised 
from a number of theoretical perspectives, and explains why the adoption 
of a cultural-economy perspective is both consistent with the philosophical 
underpinnings of this thesis as set out in Chapter 5, and assists the thesis 
in addressing the research aim. From that base consideration is given to 
how the application of certain critical accounting literatures may cast light 
on how metrics are influential in the formation of firm strategy, and the 
means by which accounting acts as the agent of financialisation in the 
transformation of the PSF. In so doing this chapter addresses the question 
posed at the beginning of Chapter 2, “what is financialisation?”, and 
extracts theoretical frameworks to be adopted to explain how 
financialisation manifests in the case study firm’s choice of strategy, and 
in its internal operations, each essential to meeting the research aim. 
 
Definitions and approaches to financialisation 
 
Since the late 1990s, “financialisation” has been used by scholars in a 
variety of disciplines including sociology, economics, geography, political 
science and anthropology (Zwan 2014). It is rooted in “finance”, but seen 
in this context as more than the simple provision of capital; rather, 
financialisation is something that has changed logics and the workings of 
society (Zwan 2014). Some take this to the logical extreme of its possible 
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application, suggesting “financial intermediaries, metrics, and practices 
are ever more ingrained in the economic geographies of our personal, 
working, and public lives…” (Pike & Pollard 2010, pp.30–31), resulting in 
the financialisation of everyday life (Martin 2002). 
 
Taking a general overview, Pike & Pollard (2010) present financialisation 
as a “neologism that has stimulated a diverse and rapidly expanding 
literature marked by different theoretical and disciplinary traditions, points 
of departure and foci” (2010, p.31). Krippner (2005) is more specific, 
noting its use in relation to four aspects of the economy. These are, first, 
the shareholder value focus, being the reorienting of firm success as 
represented in terms of a financial metric, the return to shareholders. 
Second, the ascendancy of capital markets over bank financing, 
representing capital raising through the stock markets in preference to 
bank loans. Third, the growth of the rentier class, being those who derive 
returns purely from “renting” assets such as property, rather than through 
production. Fourth, the rise of the financial instrument, being the 
commoditisation of loans and options as tradable instruments, creating a 
secondary finance market. She concludes by suggesting her own definition 
of the term: that of profit through finance rather than production, a 
modification of the rentier class, where money is the asset. 
 
Krippner’s economic view, and the four part schematic of financialisation, 
can be seen as the consequence of neoliberalism in the UK and US, albeit 
recognising influences of a more international nature (such as the Mont 
Pelerin Society). Writers such as Mirowski (2013), Harvey (2005) and Peck 
(2004; 2010) promote a view of neoliberalism as the political economic 
project of an elite “thought collective” (Reed 2014) including academia, 
general think tanks (e.g. the Institute for Economic Affairs), specialised 
think tanks and global think tanks (e.g. the Atlas Economic Research 
Foundation), as well as international media organisations (e.g. News 
Corporation) (Reed 2014; Mirowski & Plehwe 2009). Harvey (2005) sets 
out a theoretical “ideal type” of the neoliberal state: it favours “strong 
individual private property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of 
freely functioning markets and free trade[,]…the sanctity of contracts and 
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the individual right to freedom of action, expression, and choice…” such 
that “free markets and free trade is regarded as a fundamental 
good…[under which] [c]ontinuous increases in productivity should then 
deliver higher living standards to everyone” (Harvey 2005, p.64). The 
focus on the protection of property rights, freedom of action, and free 
markets is seen as the foundations for the financial orientations described 
by Krippner (Lapavitsas 2009). 
 
Responding to Krippner (2005), Epstein offers an inclusive definition: 
 
[F]inancialization means the increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies.” (Epstein 
2005, p.3). 
 
This inclusive approach is adopted by those whose work is consonant with 
the view of financialisation as a consequence of neoliberalism. For 
example, Dore (2008) sees financialisation as a process characterised by 
the “increasing dominance of the finance industry in the sum total of 
economic activity” (Dore 2002, p.116, cited in Christopherson et al. 
2013). Dore’s (2008) summary is similar to Krippner’s categories, he 
adding attempts by government to “promote an ‘equity culture’…[to] 
enhance the ability of its own nationals to compete internationally” (2008, 
p.1098). Crotty (2005) presents evidence of Krippner’s “profit through 
finance”, asserting that the change in balance from production to finance 
has suppressed economic growth. Dickens (2005) agrees with Crotty’s 
analysis, but seeks to draw attention to the financial elites who have come 
into being as a result of the process of financialisation, a conclusion 
consistent with the link between neoliberalism and financial elites drawn 
by Mirowski (2013), Harvey (2005) and Peck (2010). 
 
On the other hand, Zwan (2014) challenges Krippner’s (2005) view of 
financialisation as a logic driven by the rentier class as “overly 
deterministic, assuming both intent and efficacy on the part of the 
capitalist class”, resulting in the role of government and other actors being 
 32 
ignored, such that “[f]inancialization is rendered abstract, anonymous and 
teleological: ‘finance’ becomes the driving force behind its own expansion” 
(Zwan 2014, p.106). Taking account of such a critique is the view that 
financialisation is best described as an unintended consequence of a series 
of other decisions designed to increase the flow of capital in a capital 
constrained environment, with particular reference to the US structural 
crisis of the 1970s (Krippner 2011; Zwan 2014; Stein 2010). 
 
What can be surmised from the debate between these scholars is that 
financialisation is a somewhat “fuzzy” concept which is used both in the 
general and the specific, both as a consequence of the actions of a series 
of human and institutional actors, and a driver of those actions. On the 
one hand arguments are made to suggest financialisation is a pre-planned 
outcome of a self-serving neoliberal financial elite, while on the other the 
argument suggests that such elite are the product of decisions designed to 
achieve other outcomes. In addition financialisation is either a very 
general concept describing all instances of the role and effect of finance 
and metrics on our lives, or a series of more specific propositions, 
although it would be reasonable to view the latter as simply a series of 
examples of the former. 
 
One way to advance our understanding for the purpose of this thesis is to 
characterise and make sense of these various definitions within the 
historical specificities of financialisation, argued to be essential to 
understanding how management practices are shaped by its influence 
(Delbridge & Keenoy 2010). Erturk, Froud, Johal, Leaver and Williams 
(Erturk et al. 2008) provide a useful chronological breakdown of work of 
financialisation across four periods and “problematics”, namely: liberal 
collectivist theory (1920-1939), agency theory (1980-1999), political 
economy (1990 onwards), and cultural economy (2000 onwards). The 




Liberal collectivist theory 
 
Financialisation, under a liberal collectivist approach, is seen as having 
originally arisen in the early part of the 20th century, a negative outcome 
of an unregulated market exploited by the speculative rentier class 
seeking returns on money rather than production, which ultimately 
resulted in the stock market crash of 1929 and the great depression 
(Dumenil & Levy 2005; Harvey 2005). Those events also marked the 
beginning of an enforced hibernation spanning almost four decades during 
which regulation of the market was part of a conventional wisdom under 
Keynesian social welfare economics. The liberal collectivist theory 
becomes more current when one takes its insights beyond that period of 
hibernation and into much later in the 20th century. It was not until the 
late 1970s when, after the 1973 oil shock, the fall of the Bretton Woods 
exchange system and the resulting economic stagnation and structural 
crises in the UK and US (Gómez-Loscos et al. 2012; Zwan 2014), 
Keynesian economics and associated market regulation was widely 
considered to be failing in the US and UK. That opened up a void that 
allowed financialisation to reappear, alongside the rise of neoliberalism, in 
the UK and US (Harvey 2005; Peck 2010). 
 
Neoliberalism here is regarded as a combination of an ideological objection 
to social welfarism and socialism, a belief in the “market society” as the 
“good society”, and a requirement for a strong state to procure and 
protect its marketising and financialising effects (Reed 2014, p.14). 
Hence, in this construction, the application of a neoliberal ideology led to 
re-regulation favouring market freedom (Beaverstock & Smith 1996) such 
that the “[f]inancial markets experienced a powerful wave of innovation 
and deregulation internationally” (Harvey 2005, p.90), in many ways a 
return to the de-regulated conditions which are the subject of liberal 
collectivist theory. Whereas the liberal collectivist approach is helpful in 
locating financialisation in the past, and linking to the present, it is very 
much located at a macro level, or what one might term capital “F” 
financialisation, rather than small “f” financialisation, which plays out at a 
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micro level. The latter is where the study is located: looking at the effects 




Agency theory, promoted by Fama and Jensen, focuses around the over-
simplified problematic of the relationship between managers of 
corporations (and their interests), and shareholders (and their interests), 
based in the assumption that managers were primarily interested in 
personal aggrandisement and job security, sometimes at the expense of 
shareholder returns, while shareholders were solely interested in those 
returns (e.g. Fama & Jensen 1983; Eisenhardt 1989; cf. Erturk et al. 
2008; Zwan 2014). Approaches to financialisation that emphasise the 
shareholder value focus, such as parts of Krippner (2005) and the work of 
Froud and colleagues (2000; 2006) arguably have part of their origins in 
agency theory, albeit such focus can also been seen through other lenses 
which may be more fruitful for the study. 
 
Although agency theory is helpful in moving the analysis away from the 
macro level and into the firm, in examining the role of managers and their 
motivations, it tends to assume a dichotomy between managers and 
shareholders that ignores the more nuanced position of managers and 
partners in the PSF. In particular, whereas partners in the PSF are in some 
senses notional equivalents of shareholders, they are also quite distinct 
from them. Partners are not detached investors driving management to 
deliver a return at the expense of other interested parties such as the 
workers; they are the principal workers within the PSF, a means by which 
financial results are produced, as well as beneficiaries of those results. 
Likewise, senior management in the PSF are often also partners, and 
hence have a field of vision that covers the concerns of partners and 
management. Whereas agency is still applicable in the sense that PSF 
partners appoint managers, both from the ranks of the partners, and from 





Those following a political economy perspective, often aligned with 
regulation theorists (cf. Boyer 2000; Engelen 2008), view the economy as 
an independently existing “machine”, with outputs resulting from the 
balance of inputs, and the factors of supply and demand, as manipulated 
by regulation of the market (Erturk et al. 2008). Scholars working within 
this perspective seek to identify the roles played by groups of social 
actors, to describe the economic and regulatory relations between them, 
and to reach broad conclusions about the operation of the economy as a 
result, reflected in titles such as “Fordism”. They seek “generalizable 
relations… which would structurally distinguish a financialized economy 
from (earlier) forms of capitalism” (Froud et al. 2006, p.65). This view 
tends towards an all-encompassing view of financialisation as part of a 
post-Fordist discourse, using neoliberalism, globalisation and 
financialisation as descriptors of the prevailing political economic paradigm 
after the structural crisis of the 1970s (Erturk et al. 2008). Scholars in this 
tradition see financialisation as an emerging new form of capitalism or 
“accumulation regime” under which capital flows into states that allow 
capital mobility, and maximised returns through mechanisms such as 
labour market flexibility and shareholder power over management (Boyer 
2000). 
 
From this perspective, neoliberal policies, including the creation of high 
levels of unemployment, and the imposition of the shareholder value 
imperative on management, are seen as moves designed by the financial 
class to improve returns to themselves rather than benefit society by 
facilitating productive growth (Dumenil & Levy 2005). In other words, 
neoliberalism is the result of financial interests, rather than the rise of 
finance being an expression of the operation of the market ideals of 
neoliberalism. Hence “finance” acts as a sponsor of neoliberal ideology 
(and its pretensions towards improvement for all) as a means to deliver a 
market that benefits financial interests. In the context of this thesis, the 
political economy perspective, like the liberal collectivist approach, once 
again seeks to situate financialisation at the macro level, seeking to 
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characterise the phenomena in the general rather than the specific. This 




The political economy perspective can be contrasted with the cultural 
economy perspective which: 
 
…takes a more social constructivist line about how the economy is 
formatted by discourses: the economy is then a performance which 
combines stories and enactment through saying and doing so that the 
world can become more like our theories. (Erturk et al. 2008, p.34) 
 
This is a radical departure from the positivist inspired basis of traditional 
political economic views. Taking this perspective Du Gay and Pryke 
expand discourse to go beyond “beliefs, values and symbols” to a “form of 
representational and technological…practice that constitutes the spaces 
within which economic action is formatted and framed” (2002, p.2). 
Hence, according to them, financialisation takes shape through finance 
and management discourses within sections of society, as located in social 
and material practices. In other words discourse informs social practice, 
which practice then reflects and adds to the discourse, which in turn leads 
to material practices that “prove” the theory (MacKenzie & Millo 2003; 
MacKenzie 2006). 
 
Under the cultural economy umbrella sociocultural accounts of 
financialisation look at how, in a process which is not always smooth and 
uncontested (Coppock 2013), neoliberalisation (Hall 2012) and the 
consequent discourses of financialisation call forth and shape individuals 
as financial beings, reconstructing them with a subjectivity as self-
disciplined investor subjects (Blackburn 2003; Langley 2006; 2007; 2008; 
Pike & Pollard 2010; Coppock 2013; Hall & Appleyard 2009; Hall 2012). 
They are investors in the self, or “two-legged cost and profit centre[s]” 
(Blackburn 2003, p.39; in Allen & Pryke 2013). Such a view is consistent 
 37 
with the focus of this thesis, which seeks to investigate how 
financialisation affects the choices made by actors within the PSF, and 
what subjectivities are offered and taken up in the process. 
 
In sum, whereas the perspectives of theorists working within a liberal-
collectivist or political economy perspective are interesting in locating 
financialisation at a macro level, this thesis seeks to give an in-depth 
consideration to the effects of financialisation at the micro level, taking a 
single PSF as the case study. It seeks to explore how financialisation, 
taken to be the reorienting of PSF success as seen in terms of metrics, is 
reflected in managerial choices and practices, and how that impacts on the 
working experience of partners within the firm. The focus of the study is 
therefore a variation of Krippner’s first category of financialisation 
(Krippner 2005), and Zwan’s second (Zwan 2014), that of the pursuit of 
the financial metric of shareholder value as a measure of firm success, 
albeit seen within the unique context of the PSF; a structure which treats 
partners as both workers and owners (hence quasi-shareholders) 
(Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009). 
 
The cultural economy view is interesting as it releases us from the 
shackles of an instrumentalist, cause and effect, view of the process of 
financialisation as the result of neoliberal inspired re-regulation of the 
market. It reflects a view that “new forms of influence on the conduct of 
firms… are important because… changes are not simply about numerical 
quantities and relations but also involve mobilizing narratives and 
performative enactment” (Erturk et al. 2008, p.37). It allows us to looks 
inside the organisation as a “subnational space within which the 
generalized pressures of financialized capitalism are most readily 
expressed” (French et al. 2011, p.808). In so doing the cultural economy 
view allows a messier, more fragmented view where, within the 
organisation, discourses of finance and management compete with other 
prevailing logics, including professionalism, so as to provide a range of 
possible subject positions for organisations and professionals, all with 
uncertain consequences (Gleadle & Cornelius 2008). It enables us to 
recognise how discourses of financialisation may clash with, inculcate, and 
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hybridise discourses of professionalism, having performative effects 
(Froud et al. 2006). 
 
Within that frame of reference it becomes possible to see how, at the level 
of the organisation, sometimes consistent and sometimes contrary, 
financial and managerial discourses affect views of organisational purpose 
and goals, and legitimise new managerial applications and tools and 
practices, and the subjectivities they create. This has resonance with the 
Foucauldian view of the role of discourse and subjectivities, while allowing 
for the effects of power (Engelen 2008), all factors that inform an analysis 
of the data. It also provides a medium to investigate management control 
under financialisation within a case study context, including hearing the 
voices of those affected, as called for by Erturk and colleagues (Erturk et 
al. 2007), Gleadle and Cornelius (2008) and Cushen (2013). 
 
The next section applies a cultural economy perspective within the field of 
critical accounting, a field considered to have explanatory potential for this 
thesis. 
 
The contribution of critical accounting 
 
The role of accounting is central to financialisation, being a means by 
which financial metrics are brought into being. Consistent with the cultural 
economy perspective, and the philosophical orientations underpinning this 
thesis as set out in Chapter 5, critical accounting challenges the positivist 
and post-positivist view of accounting as a value neutral activity that 
records facts reflecting a reality that is already out there in the world. 
Rather, critical accounting studies, led by Hopwood (1976), encouraged a 
view of accounting as “simultaneously social and technical” (Chapman et 
al. 2009, p.2), having an effect on the world by bringing into being certain 
states, enabling certain views, causing or being implicated in conflict, and 
facilitating or informing power relations (Annisette et al. 2016; Miller 
1994; Chapman et al. 2009). 
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Accounting gained increased currency in the field of organisation by virtue 
of use of accounting tools being associated with “good management” 
(Meyer & Rowan 1977). It is used as a means of seeking legitimacy or 
power (Gerdin et al. 2014). Critical accounting scholars have shown how 
accounting practices are linked to methods of organising, where 
accounting serves as a mechanism for organisational control, and has 
performative effects (e.g. Miller & O’Leary 1987; 2007; Ahrens & 
Chapman 2006; Frow et al. 2010; Briers & Chua 2001). Accounting plays 
a role in the process of organisational rationalising (Weber 2002; Meyer 
1986; Oakes et al. 1998), referencing and mediating market rationalities 
into everyday organising, using the lingua franca of accounting (Chua 
1995; Arnold & Oakes 1998; Chapman et al. 2009) and accounting 
measurements with an apparent if not real objectivity, to make both 
individuals and organisations as economic actors and entities (Miller 1994; 
Townley et al. 2003; Miller & Power 2013). At this nexus critical 
accounting and governmentality (Foucault 1991) meet as actors 
consciously discipline themselves to act in accordance with the callings of 
accounting, rendering themselves as economised beings (Rose 1988; 
1999; Miller 1992; Miller & Power 2013). As Chapman, Cooper and Miller 
sum up: 
 
If the single financial figure is a potent tool for intervening – in so far 
as it appears to confer objectivity and neutrality – then its 
deployment is always in relation to a particular object and objective, 
whether that be improving efficiency, reducing waste or transforming 
individuals into calculating selves. (Chapman et al. 2009, p.14)  
 
As such, critical accounting brings to the fore the performative aspects of 
financialisation (Pike & Pollard 2010). Such aspects enable us to see how 
“financialization is reconfiguring people’s positions… [and how] 
[i]ndividuals are being drawn into and having their sociospatial relations 
and identities reworked and realigned… open[ing] up to closer scrutiny the 
divided, complex, and often ambiguous situations that result” (Pike & 
Pollard 2010, p.37). However, that notwithstanding, financialisation and 
accounting have only gained scant coverage outside of the accounting 
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field, and, putting a small number of empirical studies aside, there is a 
lack of in-depth studies that address financialisation and accounting in the 
wider management and organisation literature (Gerdin et al. 2014), 
something which this thesis seeks to address. 
 
Moving from the general to the particular, and focusing in on studies that 
are central to this thesis, the work of Froud, Johal, Halsam, Williams and 
Feng (Froud et al. 2000; Feng et al. 2001; Froud et al. 2006) is of 
particular interest. Initially they studied the prevalence of financial 
calculations recast the role of large businesses as deliverers of shareholder 
value (Froud et al. 2000; Feng et al. 2001). This was linked to the 
introduction of “metrics”, or financial measures of performance, such as 
Economic Value Added, Total Shareholder Return, Cash Flow Return on 
Investment and Return on Capital Employed, as determinants of the 
strategy and success of the firm. The medium for this is said to have been 
consultants such as Stern Stewart and Boston Consulting Group, each 
selling their own set of measures and strategies for success, following on 
from business orientated “quasi-academic” books published by consultants 
such as Creating Shareholder Value (Rappaport 1986) and The Quest for 
Value (Stewart 1991). The result is a discourse of strategy linked to 
shareholder value, judged in accordance with given metrics, and adopted 
by management seeking to demonstrate performance to fund managers 
(Williams 2000). This reflects the view that shareholder value can be seen 
as “a theory of corporate performance, one that prioritizes the shareholder 
over other constituents of the firm” (Zwan 2014, p.107). 
 
Measures used are said to be powerful due to their commensurability 
between competitor stocks resulting in a “new kind of competition” (Froud 
et al. 2000, p.104). Within the firm the focus on a chosen metric results in 
a narrower focus on the component parts which make up the metric, with 
strategy becoming “the corollary actions which improve the ratio by acting 
on numerator and denominator” (Froud et al. 2000, p.85). In other words 
the metric becomes a driver of operational strategies rather than an 
outcome of them, thereby rendering metrics performative. By virtue of 
that, and its manifestation in social and material practices, the rhetoric 
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becomes reality. As Erturk and colleagues point out (Erturk et al. 2008), 
this places financialisation into wider debates on performativity (cf. Callon 
1998; MacKenzie & Millo 2003; Muniesa 2014) and commensurability (cf. 
Boltanski & Thévenot 2006; Jagd 2011; Lamont 2012).  
 
Whereas this work by Froud and colleagues (Froud et al. 2000; Feng et al. 
2001) is interesting, its empirical scope is limited to stock market listed 
companies. As explained above, the structure of the PSF is different, with 
the partners both workers and owners. But that does not mean PSFs do 
not engage in strategy-making. On the one hand, the work of Froud and 
colleagues might suggest the PSF would pursue value creation like any 
stock market company. On the other hand, professional logics would 
suggest that, while monetary returns are important, they are not a 
strategic drive as such. Faulconbridge and Muzio (2009) considered the 
financialisation of large and global corporate law firms. They argue that 
significant increases in profitability in large and global corporate law firms 
between 1993 and 2008 were "as a result of a process of financialization 
that has re-engineered law firms to make them appear ever more 
profitable and successful" (Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009, p.642). This 
stands in contrast to professional logics which privilege the provision of 
expert knowledge as a means of delivering a public service. 
 
Faulconbridge and Muzio (2009) argue that the profit per equity partner 
(PEP) metric can be seen as a proxy indicator of shareholder value, with 
law firms having become “enchanted by management logics similar to 
those promoted by shareholder value discourses" (Faulconbridge & Muzio 
2009, p.642). The analogy here is that the equity (profit-sharing) partners 
in the PSF are the “shareholders”, and that practices have been introduced 
designed to maximise value to them. Faulconbridge and Muzio (2009) 
point to discussion of financial metrics within the legal media, and ranking 
firms according to such metrics, as reflecting the influence of 
financialisation. Visibility of law firm performance, including comparisons 
with PEP levels in large US law firms, coupled with re-regulation following 
the introduction of The Legal Services Act 2007, are said to have 
legitimised management initiatives to increase PEP in large English law 
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firms, with those firms openly citing the pursuit of profitability and PEP as 
key targets. In other words large English law firms are both engaging with 
the discourses of financialisation, and introducing practices designed to 
maximise PEP as a means of inter-firm competition. Those practices 
amount to a restructuring, including reducing the number of equity 
partners as a ratio to fee earners such that the profits are split between a 
smaller number resulting in higher PEP (Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009). 
 
However, in the field of law in the US and UK, firms are not only ranked 
according to PEP. In the US they are ranked according to revenue, profit 
and number of lawyers by The American Lawyer, known as the Amlaw 100 
rankings (The American Lawyer 2016), and in the UK by The Lawyer and 
Legal Business. Galanter and Henderson (2008), commenting on large US 
law firms, suggest rankings have supplanted more traditional means of 
determining law firm success based on reputation: 
 
The search for honor has shifted from the accumulation of 
incommensurable professional accomplishments to the currency of 
ranking in metrics of size, profit, and income that signify importance, 
success, and power and are, at most, indirectly correlated with 
achievements measured by avowed professional values. (Galanter & 
Henderson 2008, p.1882) 
 
This interaction of financial metrics such as revenue and PEP, with 
published rankings is a key development. What is interesting is that, as 
absolute numbers, revenue and PEP, or indeed size by reference to 
number of lawyers, do not appear to be the main driver. Rather, both 
Faulconbridge and Muzio (2009) and Galanter and Henderson (2008) 
appear to suggest each is experienced as important when rendered 
commensurable by the rankings that compare the firms against one 
another by reference to a league table. The placing on a table gives rise to 
a numbered ranking and thereby is, in a sense, a metric. Hence, perhaps 
counter-intuitively, it is possible to conceptualise financialisation as going 
beyond purely financial metrics to metrics more generally; in other words 
it is the act of rendering something commensurable with reference to 
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some sort of measure, financial or otherwise, that can be regarded as an 
effect of financialisation. 
 
Taking this further, in the UK firms are also ranked by Chambers and 
Legal 500, claiming to be “researching the world’s best lawyers” 
(Chambers 2016a) and “the clients’ guide to the best law firms” (Legal 
500 2016b). Whereas not wholly defined, references here to “best” appear 
as a proxy for reputation and by extension quality. The rankings place 
firms and lawyers in “tiers” or “bandings” on a national and regional basis. 
The interaction of rankings of financial metrics and those rankings based 
on size (number of lawyers), as well as these quasi-metricised quality 
rankings produced by Chambers and Legal 500, and their effect on law 
firm strategy and tactics has not been explored. However, analogous to 
these quality rankings, Sauder (2008) analysed the effects of the 
publication of rankings on US law schools. These rankings were based on a 
qualitative assessment of quality, selectivity, placement success and 
resources, each metricised by a score that leads to an overall score. 
Sauder (2008) found that, over time, the ease of comparison offered by 
rankings, together with the apparent objectivity of a number score, led to 
their growing importance in the minds of law school deans and external 
actors. Performative effects resulted including influencing operational 
decisions, leading to changes in revenue allocations, awards of funding, 
and student choices. Ultimately this led to law school administrators 
taking actions (such as improving staff-student ratios) in order to climb 
the rankings. 
 
Sauder and Espeland (2009) examined the same subject matter through 
the Foucauldian lens of discipline, in particular the technologies of 
surveillance and normalisation (Foucault 1977). According to Sauder and 
Espeland (2009) rankings make visible school reputations, with their 
annual nature and instantaneous internet availability promoting a form of 
continuous surveillance. Through comparative metrics, law schools are 
rendered the subject and object of knowledge, and differentiations and 
hierarchies established. As a result, law school actors “struggle to 
reconcile their sense of themselves as professional educators with an 
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imposed market-based logic of accountability” (Sauder & Espeland 2009, 
p.66). Over time rankings were found to have became naturalised as an 
indicator of relative success, and the cumulative effect was the 
legitimation of the ranking agency, and its incorporation in the field 
(Sauder 2008). 
 
Hence, by expanding financialisation to include these various forms of 
ranking, each resulting in a metric or quasi-metric, opens up the research 
to include an investigation of not only financial metrics, but metrics and 
rankings more generally, on strategic and other choices of the PSF. This is 
relevant to the debates referred to in Chapter 2 as it informs our 
understanding of how metrics affect the choices made by PSFs in terms of 
their governance structures, and whether and to what extent 
professionalism as a logic and means of organising (Freidson 2001), and 
the concomitant virtues of autonomy, expertise and public service, 
continue to apply within the contemporary PSF, or whether they have 
been supplanted by financial and metricised imperatives. 
 
Strategy and Financialisation 
 
Building on the view of financialisation as the pursuit of shareholder value, 
or the PSF equivalent in the form of PEP, the previous section left 
unanswered questions regarding the interface of strategy and 
financialisation within the firm. This section briefly reviews strategy, and, 
still within the sphere of critical accounting, connects that back to 
financialisation. 
 
The word “strategy” derived from the Greek word strategos, and referred 
to generalship, or the plan of action formed by the general in order to 
fight a battle. Individual component parts of that plan, or steps towards 
achievement of the strategy, are often called “tactics”. Carried over into 
organisational strategy, early academic conceptualisations focused on the 
idea of strategy as a plan, or set of rational steps, which sought to 
understand and ultimately control outcomes in a changing market (e.g. 
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Chandler 1962; Ansoff 1965). This view found favour in business schools 
leading to highly influential scholarly work such as Porter’s 5 forces model 
(Porter 1979). However, even as that orthodoxy  spread, others 
challenged it, suggesting rationality may be overstated (Knights & Morgan 
1991). Mintzberg, in observing corporate leaders, noted the seemingly 
disorganised and reactionary nature of managerial work and the decision-
making process (Mintzberg 1973; 1975). Strategy for Mintzberg (1993; 
1994) was better seen as emergent, the collision of rational strategising, 
or the absence of the same, with internal and external events. For 
Pettigrew (1985b; 1985a; 1990) it is as a process emerging from the 
socially constructed and political nature of organisational strategising, 
taking account of the internal thinking of those within the organsation, 
and what is happening outside it (Knights & Morgan 1991). 
 
Taking a Foucauldian perspective, Knights and Morgan see strategy as “an 
emergent set of practices which has distinctive power effects on 
organizations and subjectivity” (Knights & Morgan 1991, p.251). Situated 
in a wider discourse of corporate strategy, it has a constitutive effect: it 
defines problems, and carries an assumption that strategy is the means of 
resolution; it defines individuals as strategists; it legitimises actions and 
thereby power effects; and it “provides managers with a rationalization of 
their successes and failures” (Knights & Morgan 1991, p.262). The Knights 
and Morgan (1991) view of strategy is consistent with the cultural-
economy view of financialisation, and the philosophical underpinnings of 
this thesis set out in Chapter 5. 
 
Froud and colleagues (2006), drawing on the work of Gabriel (2000) and 
Boje (2001) on narrative as part of organisational life, add a further 
dimension to the cultural economy view of the financialisation of the firm 
by bringing together corporate strategising and financialisation. Here 
narrative, which is inherently discursive in nature (Zwan 2014), is 
regarded as constitutive of the reality experienced by those subjected to 
it, and acts as an ordering and constructive device with the potential to 
draw together elements within and outside organisations into a coherent 
story. Financialisation is evidenced by senior management promoting a 
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“narrative of strategic purpose”, which is ex post proven to be successful 
by the achievement of metricised success (Froud et al. 2006). Initiatives 
that follow are regarded as a performative enactment of the narrative 
(Erturk et al. 2008). This reflects Knights & Morgan’s (1991) assertion 
regarding the definition of success and failure (hitting or missing metrics), 
and their view, expressed before financialisation was described as such, 
that accountants, through links with institutions and the state, have 
become key influencers in strategy making. 
 
According to Froud and colleagues (2006), when metrics are adopted to 
measure aspects of the organisation’s activities, the surrounding 
environment, or to determine organisational progress or success, they 
have the potential to become performative. In other words the act of 
measurement leads to actions which bring about the outcomes measured, 
such that the measure drives or brings into being that which is measured 
(Muniesa 2014). Moreover, when organisational actors behave so as to 
enact such measures, and describe the organisation in terms of the 
measures, the measures play a constitutive role: the organisation 
becomes that which is measured (Erturk et al. 2008; Du Gay & Pryke 
2002). 
 
The linking of strategy to “narrative and numbers” (Froud et al. 2006, 
p.102) offers great explanatory potential to inform the research aim. If 
the work of Froud and colleagues applies to the PSF, such that PSFs adopt 
a narrative of strategic purpose, and use metrics to “prove” success and 
failure, then that would go towards demonstrating how the PSF has 
become financialised. To that end the first research question is 
established: Has PSF strategy been financialised? More specifically, and 
following Froud and colleagues (2006): do PSFs adopt “narrative and 
numbers” and if so, are there performative effects? 
 
Whereas the foregoing addresses financialisation at the level of strategy 
making, it leaves open questions as to how high level strategy reflects the 
logics of financialisation, and how such logics are turned into operational 
interventions within the firm.  
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Accounting as the agent of financialisation 
 
Whereas the last section explored financialisation at the level of strategy 
making, there remain questions as regards the basis on which individual 
metrics are chosen, what such choice reflects, and to what effect. These 
questions require to be explored in detail in order to lend substance to and 
expand upon the theories and findings of Froud and colleagues (2006), 
and Faulconbridge and Muzio (2009). Consistent with the cultural 
economy perspective, and the constructionist philosophy that underpins 
this thesis, Miller and Power use Foucault’s idea of the dispositif (complex) 
to suggest the existence of the “accounting complex” as a relational 
network of “ideas, laws, bureaucratic instruments, spreadsheets, reports, 
standards… registers… accountants and other human agents” (Miller & 
Power 2013, pp.588–589). For example, this complex is said to connect 
ideas of fair value accounting with capital markets and organisations to 
bring about “the prioritization of financial economics as a way of knowing 
the firm and its position in markets” (Miller & Power 2013, p.592). 
Accounting is seen to carry financial logics into the firm, giving the means 
for their application within it, and enabling a representation of reality such 
that metrics become “facts” that inform how those within the firm analyse 
themselves and take action. 
 
Miller and Power (2013) use “economizing” as a means to describe how 
accounting and organising come together, defined as “the processes and 
practices through which individuals, activities, and organizations are 
constituted as economic actors and agents”, and hence “rendered 
calculable and governable” (Miller & Power 2013, pp.560–561). Accounting 
metrics are thereby “simultaneously interventions which shape people, 
processes and organizations” (Miller & Power 2013, p.594); and by virtue 
of such interventions, sponsored by “calculative agents” (Callon et al. 
2007, p.323), and having performative effects (Callon et al. 2007; 
MacKenzie & Millo 2003; Muniesa 2014), accounting becomes an agent of 
financialisation, and a form of Foucauldian governmentality (Miller & 
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Power 2013; Zwan 2014). The result is that the “organisation becom[es] 
an effect of calculation rather than its premise” (Justesen & Mouritsen 
2011, p.175; in Gerdin et al. 2014, p.390). This is a view which allows the 
placement of accounting and its metrics in the centre of the process of 
financialisation, constituting the firm, influencing its processes and 
shaping its people. 
 
The explanatory power of Miller and Power’s (2013) paper can be 
operationalised in the study by following their four part schematic 
framework to understand the centrality of accounting in organising and 
economising. In the first part, accounting “territorialises” by constructing 
real or abstract spaces occupied by actors which can then be made 
calculable – such as a division, or office (cf. Fauré et al. 2010; Miller 
1992). Next, accounting “mediates” by linking accounting practices with 
ideas and people within spaces: accounting practices carry and articulate a 
discursive rationality, for example efficiency as a means of delivering 
value, and link such rationalities to people, groups or spaces (cf. Anthony 
1992; Llewellyn & Northcott 2005; Modell 2003; Sauder & Espeland 2009; 
Vosselman 2014). Third, accounting has an “adjudicating” role, measuring 
the performance of individuals and organisations, rendering them 
accountable, and knowable in comparison to others, ultimately 
determining their success or failure (cf. Sauder 2008; Sauder & Espeland 
2009). From an organisation’s balance sheet comes a series of metrics, 
making that organisation commensurable to its peer group, and guiding 
management action towards “improvements” in those metrics and 
comparisons. And within the organisation, those made responsible for 
spaces created, and measured with reference to the metrics applied by 
accounting, become visible, making that which is measured fact-like, and 
leading those individuals to direct attention towards the metrics applied in 
those spaces, and to lose sight of those that are not used (Gerdin et al. 
2014; Chua 1995). Finally, accounting “subjectivises” individuals. In so 
doing it “presupposes and brings into being a certain kind of self” (Miller & 
Power 2013, p.586), the calculable self; one enabled to compare itself 
with others in accordance with financial measures, with resulting impacts 
on identity (Covaleski et al. 1998; Foucault 1978; 1982). 
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The outcome is that accounting is “both agent and outcome, both idea and 
practice” (Miller & Power 2013, p.582). This four part schematic provides a 
means to address the research aim by assessing the constitutive role of 
accounting and its tools within the case study PSF, moving beyond high 
level strategy into management interventions which reflect the 
financialisation of the firm. To that end the second research question is 
established: How do the logics of financialistion enter and take effect in 
the PSF? In particular, and following Miller and Power (2013): does 





This chapter has reviewed literature relevant to the theorisation of 
financialisation, reviewing these against four perspectives or problematics, 
namely liberal collectivism, agency theory, political economy and cultural 
economy. The last of these brings together (a) the discourses of 
financialisation, being the myriad ways in which financial imperatives are 
reflected and discussed within society and the organisation, and (b) the 
social and material practices in which such discourses and imperatives are 
located or reflected. Cultural economy allows us to see how discourse 
informs social practice, and thereby becomes performative (MacKenzie & 
Millo 2003; MacKenzie 2006). This performativity is a concept carried 
forward in this thesis. 
 
As part of the examination of performativity, this chapter gave 
consideration to the effects of financial metrics, non-financial metrics 
(such as number of lawyers), and quasi-metrics in the form of rankings 
(Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009; Galanter & Henderson 2008; Sauder 2008; 
Sauder & Espeland 2009), related these to PSFs, and proposed to extend 
the conceptualisation of financialisation to include metrics and rankings, 
and their effects, more generally. This is carried forward and combined 
with the use of certain critical accounting literatures to cast light on how 
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metrics and quasi-metrics are influential in the formation of firm strategy. 
In that regard use will be made of Froud and colleagues’ “narrative and 
numbers” (Froud et al. 2006) to examine how financialisation affects 
strategy within the PSF. And Miller and Power’s (2013) framework will be 
utilised as the means by which accounting acts as the agent of 
financialisation within the PSF, creating or exploiting spaces in which 
metrics can be applied (territorialisation), mediating financial logics into 
the firm (mediation), defining and determining success and failure 
(adjudication) and proffering financialised subjectivities to organisational 
actors (subjectification). 
 
This chapter has informed the choice of two research questions, namely: 
 
1. Has PSF strategy been financialised? More specifically, and following 
Froud and colleagues (2006): do PSFs adopt “narrative and numbers” and 
if so, are there performative effects? 
 
2. How do the logics of financialistion enter and take effect in the PSF? In 
particular, and following Miller and Power (2013): does accounting act as 
the agent of the financialisation of the PSF and if so how? 
 
However, an examination of the effects of financialisation within the PSF 
cannot stop here. Rather, it is necessary to consider the effect of 
financialisation on the mechanisms of management control applied within 
the firm in order to enable senior management to deliver the firm’s chosen 
strategy. Further, it is necessary to examine the experience of partners as 
the targets of such mechanisms. Chapter 4 considers literature that can 
help do that, including conceptualising power, control, identity and 
subjectivity, as well as the impacts of change on professional identity, and 
the tensions and contradictions that may arise as a result. 
  
 51 




Chapter 2 considered literature dealing with the sociology of the 
professions and professionalism. It noted a move in PSFs from traditional 
partnership structures, and the associated professional logics of expertise, 
collegiality and autonomy, to hierarchical governance structures akin to 
the corporation, and with a focus on commercial and financial logics. From 
there it considered what that tells us about the development of the 
concept of professionalism within the PSF, utilising the concepts of 
commercialised professionalism (Hanlon 1999) and organisational 
professionalism (Faulconbridge & Muzio 2008). It drew attention to 
professionalism as a component of identity and as a means of control 
(Covaleski et al. 1998; Grey 1998), and the link with human resource 
management (HRM) technologies. 
 
Chapter 3 considered how financialisation has been conceptualised in the 
literature, and how taking a cultural economy perspective can offer 
insights into the role of accounting and metrics in the financialisation of 
the PSF. In particular they allow for an exploration of the effects of 
financialisation on firm strategy (Froud et al. 2006), and the choice and 
use of metrics (Miller & Power 2013). 
 
This chapter dovetails with those literatures by examining literatures that 
are capable of conceptualising how firm strategies are operationalised 
through the disciplining and control of partners. Consistent with the 
cultural economy perspective advocated by Chapter 3, this chapter 
reviews literature which treats HRM practices as Foucauldian disciplinary 
technologies of power (Foucault 1977; 1978). By extension, responding to 
the call in Chapter 3, literature which sheds light on the manipulation of 
identity and subjectivity of professionals as a means of control is 
examined, alongside that which seeks to explain why professionals engage 
with such technologies of manipulation (Townley 1993a; 1994; Grey 
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1994). Finally, in order to characterise the experience of partners, this 
chapter offers a conceptualisation of tension and contradiction as a means 
of drawing out how partners may experience financialisation alongside 
vestiges of traditional professional logics. In so doing it rounds up a tool-
kit of theoretical approaches that will enable data to be put to use in 
achieving the research aim. 
 
Control and power: general 
 
Control in the context of the PSF is linked to the analysis of change in PSF 
governance structures set out in Chapter 2. Governance structures are 
designed to enable the act of organisation of those within the firm. Clegg, 
Courpasson and Phillips ask: “What is organization but the collective 
bending of individual wills to a common purpose?” (Clegg et al. 2006, 
p.2). Bending of wills evokes an image of individuals wielding control over 
dominated others, a form of power. But this begs the question: what is 
power? This section seeks to review conceptualisations of power, and 
thereby control, in order to determine which should be utilised to inform 
the research aim. 
 
Arguably the origins of discussions of power lie with Thomas Hobbes and 
Niccolo Machiavelli. In his 17th century work, Leviathan (Hobbes 1990) 
Hobbes advocates sovereign power as a model for rationality and the 
maintenance of order for the security and progress of all, the hallmark of 
modernity. This has informed views of power into the 20th and 21st 
centuries, seeing power as agential (held by an individual or group) and 
episodic (exercised through discrete acts) (Lawrence et al. 2012). 
Conceptions of power in this mould see it as being “expressed through 
causal relations and measureable in terms of mechanistic indicators” 
(Clegg 1989, p.22). Hence power is the capacity of one individual (or 
group) to force the other to act against his will, evidenced by the other 
taking actions that he/they otherwise would not. In other words power has 
a visible form. Machiavelli’s 16th century works, The Discourses (1970) 
and The Prince (1975), stand in contrast to Hobbes, focusing on strategies 
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and tactics adopted in to secure desired ends. Machiavelli’s focus on 
strategies is said to be closer to post-structuralist and decentred views of 
power, in particular in the genealogical works of Foucault (Clegg 1989), 
which are explored below. Machiavelli is an altogether more “cynical, 
rationalist and realist perception” (Clegg 1989, p.30). 
 
In the 20th century, alternative views of power, or “dimensions” (Lukes 
1974) were developed. The foundations of the first dimension of power 
are in Hobbes, reflecting the common sense understanding of power as 
being either facilitative (the power to do something) or coercive (power 
over someone) (Clegg et al. 2006). The second dimension is “non-
decision-making”, or agenda control (Bachrach & Baratz 1962; 1963; 
1970); in a sense the power “not to”, or to stop something happening by 
keeping it off the agenda. In a sense it is the other side of the “power to” 
dimension, being the power to ensure something doesn’t happen. The 
third is Lukes’s (1974) so called radical view, which posits that power 
operates silently on the thoughts and desires of actors, blinding them to 
their own interests, and so as to create a hegemony: the acceptance of 
the rule of an elite minority as the natural and only available option 
(Hindess 1996). The last conceptualisation has retrospectively been called 
the fourth dimension (Clegg et al. 2006), and refers to Foucauldian 
discipline and governmentality, as well as the correlational nexus of power 
and knowledge (Foucault 1977; 1978). Foucault largely avoids focusing on 
what power is in favour of an examination of what power does (Clegg 
1989). He is not interested in how power “ought” to operate (Gordon 
2009), as a Hobbesian would be. This reflects a view that, rather than 
defining power and what it should do, “it is more productive to attend to 
the practices, techniques and methods through which ‘power’ is rendered 
operable” (Knights & Vurdubakis 1994, p.174). This is much closer to 
Machiavelli’s (1975; 1970) conception. 
 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of power is considered to offer most utility to 
the study as a means to examine the technologies of control, and their 
links to financialisation. Such a view is consistent with the cultural 
economy perspective adopted in Chapter 3; it recognises the constitutive 
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role of discourse, embedded in the “narrative of strategic purpose” 
theorised by Froud and colleagues (2006) and underpins the critical 
accounting perspective adopted by Miller and Power (2013). However, to 
properly appreciate Foucault’s work on power, a deeper analysis is 
required. 
 
Control and power: the insights of Michel Foucault 
 
In Discipline and Punish (1977) and The History of Sexuality (1978), 
Foucault developed his theories of discipline (control) and power. He 
located this in an analysis of political rationalities, describing how, when 
statehood became the dominant political rationality in Western Europe, 
replacing a rationality based on the power of the sovereign (cf. Hobbes 
1990), the importance of the population as a source of labour and thereby 
production, and hence state power, grew. This, Foucault tells us, led to a 
focus on both the welfare of the population, enabled by the human and 
social sciences, and the control of the population, each understood as 
necessary to secure the prize of labour productive capacity. These are 
described by Dreyfus and Rabinow as the “two poles of bio-power - control 
of the body and control of the species” (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, p.140), 
the body referring to the individual, and the species the wider population. 
Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977), focused on how disciplinary 
technologies within prisons, schools, the military, and hospitals were used 
to exert control over the bodies of those occupying such institutions. They 
operated by detailing how a whole series of tasks should be carried out, 
under the watchful eye of an observer, ultimately so as to create each 
person as a disciplined and "docile body" (Foucault 1977). 
 
The History of Sexuality (Foucault 1978) developed this further, 
presenting sex and sexuality as threats to the state’s access to the 
productive capacity of its primary asset – the working classes. Hence sex 
and sexuality were also the means by which the population (species) was 
to be controlled. Power and health were linked by means of a discourse of 
sexual repression; the naming and outlawing of sexual “perversions” 
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supported the use of sexuality as a means of controlling the activities of 
the population. From this, Foucault (1978) critiqued what he called the 
“repressive hypothesis”: the view that truth and power are in opposition, 
with power seen as a constraint on the formation of knowledge, and truth 
as the liberator from repression and false consciousness (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow 1982). Foucault (1978) sets out a view of power as altogether 
more hidden and productive, rather than repressive. For example, where 
practices such as the making up of dossiers of information (knowledge) 
appear, so does power. Foucault (1978) tells us that these practices, and 
access to the information generated, give rise to power relations between 
the holder of knowledge and the subject of such knowledge. This 
necessitated the reconceptualisation of power in the conjunction 
“power/knowledge”, recognising that one always inheres in the other. 
Within such power relations, subjectivities, or the subject positions 
occupied by individuals, are offered and negotiated. The explanatory 
potential of Foucault’s use of these concepts in the context of the 
fulfillment of the research aim is revealed by examining how these two 
texts form the foundations of a view of the individual as the object of 
power, and as the subject of power, considered next. 
 
The individual as an object of power 
 
In Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977), Foucault analysed the prison as 
an exemplar of the development of a disciplinary technology applied to the 
body of each individual prisoner, making that prisoner the object of power. 
This form of power operated on the body so as to train, exercise and 
supervise its movements (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, p.152). The minute 
ordering of the prisoner’s day spread from the prison to similar regimens 
in schools, hospitals and barracks, moulding the attendees “both as 
objects and instruments of its exercise” (Foucault 1977, p.170). 
 
The individual as the object of power manifests through distinct 
technologies of power, starting with the examination (Foucault 1977). This 
includes several elements. Firstly, surveillance, which Foucault terms 
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hierarchical observation, uses spatial organisation as its means to make 
each individual visible. Bentham’s Panopticon, a prison in which a single 
guard is placed in the middle of a circular chamber around which prison 
cells with barred doors are placed, is the exemplar here: the single guard 
can observe all of the prisoners at once from his guard station, but each 
prisoner is not aware of when he or she is actually being observed. 
However surveillance of itself is not all there is in this conceptualisation. 
Foucault (1977) tells us it is reinforced by documentation and normalising 
judgement. Documentation manifests in the keeping of information on 
every person, allowing them to be codified, compared and thereby 
rendered calculable. Finally, normalising judgement ensures those under 
the supervisory gaze know what is expected of them. Normalisation 
creates and separates the normal from the abnormal, and calls for 
intervention to order the behaviours of the abnormal individual, who 
thereby stands at the nexus of knowledge and judgement. Foucault 
(1977) exemplifies this by showing how those within state institutions who 
failed to conform to detailed specifications as to time-keeping, behaviours, 
and actions were subject to attention and punishment. 
 
The explanatory potential of Foucault comes not from his narration of 
what happens within state institutions, but from his assertion that such 
institutions are an exemplar of what happens in wider society, leaving 
open to further analysis a multitude of possible applications. It is here that 
Foucault’s work can inform the study. Of particular note is scholarly work 
which extends Foucault’s insights into the workplace (for example, Knights 
& Vurdubakis 1994; Grey 1998; Covaleski et al. 1998; Fournier 1999; Ball 
2005). But the greatest insight for the study is perhaps offered by 
Townley (1993a; 1993b; 1994; 1995a; 1995b) and Legge’s (2005) work 
on HRM, which show HRM practices as Foucauldian technologies of 
knowledge production and discipline, which render employees as the 
objects of power/knowledge, and as a result, governable. 
 
Applied to the organisation, Townley (1994) describes how individuals are 
located in time and space by virtue of “enclosure” within the organisation, 
then “partitioning” by categorisation of work, and finally “ranking” by 
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virtue of classification enabling a hierarchy. There are echoes here of 
Miller and Power’s (2013) framework. Citing The Order of Things (Foucault 
1973), Townley describes two systems of comparison, taxinomia, which 
uses descriptive language to set out desired qualities, and mathesis, which 
orders numerically. Each operates as “a technique of power and a 
procedure of knowledge – which provide an order that simultaneously 
circumscribes a whole, and specifies its component parts” (1994, p.31). 
These operate so as to have both disciplinary and normalising effects 
(Legge 2005). By revealing where the firm utilises systems of comparison 
based in taxinomia and mathesis within the firm, we can begin to 
understand the structure of controls the firm operates and how they link 
to those financial logics which application of Miller and Power’s framework 
shows have been mediated into the firm by accountancy (Miller & Power 
2013). 
 
Applied to the contemporary setting, hierarchical observation can be seen 
as a form of surveillance which is not only spatial but also enabled through 
information technologies. Normalising judgement, as facilitated by 
documentation, and measurement, distributes individuals between two 
poles. Townley (1994) cites Foucault (Foucault 1977, p.180) in terming 
this a penal accountancy, a “punitive balance sheet of each individual” (cf. 
Miller & Power 2013). The placing of individuals on a scale is said to 
encourage conformity (normalisation), the individual becoming "[an] effect 
and object of power… [an] effect and object of knowledge" (Foucault 
1977, p.189; cited in Townley 1994, p.85). Through application of 
(apparently) objective quantification individuals are rendered knowable, 
calculable and governable: 
 
Thanks to the whole apparatus of writing that accompanied it, the 
examination opened up two correlative possibilities: firstly the 
constitution of the individual as a describable, analyzable object… and 
secondly the constitution of the comparative system that made 
possible the measurement of overall phenomena, the description of 
groups, the characterisation of collective facts, the calculation of the 
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gaps between individuals, the distribution in a given population. 
(Foucault 1977, p.190; cited in Townley 1994, p.85) 
 
Those who do not live up to the established norms can be identified as 
outliers, and interventions may take place. Putting individuals on a scale is 
thereby both inclusive, the individuals being a member of a wider group, 
and exclusive, outliers from norms being identified. Each step is an 
objectification of the individual and the group. By determining where 
partners are distributed across a scale, what that indicates, and how that 
is understood by partners, we can explore how these operate so as to 
render the partners knowable, calculable and governable towards the 
metricised ends of financialisation. 
 
The individual as the subject of power 
 
In The History of Sexuality (Foucault 1978), Foucault carried out a 
genealogical analysis of sex and sexuality as scientific categorisations, and 
how they became the subject of governmental control. According to 
Foucault, sex in the Victoria era was seen as threatening the productive 
capacity of the state. It therefore had to be controlled. As a result, sex 
and sexuality were medicalised and categorised, “aberrations” made 
unlawful, and subjected to medical intervention using a different 
technology of power: the confessional. Foucault’s (1978) analysis shows 
how the confessional was originally used within pastoral applications, but 
later applied in a much wider range of clinical settings that combined 
examination and confession; doctors and other medical or quasi-medical 
settings such as psychoanalysis employing the same. 
 
In contrast to disciplinary technologies, which aim to correct behaviours 
through the setting of norms, and thereafter reward and punish, 
confessional technology is said to operate on the subject therapeutically. 
It is a technology of power which acts so as to turn the individual on 
himself, either in the presence of others or in self-reflection (Foucault 
1978). The subject must “know thyself” and in so doing self-reflect and 
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hence make changes, making the confession a “technology of the self” 
(Foucault 1988). The individual is thereby the subject of his own 
knowledge, and hence the subject of power. For Foucault therefore, power 
is related to the subject in three ways: first, constitution of the subject 
through the adoption or allocation of a particular subject position (e.g. a 
high performer); second, the subject is situated, known and thereby 
constituted by classification (e.g. by financial results or appraisal); third, 
the subject is an object of its own knowledge, relationally to others (e.g. 
through confession, and relationally such as managing partner and fee 
earning partner) (Clegg et al. 2006, citing Colado 2001). 
 
Underlying the notion of the individual as the subject of power is the belief 
that within the individual is a hidden authentic self-knowledge which can 
be revealed through speech. The link to power comes from the 
conjunction of knowledge and power. Disciplinary technologies fall short 
here because observation, documentation, and normalising judgement is 
not enough to reveal self-knowledge, such knowledge being vested in the 
individual rather than exhibited through his actions and the actions of 
others. Confessional technology is therefore required for "self-reflection, 
self-knowledge, self-examination, for the deciphering of the self by 
oneself" (Fornet-Betancourt et al. 1987). As Townley put it: 
 
The confessional operates through avowal, the individual’s 
acknowledgement of his or her own actions and thoughts… It is a 
process which confirms identity. Through the act of speaking, the self 
is constituted, tied to self-knowledge which has been uncovered 
through prior self-examination. (Townley 1994, p.111). 
 
Hence the first role of the confessional is to get to the individual’s self-
knowledge which is otherwise hidden from view (Fornet-Betancourt et al. 
1987; Townley 1994). This requires the presence of another, not only to 
hear the confession, but to act as the master, therapist or interlocutor; 
the authority figure who judges, forgives or punishes (Fornet-Betancourt 
et al. 1987). The listener in these settings is, by virtue of his claimed 
knowledge and hence expertise, attributed with a form of interpretive 
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capacity. He is a “master of the truth” (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, p.179), 
and while claiming apparent objectivity and access to knowledge, is 
actually part of the apparatus of power. The second role of the 
confessional is "to change, or reconstitute, individuals or aspects of their 
behaviour in a way which is more productive", forming the “productive 
subject”, or in some cases the “entrepreneurial subject” (Townley 1994, 
p.119). This has echoes of Brown and Lewis’s (2011) “productive legal 
professional” cited above.  
 
Townley (1994) brings Foucault into the workplace by examining how HRM 
practices operate so as to render the individual as the subject of power, 
working so as to make the individual play an active role in constructing his 
or her identity as a subject. Townley (1994) splits these into three HRM 
techniques. The first is those used by individuals to place and identify 
themselves, making themselves “the confessing individual”. The second is 
those which seek to define the subjectivity of the target (“reconstituting 
the subject”). The third is those which seek to "construct an identity of the 
productive subject and thereby establish the individual as an active agent 
in a productive role" (Townley 1994, p.109). Each of these HRM 
techniques is discursively based, and seeks to define a reality with 
reference to a set of socially constructed criteria. As such, this view is 
consistent with the cultural economy perspective on financialisation. 
Moreover, by examining HRM practices in the firm within a Foucauldian 
framework, this thesis aims to show how such practices encourage a 
subjectivity that reflects the metricised aims of financialisation. 
 
Identity and subjectivity 
 
The foregoing analysis highlights that subjectivity is central to the 
Foucauldian view of the individual as the subject of power. Foucault is 
known for seeking to remove or “de-centre” the subject in his earlier work 
(Kelly 2009). However, latterly, as he developed his genealogy in 
Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977) and The History of Sexuality 
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(Foucault 1978), he embraced the subject, declaring that his philosophical 
project had after all been: 
 
…to study the constitution of the subject as an object for himself: the 
formation of the procedures by which the subject is led to observe 
himself, analyse himself, interpret himself, recognise himself as a 
domain of possible knowledge. In short, this concerns the history of 
‘subjectivity,’ if what is meant by that term is the way in which the 
subject experiences himself in a game of truth where he relates to 
himself. (Foucault 1998, p.461; in Hall 2004, p.92) 
 
Hence Foucault relates subjectivity to personal self-reflection. But in what 
way does subjectivity differ from identity, as used by others such as 
Brown and Lewis (2011)? Hall offers a useful definition: 
 
[O]ften used interchangeably with the term identity, subjectivity 
more accurately denotes our social constructs and consciousness of 
identity. Identity is often a flat, one-dimensional concept, but 
subjectivity is much broader and multifaceted; it is a social and 
personal being that exists in negotiation with broad cultural 
definitions of our own ideals. We may have numerous discrete 
identities, of race, class, gender, sexual orientation, etc., and a 
subjectivity that is comprised of all of those facets, as well as our own 
imperfect awareness of our selves. (Hall 2004, p.134) 
 
Hence “people have differential subjectivities and identities” (Clegg 1994, 
p.287). We tend to be able to articulate some of the “usual” identities by 
which society categorises groups of individuals as we are each generally 
aware of our own, socially constructed and recognisable, identities such as 
race and gender.  
 
Organisations and identities are connected; one of our discrete identities 
tends to be our job or occupation (Kenny et al. 2011). However, this 
identity is not exclusively constructed in wider society. Rather, beyond the 
superficiality of identity at a societal level, professional identities, in 
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particular how professionals see themselves within that identity, are 
influenced through several layers of socialisation. These layers include 
education, professional training, memberships of professional associations, 
and within the professional organisation (Covaleski et al. 1998; Anderson-
Gough et al. 2000; Anderson-Gough et al. 2001; Evetts 2013), suggesting 
professional identities are constructed in a dialogue with external 
influencers (Alvesson & Willmott 2002). Through their shared experience 
of socialisation “practitioners develop and maintain shared work cultures 
and common values” (Evetts 2013, p.780). 
 
Socialisation within the organisation reflects the fact that the “self” is 
constructed in “historically specific modes of production and contingent 
networks of social relations” (O’Doherty & Willmott 2001, p.472). Hence 
identity and the related subjectivities offered are dependent on the 
relations formed by differentiations in the structure of the organisation 
(e.g. boss/secretary). Equally, knowledge generated on the individual by 
organisational knowledge systems may also have an affect, as such 
knowledge informs the social relations within the organisation and, as has 
been demonstrated above, necessarily gives rise to a form of power 
relation (Foucault 1978). These differentiations made, and firm produced 
knowledge, contribute components of subjectivity for each individual, and 
these inform the self-reflective process enabled by Foucauldian 
confessional systems, such as the performance appraisal (Gilbert & Powell 
2010; Townley 1993b; Rose 1999). 
 
In order to inform a Foucauldian analysis it is necessary to consider 
studies that have applied a Foucauldian lens to the PSF, starting first with 
those that deal with financialisation and control, at least implicitly, and 
thereafter those that deal with identity and control. 
 
Power and the PSF: empirical links to financialisation 
 
PSFs have been the subject of numerous studies into the application of 
disciplinary power technologies (for example, Covaleski et al. 1998; Grey 
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1994; Anderson-Gough et al. 2001; Karreman & Alvesson 2004; 
Karreman & Alvesson 2009; Thornborrow & Brown 2009). But how, if at 
all, have existing studies made a link between these technologies and 
financialisation? There is a paucity of studies relevant to the question of 
how financialisation manifests in terms of operational processes and 
controls in the PSF. Without specifically referencing financialisation, both 
Karreman & Alvesson (2004) and Brown and Lewis (2011) found 
professionals in the PSF are trained to focus on chargeable hours 
recorded, a common metric which underpins revenue generation by dint of 
its role in determining the amount of fees to be charged to clients. 
Karreman & Alvesson (2004) implicitly use the commensurability of 
chargeable hours across a group as a form of mathesis by characterising 
those posting a high number of such hours as a form of “quality”. Brown 
and Lewis (2011) do something similar, using chargeable hours as the 
basis for an identity, or in Foucauldian terms a “subjectivity”, which they 
call the “productive legal professional”. 
 
However, each of these studies takes a narrow view focused on 
chargeable hours and, as a result, do not address how financial 
imperatives vest across a wider range of operational processes. In 
contrast, Alvehus & Spicer's (2012) study is broader and and more 
nuanced, thereby taking a step in the direction of informing a deeper and 
richer analysis of the operationalisation of financial imperatives within the 
PSF. Using one of the Big 4 accountancy firms as its case, it aims to show 
“how financialized forms of controls have been applied to employees in 
professional service firms” (Alvehus & Spicer 2012, p.498). In so doing 
the authors term financialisation a “control strategy”; in other words a tool 
within a “hard” HRM system which includes management by objectives, 
up-or-out systems of promotion, and forms of identity control. However, 
this view of financialisation as a tool of management control is subtly 
different from, and more limited than, a perspective which sees 
financialisation as something which manifests across society and 
organisations, influencing decision-making at multiple levels, and having 
performative and constitutive effects. This latter perspective is considered 
to offer greater insight. 
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Note however that Alvehus & Spicer's (2012) study does nevertheless 
make other contributions that inform this thesis. In particular, following 
Brown and Lewis (2011), Alvehus & Spicer (2012) suggest employees 
exercise self-discipline to maximise performance against a key metric, 
chargeable hours, at the expense of other activities which do not directly 
result in a financial return. This draws our attention to the tension 
between a focus on chargeable hours and so-called “soft values”, one 
being measurable and the other inherently qualitative. The firm in 
question sought to rebalance this by attributing scores to soft values, and 
promoting a discourse that suggested career progression would be linked 
to improvements in those values. Nevertheless hard measures – 
chargeable hours - were seen as the principal performance measure, 
resulting in behavioural issues as those climbing the ladder jostled to 
maximise their performance. In other words the tension experienced was 
resolved in favour of the measurable at the expense of the immeasurable. 
This tension requires further exploration at the partner level, where 
visibility of appreciation of wider contribution should, in principle, be most 
transparent by virtue of the position of partners and access to information, 
and this thesis aims to fulfill that requirement.  
 
In a further contribution Alvehus & Spicer (2012) suggest that employees’ 
working lives are characterised as the production of chargeable hours as 
an investment in their future careers. This is akin to a subjectivity defined 
by Aitken, that of the “investing subject” (Aitken 2007; Zwan 2014), one 
who has adopted his own self-management with a view to investing in 
future outcomes, a subjectivity that comfortably sits alongside and adds 
some depth to Brown and Lewis’s (2011) conception of the “productive 
legal professional”. Alvehus & Spicer (2012) note the limitations of their 
study and ask whether the same form of control would be found in a law 
firm, and whether, post-financial crisis, anything has changed. 
 
These studies help to widen our understanding of financialisation within 
the PSF, introducing one metric, that of chargeable hours, and seeking to 
explain its connection to performance, and thereafter to career and 
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identity. However, they are limited by their choice of focus and as a result 
their explanations, while making a contribution, lack some depth. 
Financialisation is reduced to a mechanism focused solely on the recording 
on chargeable hours rather than the wider role of metrics and accounting 
within the firm. There is significant scope to extend the exploration of the 
role of accounting and metrics to demonstrate a wider connectivity 
between logics and practices of control. By seeking to apply Foucauldian 
scholarship, and the use of taxinomia and mathesis in particular, within a 
cultural economy perspective to financialisation understood at a higher 
level of abstraction, this thesis aims to provide a richer understanding of 
how financialisation manifests in the firm and affects partners as well as 
employees, the latter tending to be the focus of existing studies. To that 
end the third research question is established: How are professionals 
managed to deliver the financial imperative implied by financialisation? 
More specifically, and following Foucault (1977; 1978) and Townley 
(1993b; 1994), do the technologies of HRM, operating alongside metrics, 
proffer partners a financialised subjectivity that redefines professionalism 
in the PSF? 
 
The identity lens introduced by Brown and Lewis (2011), and alluded to in 
the other studies, is part of this wider examination, and that is addressed 
further below. 
 
Identity in the PSF – career, anxiety and insecurity 
 
This section examines the literature insofar as it is specific to professional 
identity and thereby professionalism. It does so in order to inform a 
problematisation of how identity, and in turn subjectivity, is shaped by the 
accounting and metrics that are employed and adopted in the financialised 
PSF, and the potential for conflict with professional logics. That forms the 
basis of an examination of the nature of any tension and contradiction that 




PSFs are organisations within which professional identities are connected 
with, and influenced by, the workplace (Kenny et al. 2011). 
Professionalism is seen by Foucault as related to power, identity and 
subjectivity: 
 
For Foucault professionalism is in itself ‘a disciplinary mechanism’; 
associating specific practices with particular worker identities, 
knowledge and rules of conduct… In turn, these norms act as a form 
of discipline over otherwise autonomous professional power 
regulating behaviour through self management… Thus induction into 
professions, in terms of both knowledge and conduct, serves to 
construct a specifically governable subjectivity rooted in self-
disciplinary mechanisms such as reflective practice and models of 
supervision… (Gilbert & Powell 2010, p.9)  
 
This description is a pertinent demonstration of the Foucauldian 
perspective: the values and expectations passed on during layers of 
socialisation are internalised by the subject, and thereafter act as an 
internal force on the subject’s sense of self. But what does that mean in 
practice for the professional? Using the UK legal profession as an 
exemplar, the process begins with a period of tertiary education which 
includes teaching on matters such as ethics, standards of behaviour, and 
fiduciary duties, each of which is based on, and informs the subject’s 
experience of, professionalism and its associated logics. The next step is a 
law firm apprenticeship or “traineeship” where practical competence is 
added to the mix, along with professional standards specified by 
regulatory bodies such as the Law Societies of England and Scotland. 
Hence educational teaching is incremented by experience gained within, 
and exposure to, a socialisation process led by a PSF (Covaleski et al. 
1998; cf. Anderson-Gough et al. 2000). 
 
This process does not stop at the point of formal qualification, nor even 
when the individual concerned becomes a partner. Rather, moulding 
through formal processes such as competency frameworks, mentoring and 
appraisal may continue (e.g. Covaleski et al. 1998) and give an 
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opportunity for firms to redefine professionalism to fit organisational goals 
(Faulconbridge & Muzio 2008). In other words what is constructed by the 
firm as “what professionalism means here”, or “organisational 
professionalism”, may have a strong impact in shaping subjectivities 
(Covaleski et al. 1998; Faulconbridge & Muzio 2008). Disciplinary 
technologies act so as to create aspirational selves tied into organisational 
goals (Alvesson & Karreman 2007; Grey 1994; Thornborrow & Brown 
2009). 
 
It appears reasonable to speculate that different discourses, being those 
based in professional logics espoused by educators and the professional 
standards of regulators, and financial logics adopted within the 
financialised firm and influencing what professionalism means within the 
firm (cf. Brown & Lewis 2011; Alvehus & Spicer 2012), may give rise to 
tensions and contradictions. As Costas and Grey state, “as organizations 
seemingly increasingly envisage organizational members’ identities as a 
target of control, identity has become a contested terrain” (Costas & Grey 
2014, p.910). 
 
Seeing identity and subjectivity through the temporal lens just described 
might suggest the formation and maintenance of identity is an ongoing 
temporal project. This has echoes of Giddens (1991), who regards identity 
as fragile, leading to a search for ontological security through a continuous 
reflexive project. That view has more recently been taken up by Hoy 
(2009b; 2009a), who links identity to future desired states, and 
characterises identity as “becoming”. The search for ontological security is 
based in the desire for security in work (Knights & Willmott 1999), and the 
fragility associated with worker identities due to the threat of job loss 
(Collinson 2003), leading to anxiety (Jackall 1988; Gill 2015). 
 
Professional identity is strongly related to success and social position 
(Karreman & Alvesson 2004). Hence within career structures that involve 
progression through a series of promotions, as is the case in the PSF, each 
such promotion is no more than a temporary success because it creates 
an “identity deficit”; at each stage the individual realises that there are 
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further progressions necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of partnership 
(Karreman & Alvesson 2004; Karreman & Alvesson 2009). Firms ask 
“where do you see yourself in 5 or 10 years time?” (Costas & Grey 2014) 
as a means of testing career ambitions, and commitment to the firm, firm 
strategy, and its disciplinary regime. Aspirational identities are thereby a 
means by which individuals are disciplined and rendered docile (Grey 
1994; Brown & Coupland 2015). Even when desired identities are 
achieved, there nevertheless remain threats to that identity (Knights & 
Clarke 2013; Gill 2015), especially threat of removal, leading to anxiety 
about the retention of a desired status (Gill 2015). This is particularly 
prevalent in meritocratic career systems where status is only gained in 
competition with colleagues (Gill 2015), something inherent in PSF 
hierarchies, including the “up or out” promotion system (Sherer & Lee 
2002; Malhotra et al. 2010). Gill (2015), citing Powell (1958), points to 
professional “rules” and “ideologies” of “success” as the cause of 
psychological difficulties. 
 
Grey (1994) explained the professional’s engagement with firm processes, 
or to connect that with Faulconbridge and Muzio (2008), with adhering to 
a model of organisational professionalism, with the desire for career 
progression (Grey 1994). Applying Foucauldian principles, he 
characterised career as a project of the self, believing that success and 
expected trajectory in the career defines the individual, and leads the 
professional to engage with disciplinary processes to achieve career 
success. Mueller et al. (2011) criticize Grey’s (1994) approach as one 
dimensional, suggesting that the notion of career as a project of the self 
does not fit the contemporary workforce. It is assumed that this view is 
based on the more fluid and fragmented nature of career in the 
“postmodern” world. However, it is considered that this criticism can be 
countered by the suggestion that fragmentation may have the opposite 
effect; in other words it may create identity insecurity and lead to the 
more rigorous pursuit of career as an expression of professionalism, and 
hence identity security (Knights & Clarke 2013). Indeed, Grey’s (1994) 
insights may have strong explanatory power when considering why 
partners, who otherwise may appear to have “made it” (cf. Karreman & 
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Alvesson 2004; Karreman & Alvesson 2009), pay attention to the 
metricised effects of financialisation, and engage in HRM processes which 
continue to seek to define their subjectivity. 
 
Some studies already mentioned are also relevant to the question of how 
financialisation manifests in terms of professional identity and subjectivity. 
Karreman & Alvesson (2004) found professionals focus on chargeable 
hours recorded, connecting the “good professional”, or the “quality 
professional” with one who records a high number of chargeable hours. 
Brown and Lewis (2011) make similar findings as regards the primacy of 
chargeable hours, using that to conceptualise the identity of the 
“productive legal professional”, as linked to the number of chargeable 
hours recorded. The Brown and Lewis (2011) contribution is interesting as 
it moves beyond the assumptions inherent in Karreman & Alvesson's 
(2004) study, that financial outcomes should be connected with 
professional logics rather than a source of conflict with such logics. Rather, 
Brown and Lewis (2011) move towards the view of the contemporary 
professional as “productive”, an economic measure based on output, and 
thereby a reflection of financialisation. 
 
Two key points remain to be explored: firstly, whether and to what extent 
partners engage with disciplinary mechanisms of control, including those 
affected by financialisation, that notwithstanding their position as owners 
of the business. Secondly, it is considered that there remains the potential 
for partners to experience the effects of financialisation, and identity 
control, as giving rise to forms of tension and contradiction, particularly 
where those are experienced as pressures to adopt different work 
practices. In order to provide a basis for this second issue, the next 
section looks at literature on tension and contradiction, and asks how that 





Tension and contradiction 
 
Bringing together financialisation, the pursuit of career, tension and 
contradiction, Cushen (2013) investigated the use within a knowledge 
intensive firm (KIF), of accounting budgets as a mechanism by which 
senior management passed on performance goals, and sponsored 
interventions to achieve those goals. Finding financialisation to be “a 
performative phenomenon” accounting targets are said to be “the starting 
point, the vehicle and the destination” (Cushen 2013, p.327). Cushen 
found that, as concomitant outcomes, budget interventions caused ever-
higher levels of work, insecurity and unfounded or fake optimism. 
Tensions ensued: financial targets were seen as a fait accompli with 
management failing to acknowledge any negative consequences. 
Alongside distress and anger, knowledge workers nevertheless pursued 
performative interventions as the means understood to support their own 
careers: they understood their contributions in metricised terms. Although 
KIFs, such as the subsidiary of a listed company studied by Cushen 
(2013), have similarities with the PSF, their ownership structure is distinct 
from that of the PSF which sees partners as both owners and principal 
workers. Given the lack of research in this area in PSFs, the experience of 
partners to budget and other accounting interventions in the financialised 
PSF is ripe for further investigation. However, in order to do so the thesis 
requires to conceptualise tension and contradiction. 
 
Paradox, contradiction and tension have become frequently used terms in 
scholarly work on management and organisation, with particular reference 
to the discourse of change: globalisation, commoditisation, technological 
developments, and economic challenges such as the 2008-9 financial crisis 
(e.g. Handy 1995; Ashcraft & Trethewey 2004; De Wit & Meyer 2010; 
Mumby 2013a). Each of these phenomena are said to have resulted in 
management interventions that created contradictions and tensions within 
organisations, affecting the working lives of those that are subjected to 
them (Ackroyd 1996; Ackroyd & Muzio 2007; De Wit & Meyer 2010). 
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Such developments have led scholars to develop means of conceptualising 
tension and contradiction across a range of disciplines in the social 
sciences including sociology, psychology and organisation studies (Putnam 
et al. 2016; McGovern 2014; Heydebrand 1977; Smith & Lewis 2011; 
Lewis et al. 2014). The conceptualisations of tension and contradiction 
have interpretive value when considering the effects of financialisation on 
the working lives of partners in the PSF. 
 
Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart (2016), in their comprehensive review of 
scholarly work on contradictions and tensions in organisations, offer 
definitions of each key construct drawn from wider literature. Tension is 
defined as: 
 
Stress, anxiety, discomfort, or tightness in making choices, 
responding to, and moving forward in organizational situations. 
(Putnam et al. 2016, p.69; drawn from Fairhurst & Putnam 2014; 
Fairhurst et al. 2002; Trethewey & Ashcraft 2004; Lewis 2000; Lewis 
et al. 2014; Smith & Lewis 2011) 
 
Contradiction is defined as: 
 
Bipolar opposites that are mutually exclusive and interdependent such 
that the opposites define and potentially negate each other. (Putnam 
et al. 2016, p.70; drawn from, inter alia, Putnam 1986; Smith & 
Lewis 2011; Jones 2004; Abdallah et al. 2011; Heydebrand 1977; 
Giddens 1979; 1984; Willmott 1990) 
 
Tension is therefore a "feeling state", resulting from contradictions and 
paradoxes, examples being the stress arising from work-life balance 
trade-offs (Putnam et al. 2016; Wieland 2011). Contradiction on the other 
hand arises from exclusive opposites which are in a sense bound together, 
for example up and down. These might arise from distinct but competing 
logics (Abdallah et al. 2011; Putnam et al. 2016) or power and control 
issues. Of particular note are situations where apparent autonomy sits 
within the context of normativity driven by professional socialisation and 
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specified instructions or goals (Evans et al. 2004) such that each affects 
and constrains the other. Each is relevant to the experiential question 
asked in this thesis. 
 
In examining the metatheoretical traditions in which tensions and 
contradictions are examined, Putnam and colleagues (2016) list Hegelian 
process-orientated systems (e.g. Benson 1977), structuration studies (e.g. 
Giddens 1979; Giddens 1984), critical studies which emphasise ideology, 
control and resistance (e.g. Deetz 1992; Spicer et al. 2009), and relational 
dialectical studies based in Bakhtin’s dialogism (Bakhtin 1981). In 
addition, and with greatest potential utility in the study by virtue of its 
links with subject matter already discussed, they identify postmodern 
studies as a metatheoretical tradition in which tensions, contradictions and 
paradoxes are studied. It is here that processes of identity construction, 
and the interplay of power and resistance, are brought to the fore 
(Putnam et al. 2016, p.113; Mumby 2013a), as conceptualised by 
Foucault (Foucault 1978; 1982). Power and resistance play out as 
organisations seek to use identity as a means of control of organisational 
actors. Organisational actors are said to negotiate their identities over 
activities related to profession or work on the one hand, and personal or 
home life on the other (citing Coupland 2001; Hatch 1997; Holmer-
Nadesan 1996; Katila & Meriläinen 2002; Pratt & Foreman 2000; 
Ramarajan & Reid 2013; Sotirin & Gottfried 1999; Whittle 2003; Wieland 
2010). Such negotiations, exercised in and through an alternative but 
sometimes enduring counter-identity, may be a potent force in the face of 
managerialist advances. As Knights and Vurdubakis state: 
 
[T]he routine discourses and practices through which subjects are 
constituted (and constitute themselves) as, for instance, unitary 
autonomous individuals, are fraught with contradictions. Self-identity 
can therefore be realized only as a constant struggle against the 
experience of tension, fragmentation and discord… Identity is thus of 
necessity always a project rather than an achievement. (Knights & 
Vurdubakis 1994, p.185) 
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Putnam and colleagues (2016) ground their definitions within what they 
call a constitutive approach, where, in contrast to a cognitive approach, 
discourse and interactions form reality rather than mirror it. This brings to 
the fore language and practices as part of an ontology based in a social 
constructivist view of reality where material objects and macro features 
such as the economy are mediated by discourse and social practice. 
Hence, akin to the philosophical underpinnings of this thesis as set out in 
Chapter 5, and the cultural economy/Foucauldian perspectives in 
particular, the constitutive approach is based in social constructionism (cf. 
Berger & Luckmann 1966) and postmodernism (cf. Alvesson & Deetz 
1996; Travers 2006). Five key dimensions are identified, being discourse, 
developmental actions (the interplay of organisational processes), socio-
historical conditions, praxis (awareness of contradiction, and reflecting and 
acting upon that), and “the presence of multiples”. 
 
The last of these, the presence of multiples, is the conceptual term used 
to describe circumstances where different tensions, at multiple levels and 
from multiple sources, coexist simultaneously, as well as the forms in 
which actors adopt, co-opt, and act upon them. It uses levels and sources, 
in other words the different levels at which individuals and groups operate 
(e.g. individual, divisional, managerial, family etc.), and the different 
sources of tension (individuals, events, circumstances etc.). This is 
interesting as it envisages how steps taken at one level, or to deal with 
one source of tension, may give rise to tension or contradiction at 
another. Layered onto these dimensions are process outcomes (Putnam et 
al. 2016, p.81). Such outcomes include double binds and paralysis 
(“damned if you do and damned if you don’t”) (drawing on Bateson 1972; 
Masuch 1985; Rice & Cooper 2010; Smith & Lewis 2011; Weick 1979), 
unintended consequences (where an outcome is not expected and is 
undesirable) (drawing on Das & Teng 2000; Fairhurst et al. 2002; Jian 
2007; McKinley & Scherer 2000), and opening up or closing off 
participation (enabling the challenge of power relations, and reducing 
dialogue or participation, respectively) (drawing on Deetz 1992; Mumby 
2013b). Of particular utility in the study is the presence of multiples, and 
levels, reflecting the now hierarchical management and divisional 
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structure of the PSF, a structure which places some partners in multiple 
positions with potentially conflicting loyalties, values and goals.  
 
Contradictions over matters such as values and beliefs may create tension 
(citing Garrety et al. 2003; Lynch 2009; Real & Putnam 2005; Townsley & 
Geist 2000). Tensions arise in terms of differing views on subjectivity with 
actors negotiating their roles such that organisational expectations are 
both resisted and complied with. Micro-resistance strategies can lead to 
shifts in power relations (Murphy 1998). Discursive activities among actors 
include the use of metaphors and myths (citing Aredal 1986; Berglund & 
Werr 2000; Porsander 2000; Wasson 2004) and reflexive practice (citing 
Huxham & Beech 2003; Johnson & Duberley 2003; Norander & Harter 
2012; Whittle et al. 2008). These "strategies foster productive dialogue 
among organizational actors, which allowed them to embrace multiple 
meanings in the midst of contradictions and paradoxes" (Putnam et al. 
2016, p.117). 
 
Alvesson and Willmott (2002) conceptualised identity regulation as a 
means of organisational control, achieved through the proffering of 
management discourses for use by workers as part of their own identity 
work. This is based in literature on how control is exercised through the 
"manufacture" of subjectivity (Deetz 1992; Knights & Willmott 1989). 
However such attempts at identity regulation can be seen as giving rise to 
tensions and contradictions as organisational identities, or subjectivities 
meet identities and subjectivities from outside the organisation. Thomas 
and Davies (2005) brought out the tensions and contradictions 
experienced by public servants when considering their identities and 
subjectivities in light of the discourse of New Public Management (NPM). 
Public servants are told both what to do and who they should be within 
the roles ascribed to them. However, within the range of subjectivities 
that they are called upon to occupy, they experience tension and 
contradiction. Such tension spills over into family and work lives, for 
example between the masculine positioning of NPM, and the position of 
mother and carer within the family. The long hours culture gives rise to 
one such tension. Another arises from what is described as “the complex 
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negotiation around discourses of gender, professionalism, and leadership” 
(Thomas & Davies 2005, p.697), which results in contradictions and 
discomfort. 
 
Kosmala and Herrbach (2006) highlight how being a professional is 
influenced by constructs such as “serving the client” or implementing 
“best practice”, while at the same time socialisation processes with the 
PSF have pushed a commercial ethos (Hanlon 1994), and a dynamic 
action-orientated outlook that embodies efficiency, flexibility and business 
acumen. This may give rise to tensions between client service and the 
financial imperatives of the firm. A pretence of commercialised 
professionalism may be the result, where an outward appearance of 
compliance is coupled with a form of cynical distancing, which Kosmala 
and Herrbach (2006) call jouissance. In this way practitioners are able to 
deal with the ambiguities and ambivalence they face in organisational 
tensions and contradictions. 
 
Collinson (2003) highlights how different identities may be in tension or 
contradiction. Organisations “produce people… [by conferring] identities 
and meanings” (2003, p.541). However, the systems adopted by 
organisations to monitor and reward people not only intensify work but 
also intensify their “material and symbolic insecurity” (2003, p.541). 
 
Equally tensions and contradictions can arise when intra-organisational 
discourses are in conflict. For example Watson (1994) narrated tensions 
experienced by managers when a discourse of empowerment and skills 
growth was juxtaposed with several rounds of redundancies as a result of 
tight cost controls. One was seen as a long-term commitment and the 
other imbued with short-termism. Managers struggled with how their 
values, and the idea that the company had a social and moral 
responsibility to its workers, sat alongside a pragmatic requirement to 
manage costs. They experienced distress as they sought to undertake 
their managerial responsibilites alongside their “value-based conceptions 
of the ‘sort of people they are’” (Watson 1994, p.S85). 
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In the context of the research aim, revealing tensions and contradictions 
that arise from organisational change, and processes of power and 
control, is a key area of interest. This goes to the heart of the lived 
experiences of those who are caught in processes of control and attempts 
at identity construction through defining subjectivities: the partners. By 
taking a constitutive approach to power, control and identity formation, 
this thesis seeks to reveal how processes of financialisation are translated 
from outside to inside the firm by accounting and HRM technologies, and 
translated into processes of identity construction within an overall ecology 
of power. Tensions and contradictions may arise as the logics of 
financialisation come into stark contrast with continuing, sedimented 
(Cooper et al. 1996), professional logics which place value on the 
autonomy of the professional, seeing autonomy as the means to deliver 
expert solutions to client problems, privileging the client over financial 
returns (Freidson 2001). Partner reactions therefore present the “other 
side” of financialisation and there is a need for those reactions to be 
revealed. To that end the fourth and final research question is established: 
How do partners experience the financialisation of the PSF? In particular, 
do partners engage with the financialisation of the PSF and if so how do 
they experience the co-existence of financial and professional imperatives? 
 
Conclusions and Research Questions 
 
The purpose of the literature review contained in this and the two previous 
chapters was to select theories and perspectives that will illuminate the 
research aim: to explore the effects of financialisation on the strategy and 
governance of the contemporary PSF and the lived experiences of its 
partners. 
 
Chapter 2 reviewed the sociological aspects of the professions and 
concluded that, rather than becoming bound to what constitutes a 
profession, the term “professionalism” is more meaningful to inform 
studies into PSFs (Evetts 2013). It also contrasted traditional 
professionalism, a term which fuses professional logics and values such as 
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expertise, public service, trust and autonomy, with the concepts of (a) 
commercialised professionalism (Hanlon 1999), predicated on logics aimed 
at achieving commercial or market outcomes, and (b) organisational 
professionalism (Faulconbridge & Muzio 2008), predicated on shaping 
professionals to meet the operational requirements for delivery of the 
strategic choices of organisational leaders. These perspectives are 
considered to inform an analysis of the effects of financialisation on the 
PSF, by providing points of contrast with empirical findings on the values 
of the PSF and the role of its partners. 
 
Chapter 3 considered financialisation, and advocated exploring the role of 
accounting and metrics in the strategic choices of the financialised PSF 
through a cultural economy perspective. By exposing firm strategy, and 
the discourses surrounding it, the firm’s narrative of strategic purpose 
(Froud et al. 2006) can be revealed and assessed in terms of its use of 
financial measures. Further, by applying Miller and Power’s (2013) 
framework for assessing the effects of accounting and metrics on the firm, 
we can begin to see how financial logics inculcate the operations of the 
firm. 
 
This chapter reviewed literature which informs an analysis of how firm 
strategies are operationalised through the disciplining and control of 
partners, seeing HRM practices as Foucauldian disciplinary technologies of 
power (Townley 1993a; 1994; Foucault 1977; 1978). Carried forward into 
data analysis are concepts which explain how technologies employed by 
management render the individual as an object and subject of power, 
those being Foucauldian technologies of examination (including the 
utilisation of taxinomia and mathesis), and confession (Foucault 1977; 
1978). Working along with accounting, these HRM technologies offer 
individuals subjectivities built to suit organisational purposes, and the 
applicabilty of commercialised professionalism (Hanlon 1999), and 
organisational professionalism (Faulconbridge & Muzio 2008; Evetts 
2013). This enables an examination of the identity and subjectivity of 
partners in the firm. In turn that links to the idea of career as a project of 
the self (Grey 1994) as a means to understand the motivations of partners 
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and their engagement with management processes of discipline and 
control. Nevertheless, the outcomes of discipline and control cannot be 
taken for granted. Tension and contradiction may arise as traditional 
professional logics clash with commercial logics within the firm. As such 
this chapter offers definitions of those notions to assist in explaining 
partner experience. 
 
Taking the literature reviews in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 together with the 
stated research aim, we are left with a series of levels at which 
financialisation applies and should be explored: firm strategy, operations, 
controls and the personal experience of its partners. Such exploration is 
informed by the following research questions, stated in the general and 
then the specific: 
 
1. Has PSF strategy been financialised? More specifically, and following 
Froud and colleagues (2006): do PSFs adopt “narrative and numbers” and 
if so, are there performative effects? 
 
2. How do the logics of financialistion enter and take effect in the PSF? In 
particular, and following Miller and Power (2013): does accounting act as 
the agent of the financialisation of the PSF and if so how? 
 
3. How are professionals managed to deliver the financial imperative 
implied by financialisation? More specifically, and following Foucault 
(1977; 1978) and Townley (1993b; 1994), do the technologies of HRM, 
operating alongside metrics, proffer partners a financialised subjectivity 
that redefines professionalism in the PSF? 
 
4. How do partners experience the financialisation of the PSF? In 
particular, do partners engage with the financialisation of the PSF and if so 
how do they experience the co-existence of financial and professional 
imperatives? 
 
These research questions are addressed in the following chapters, and 
revisited in the concluding chapter.  
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This chapter sets out details of the research design, methodology and 
methods I employed in the study. I begin by explicating my philosophical 
orientations. Methodology and methods follow, with an explanation of my 
choice of the ethnographic case study methodology (Watson 2001). From 
there I describe the data collection strategy and my process for reflective 
analysis. I conclude with some comments on access and reflections on my 




It is apposite at this point to briefly describe my philosophical orientations 
and how they affect my view of the PSF and those within it. Firstly, in 
ontological terms, in contrast to objects existing in the natural world 
independently of the perception of human beings, I regard “social-reality” 
as socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann 1966) and dependent on the 
continuing actions of social actors for their formation and reformation. I 
move away from the classic structure/agency dualism by seeing agency 
and structure in a dialectical, mutually constitutive, relationship. This finds 
expression through the role of agency in forming structure, the constraints 
that structure then places on agency, and agency’s ability to change 
structure. Hence structure and agency are not ontologically distinct: they 
are a duality (O’Reilly 2008)1. Applied to the firm, I see it as socially 
constructed by agents as a form of micro-society: as such it is a structure 
recognisable as a “dynamic cluster of relations” (Matthews 2009, p.114), 
                                       
1 What is a structure? It is a social relation, a local conjuncture, discursively produced and 
related to practices and possibly material manifestations (buildings etc), that is 
recognisable through its familiarity such that it has become “ossified and regimented” as a 
form of organising (O’Doherty & Willmott 2001; in Hardy & Clegg 2006, p.766). So there is 




with a continually evolving hierarchy and associated norms that are 
themselves related to organising practices. Put another way, and following 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), I view the firm as a temporary local 
conjuncture of discourses, practices, relations and material 
manifestations, but experienced as an enduring structure. The firm is 
thereby dependent for its continuing existence on recognition of the firm 
and its associated norms and organising features by actors, such 
recognition manifesting in the discursive practices of actors. Hence 
accessing those discursive practices is key to my study, and is 
encapsulated in the following methodology. 
 
Regarding epistemology, Cunliffe (2011) review is helpful in distinguishing 
various positions, splitting them at a macro level between objectivism, 
subjectivism and intersubjectivism. Whereas I tend to view such broad 
categories with suspicion (particularly as they are used in different ways in 
different contexts), they do have a certain heuristic value. According to 
Cunliffe (2011), objectivists regard themselves as separate observers, 
applying scientific theories to generate knowledge that reflects an 
objective and single reality, free of researcher influence. Subjectivists see 
themselves as part of the world occupied by research subjects, acting as 
mediators and interpreters of local meanings and events which, when 
combined with theory, generates knowledge. Intersubjectivists see 
themselves and research subjects co-constructing meanings, resulting in 
either multiple expressions of meaning, or a single collaborative narrative, 
in each case showing a fleeting expression of reality (Mahoney 2007; 
Cunliffe & Karunanayake 2013). 
 
I treat the objectivist view as problematic, it constituting naive 
empiricism, and because, in social research of the nature I have 
undertaken, the researcher is part of the social world and thereby 
necessarily affects it (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009; Maxwell 2004). As a 
result, I see knowledge as socially constructed in discursive practices, 
where language and interaction meet (Tracy 2013). I thereby see myself 
as not only seeking the meaning attributed by respondents, but as 
participating interactively in the co-construction of meaning, particularly 
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when exploring meaning through interviews (Alvesson 2010). I play a role 
in mediating such meanings, and contributing to knowledge through the 
use of academic theory, so as to proffer this thesis. 
 
Although the final step, formed during “writing up”, is holistically informed 
by data collection, analysis and application of theoretical knowledge (Flick 
2007), as well as my own experience (Creswell 2007), it is nevertheless 
subjective. Indeed, unlike objectivists seeking detachment, I have used 
my experiential knowledge to inform and thereby support the 
interpretations made in this thesis (Berg & Smith 1988; Denzin & Lincoln 
2005; Maxwell 2004), but interpretations they remain. Hence I accept 
what is presented here as necessarily partial and affected, but not wholly 
determined, by my perspectives and theoretical preferences (Maxwell 
2004; Tracy 2013). As Maxwell states, “any view is a view from some 
perspective and is shaped by the location (social and theoretical) and 
‘lens’ of the observer” (Maxwell 2004, p.39). I therefore do not claim to 
discover “true” reality in an ontological sense, but I do make knowledge 
claims, it being inescapable in doctoral research which, at its most basic 
level, requires me to make claim to an original contribution to knowledge. 
At the same time I follow Foucault’s view that all knowledge and truth 
claims are historically and situationally contingent, and their recognition as 
valid is dependent on the orders of discourse which prevail at that time 
(Foucault 1972), and I therefore seek to fit within such orders. 
 
Having briefly set out my philosophical commitments I now move on to 
review methodology and methods. 
 
Methodology and methods – a discussion 
 
In this section I deal with my thought process in arriving at the 
methodology and choice of methods for the study. In order to meet the 
research aim it was necessary to pick a methodology and methods that 
gave access to: (a) management practices “in action”, preferably at 
multiple levels in order to gain depth of vision; (b) less formal meetings 
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where partners and/or managers in a group reflected on events as they 
unfolded; (c) the personal reflections of managers and partners on issues 
pertinent to the study; and (d) forms of communication, such as emails, 
memoranda and guidance notes, as part of the discursive practices of the 
firm. 
 
Each of these favoured the choice of qualitative methods by virtue of their 
aptitude for gaining an understanding of complex events, the meanings 
attributed by people to those events as part of their sense-making, and 
the unique context and processes in which that occurs (Maxwell 2004; 
Leedy & Ormrod 2010).  Moreover, such methods facilitate in-depth 
access to intersubjective social meanings (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009), 
and, in the case of professions, the “esoteric knowledge and practices that 
are the repositories of situated meanings” (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007, 
p.168), each of which are directly relevant to the research aim. 
 
The following sub-sections explain why the ethnographic case study 
(Watson 2001) offered the flexibility to achieve the research aim and to 
incorporate a range of methods, including interviews, observation and 
documentary review that I considered would be required to get beyond 
superficial impressions to the inner workings of the chosen case study, 
while at the same time garnering the thoughts of those within the firm. I 
begin by comparing ethnography and case study as a means of explaining 
what an ethnographic case study comprises. 
 
Ethnography and case study 
 
Interviews often constitute the sole data collection method in social 
research (Babbie 2013), forming a methodology as well as a method. And 
from the point of view of access and time commitment the easiest data 
collection device would have been to rely solely on interviews. However, to 
meet the research aim it was necessary to seek out the social and 
discursive practices associated with firm management, and shared 
meaning making among partners. Interviews “do not give a direct access 
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to processes and practices but provide accounts, reports and narratives 
about these” (Flick 2007, p.89). Hence interviews, while useful in their 
own right, do not enable the researcher to observe the processes of 
management as a social practice, and how such processes play out. This 
suggested that interview be adopted as a method supporting a wider 
methodology, something expanded upon below. 
 
Alvesson’s (2003) “ambitious alternative” to methodological reliance on 
interviews is ethnography. This is no longer the sole preserve of 
anthropologists and sociologists, as evidenced in commentaries by 
Schwartzman (1993), Creswell (2007), Tracy (2013), Flick (2007), 
Faulconbridge (2012) and others. There is much opinion expressed over 
what constitutes ethnography. All commentators acknowledge the 
necessity for some form of observation but whilst some insist that 
ethnography study a culture (Van Maanen 1979) others focus on the end 
product as a literary text (“an ethnography”), written as an aesthetically 
pleasing narrative (Macdonald 2001; Richardson 2000) often through 
“thick description” (Geertz 1973) so as to produce a “culture-as-text” 
(Bate 1997, p.1152). Time in the field is a key factor for many 
anthropologists, Wolcott (1995) advocating at least two years. Those with 
a less dogmatic view on ethnography, such as Brewer (2000), recognise a 
wide array of uses of ethnography and time in the field. Some offer 
alternatives, for example a continuous but shorter period (Davies 2008); 
selective intermittent periods focusing on key events (Jeffrey & Troman 
2004; Davies 2008); or a period expiring on reaching saturation of chosen 
analytical categories (Strauss & Corbin 1990). In considering what 
ethnography is, the starting point that took me towards something more 
meaningful for the purposes of the study, was to focus on ethnography as 
a practice, hence on what ethnographers do: 
 
In terms of data collection, ethnography usually involves the 
researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people's daily lives for 
an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what 
is said, and/or asking questions through informal and formal 
interviews, collecting documents and artefacts – in fact, gathering 
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whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the 
emerging focus of enquiry. (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007, p.3) 
 
In thinking about methodological choices I considered this a practical 
“shopping basket” of data collection possibilities to inform the study and 
fulfill the research aim. Hence Hammersley and Atkinson’s (2007) 
shopping basket appeared to be a list of means by which such access 
could be gained. Further, in addition to what ethnographers do and the 
features of that, I considered it helpful to stand back and think holistically 
in terms of what ethnography as a practice is said to achieve: 
 
It gains its understanding of the social world through involvement in 
the daily practice of human agents, and involved immersion in the 
context, the building of trust and rapport with agents, both 
phenomenological and hermeneutic interpretations, and recognition of 
the complexity of the social world (O’Reilly 2008, p.11) 
 
This involvement in practices, and immersion in context, appeared to be 
desirable to inform a deep understanding of the experience of managers 
and partners within the PSF. Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) go on to 
provide more detail, stating that ethnographic work usually has the 
features set out in Table 5.1. 
 
This categorisation pointed me towards the study of social action and 
peoples’ accounts in a single setting. By focusing in this manner, and 
spending a considerable time observing in the field, I considered that I 
could trace events, and in particular annual management processes, as 
they unfolded, so as to observe these in “real time”. This would allow 
me to place myself in positions where managers and partners both 
implemented and discussed management practices, while building a 
more meaningful basis for one-to-one exploration in an interview 
context. 
 
I was aware that ethnography began in anthropology as the study of a 
human culture. However, ethnography in organisations is also widely 
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recognised (Schwartzman 1993; Eberle & Maeder 2011; Watson 2011). 
Indeed, Eberle and Maeder (2011) note the “paradigmatic diversity” 
within organisational studies, and hence the wide range of possibilities 
for ethnography in organisations. Central to this is “the idea that any 
social order is produced and constructed by the actions and practices of 
people in a given context” (Eberle & Maeder 2011, p.69), an idea 
consistent with my philosophical orientations. 
 
Location Peoples’ actions and accounts are studied in everyday 
contexts (rather than experimental or structured 
interview) 
Design Open ended, becoming more focused on specific questions 
as data collection proceeds. Foreshadowed problems 
(Malinowski 1922) may be an influence.2 
Data sources A range of sources, including participant observation, 
informal conversation, and documentary evidence 
Analytical 
categories 
Not built into the data collection process but generated 
out of the process of data analysis 
Focus Generally fairly small-scale, a single setting or a group of 
people 
Analysis Based on interpretation of the meanings, functions, and 
consequences of human actions and institutional 
practices, and how these are implicated in local, and 
perhaps wider, contexts 
Researcher Has a role in the field 
Table 5.1: Features of ethnographic work (adapted from Hammersley and 
Atkinson 2007) 
 
Schwartzman (1993) provides a very useful historic analysis of the 
development of ethnography in organisations, beginning with the 
Hawthorne Studies as the foundation, noting that the findings were used 
by Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) to reveal the contradiction 
between the “formal organisation” and the “informal organisation”. The 
former refers to interactions based in formal rules of the company and 
its technical aspects (organisation of use of tools and resources). The 
                                       
2 My research aim and questions are based on a synthesis of my personal experience of 
change within a PSF (Malinowski’s 1922 “foreshadowed problems”), my background 
constructs, and the theoretical lenses offered by my literature review. These constructs 
and lenses acted as “sensitising concepts” that gave me angles to follow (O’Reilly 2008, 
p.32). 
 86 
latter is “the actual personal interrelations existing among the members 
of the organization which are not represented by…the formal 
organization” (Roethlisberger & Dickson 1939, p.566; in Schwartzman 
1993, p.12). This was used to demonstrate that workers do not make all 
decisions based on economic rationality and efficiency, but rather often 
by sentiments. Schwartzman (1993) argues that these important 
findings would not have been made but for the research design 
expanding to include ethnographic methods, including observation and 
interview. 
 
This view of the formal and informal organisation chimed with my own 
experience, and encouraged me to produce a research design including 
observation of the formal and informal, something I return to below. 
Chapple (1953) emphasised that organisations “can best be studied as a 
system of relationships between individuals” (Schwartzman 1993, p.19), 
akin to and consistent with the micro-society description I used above 
under Orientations, and, again, prompted me to seek to place myself 
close to personal interactions. In later work Van Maanen described the 
role of organisational ethnography as to “explicate the ways in which 
people in particular work settings come to understand, account for, take 
action, and otherwise manage their day-to-day situation” (Van Maanen 
1979, p.540). This re-emphasised a key part of my study: to 
understand the partner experience by juxtaposing management 
processes with the personal reflections of those enacting or subject to 
those processes. In order to do that I required to be present during the 
formation and enactment of the processes, as well as being able to 
discuss them with partners. 
 
I considered that, in combination, these features of ethnographic practice 
and its outcomes were consistent with my research aim, and my 
philosophical orientations. Following Weick’s (1979) encouragement to 
look to organising processes in preference to a reification of the firm 
(Schwartzman 1993), I saw ethnographic practice as giving me the 
opportunity to observe practices and processes both as they happen, and 
as they are ossified in routines, signs, and ways of speaking about the 
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firm and those within it (Flick 2007). This takes ethnography beyond the 
recollection, and post-hoc rationalisation, inherent in the interview, and 
adds considerably to the insights that can be gained. 
 
But what of the need to bound the study so that it addresses the 
research aim? I asked the questions: what is the substantive difference, 
and does the selection of a single PSF point me toward a case study 
rather than an “ethnography”? Investigation of the description of 
ethnography and case study shows distinctions between them are 
blurred. For example, Cresswell’s side by side analysis (2007, pp.104–
105), shows remarkable commonality between the two, with the 
principal distinction being in the focus on culture in ethnography versus 
a focus on in-depth description in case study. However, it is not 
immediately obvious what the real distinction here is. Surely the study 
of culture requires in-depth description? Indeed, I took the view that, to 
meet the research aim, a considerable amount of description would be 
required to convey the depth of the effects of financialisation within the 
PSF. Moore, Lapan and Quartaroli describe the case study as “an 
approach commonly used to better understand a complex phenomenon 
within its context” (2012, p.268). Thomas describes it as “particularly 
suited to understanding the details of what is happening” (2010, p.36). 
Both of these claims appeared both to be what I was setting out to do, 
as well as very similar to those of ethnography. 
 
So I asked: is the distinction between case study and ethnography to be 
found in the typology of case studies? Thomas (2010) provides a helpful 
breakdown of the typologies offered by Merriam (1988), Stake (1995), 
Bassey (1999), De Vaus (2001), Mitchell (2006) and Yin (2009) – see 
Table 5.2. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to describe all of these. However, 
Thomas (2010) helps to simplify the task by breaking them down into 
three foci – purpose, approach and process, represented in Table 5.3. 
Every study has elements of each. In my case the purpose was 
exploratory, followed an interpretive approach (assisted by theory), and, I 
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concluded, should be located within a single case in order to ensure depth. 
By virtue of that it was closest to what Thomas (2010) describes as the 
“classic interpretive” case study, the “ethnographic” study of folk in which 
theory may be tested or built. Likewise, Moore et al. (2012, p.266) 
describe the interpretive case study as one which “adds explanation in 
addition to description”. As later chapters will demonstrate the 
juxtaposition of data and theory brings explanation; theory helping to 

































































Table 5.2: Case study typologies by author (adapted from Thomas 2010) 
 
Finally, I asked: is there a distinction between ethnography and case 
study in methods used? The answer was generally “no”, Hartley (2004) 
confirming that case studies utilise observation, interviews, 
documentary analysis, albeit Hartley also refers to using ethnography 
and surveys. My conclusion was that at least some case studies might 
also be termed ethnographies, particularly when each uses a similar 
range of methods based principally in observation. The distinction 
appears to be partly disciplinary, in the sense of which term is preferred 
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(Creswell 2007), and partly methodological, some case studies being 
more narrowly focused (Thomas 2010; Hartley 2004). However, the 
boundary between the two in organisation studies is not a fixed one, 
with Watson’s study of management described as a “ethnographic case 
study” (Watson 2001, p.xiii), and Travers (1997) case study of lawyers 
using a four month period of ethnography. 
 
Purpose Approach Process 





 Testing theory 
Building a theory 





 Single – retrospective, 
snapshot or diachronic 
Multiple – nested, parallel 
or sequential 
Table 5.3: Case study by purpose, approach and process (adapted from Thomas 
2010) 
 
Synthesising the above considerations, and the choice of the ethnographic 
case study (Watson 2001), with the research aim, I concluded that the 
important features for the study were: (a) observation of “management” 
processes and events; (b) regular contact with managers and partners; 
(c) access to firm documents insofar as relating to key processes; (d) 
continual reflection, and reference to a range of appropriate theoretical 
lenses during the data collection process and in writing up; and (e) 
sufficient time in the field to obtain a deep understanding. In combination 
I saw these as providing the necessary closeness to the site and subjects 
under study (Alvesson 2003; Faulconbridge 2012). 
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These features would take me beyond “quick description” to “thick 
description” (Wolcott 1995, p.90), avoiding the “ethnographic pastiche” 
bemoaned by Bate (1997), and reflecting the need for time in the field as 
a necessary route to familiarity, and the avoidance of conclusions based 
on fleeting occurrences (Strauss & Corbin 1990). They include elements of 
“researching down” (at management level) as well as “researching up” 
(from partner level) (Eberle & Maeder 2011). These features would 
provide access to language use and discourses, routine activities and 
directed practices, technologies, decision-making and implementation, and 
by inference rules and norms, each of which is essential to meaning-
making in professional contexts (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). Following 
Weick (1979) and Schwartzman (1993), the firm, rather than being reified 
as a fixed and stable entity, could be problematised and seen as socially 
constituted through a series of processes – the necessarily interrelational 
act of organising, underpinned by the power/knowledge conjuncture and 
power relations. 
 
Having reviewed ethnography and case study in general, I now move on 
to consider key methods included in the chosen methodology: 




Spradley tells us that one of the key roles of the modern fieldworker is to 
“observe the activities, people, and physical aspects of the situation” 
(Spradley 1980, p.54; in De Laine 2000, p.101). I considered that to 
achieve depth I required to seek access to both the formal and informal 
aspects of the firm: 
 
Organizations are ‘formal’ in the sense of having explicit tasks to 
accomplish and ‘informal’ in the sense of the way members 
continually negotiate with one another in the interpretation and 
carrying out of such tasks. (Schwartzman 1993, p.vii) 
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Schwartzman’s link back to the Hawthorne Studies and Roethlisberger and 
Dickson (1939) is clear. As Bate (1997) explains, it is the informal process 
where different parts of the firm conflict and negotiate their co-existence. 
In order to gain such access those within the firm, who were to be 
observed, required to understand my presence and role in the field. Gold 
(1958) and Junker (1960) introduced the now classic typology of complete 
participant, complete observer, participant observer and observer 
participant. The first two are at opposite ends of the spectrum. A complete 
participant is a covert fieldworker who is seeking to be no different from 
any other, whereas a complete observer has no contact at all with those 
being studied. The other two are in the middle and the difference between 
them may not be meaningful (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). Tracy 
(2013) refers to the play participant, likening it to the participant observer 
and Spradley’s (1980) “active participant”. The play participant engages in 
a range of activities in order to get closer to the culture and its associated 
rules of behaviour (Spradley 1980). Tracy (2013) narrates certain 
advantages to such a role: the ability to become closely connected to the 
scene and the participants while also raising questions. In my case I 
assumed the role of researcher-observer in formal aspects of the firm, 
with an element of participator in some more informal aspects, something 
which I return to consider further below when reflecting on my role as a 
researcher. I also describe below the wide extent of the observation that I 




Interviews are useful as they allow “participants to talk about a set of 
questions or topics in their own way” (Matthews & Ross 2010, p.147). The 
explanatory value of interviews is captured by Hammersley and Atkinson: 
 
The expressive power of language provides the most important 
resource for accounts.  A crucial feature…is its capacity to present 




I regarded such descriptions, explanations, and evaluations as invaluable 
to my research aim, enabling me to explore with managers and partners 
alike their personal reflections on the firm, its operations, and their 
position in it. However, it is necessary here to address the pragmatic 
question: "Is this interview-produced knowledge useful?" (Kvale 2008, 
p.143). This question alludes to a series of criticisms of interviews as a 
means of data collection, which start with an assertion that: 
 
Interview knowledge is produced in a specific interpersonal situation, 
and the situational and interactional factors influencing the 
knowledge produced need to be taken into account… [T]he emphasis 
is on situated knowledge… not arriving at context-independent 
general knowledge… Interview knowledge is not collected, but 
produced between interviewer and interviewee, and the meanings 
constructed in the interaction are again restructured throughout the 
later stages of an interview inquiry (Kvale 2008, p.143) 
 
This starting point is helpful from an epistemological standpoint. It reflects 
my own philosophical position, in particular the role of the researcher in 
co-creating meaning, a viewpoint which is shared by numerous 
commentators (Chirban 1996; Davies 2008; Holstein & Gubrium 1995; 
Brinkmann 2013). As Brinkmann (2013) states, this criticism tends to be 
leveled by those with positivist or post-positivist leanings who suggest 
that unlike other methods preferred by the positivist, interviewing is 
reliant on human judgement, generates subjective knowledge, and hence 
lacks reliability and generalisability. However, these are only valid 
criticisms to the extent that their underlying premises are accepted: that 
research methods should seek objectivity, reliability and generalisability. 
Like Brinkmann (2013) I broadly reject these premises as based in naïve 
empiricism. However unlike Brinkmann (2013) I seek to avoid being 
drawn into claims based on the possibility of "objectivity about 
subjectivity". If one accepts (as I do) that all research is influenced by the 
researcher, and all researchers bring their own subjectivity (Hammersley 
& Atkinson 2007), there is little point dwelling on positivist objections, nor 
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in seeking objectivity through the back door as Brinkman (2013) appears 
to do here. Rather, as I have argued, subjectivity and intersubjectivity is 
inherent in social research and simply needs to be recognised when 
reviewing claims made. 
 
The second set of criticisms of interview as a method are what Brinkmann 
(2013) describes as "internal critiques". For this purpose he draws on 
criticisms levied by Potter and Hepburn (2005). Firstly, in terms of the 
reporting of interview data, selected quotations frequently do not include 
the interviewer and therefore limit the context of the response. Secondly, 
transcriptions may not include pauses, vocal emphasis, speech errors and 
the like which may be revealing. Thirdly, interpretations are often 
disconnected from the specifics of the text. Fourthly, how the interview 
came about may not be apparent. Finally, there may be a failure to 
account for the interview as an interaction. Whereas, as Brinkmann 
(2013) notes, most of these criticisms are capable of being dealt with by 
including more detail within the write-up, I consider that, at the same 
time, there requires to be an element of pragmatism here: theses have 
space limitations, and the writer must chose to use that space in such a 
manner as conveys both the data and analysis in a balanced manner 
rather than become lost in what amounts to a counsel of perfection in 
terms of data presentation. Further, the comments on transcription and 
interaction reflect the disciplinary background of Potter and Hepburn 
(discursive psychology), which seeks to analyse the micro-detail of the 
interaction. For my purposes, I agree with Brinkmann’s response, and 
take the view that this level of detail is unlikely to be required in many 
studies, and my study in particular, where depth comes not from micro-
analyses of interview data, but rather a much broader sweep of data. 
 
Brinkmann’s (2013) third category of criticisms is Potter and Hepburn’s 
(2005) "necessary" problems with interviews. Firstly, interviewers "flood" 
interviews with the agendas of social science, being agendas which may 
not be of interest to the respondents. This does of course depend on how 
the interview is carried out, and what the subject matter is, and does not 
appear “necessary”. In point of fact, while I accept that interviewees in 
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the study may have been seeking to be polite, many interviewees 
expressed the view that they had enjoyed the interview undertaken as 
part of the study, perhaps it being a now all too rare occasion when their 
views on the firm and its management were being sought.  
 
The second “necessary” limitation is the assertion that the respective 
positioning of interviewer and respondent will affect the discourse that 
takes place. I tend to agree this is an inevitable outcome, the interview 
process being an intersubjective process of meaning creation (Cunliffe 
2011) where the respective roles of the interviewer and interviewee come 
into play (Cunliffe & Karunanayake 2013), the latter being something I 
return to later when reflecting on the data collection process. However, in 
practice I reflexively took account of events as they unfolded, and updated 
the interview guide used as data emerged, so as to seek input from 
interviewees in a layered process that sought to add depth of 
understanding in a reiterative process (Cunliffe & Karunanayake 2013). 
Whereas this does not make the study an objective one, it does mean the 
focus of interviews became a product of current events, and past 
interviews (and other data collected), as influenced by interviewees, 
rather than being purely an artefact of a pre-determined set of questions 
created by me as the researcher before the study began. 
 
Thirdly, Brinkmann (2013) suggests that people answer questions based 
on their own interests. Whereas I consider this as “necessary”, the key is 
to be aware of the possibility, and to take account of it in analysis, 
something I sought to do having regard to my own experience of the 
interrelations between partners and firm, and something I describe further 
below in my reflections.  
 
I concluded interviews remain an important source for the investigation 
of meaning (as opposed to “truth”), member perspectives and discursive 
strategies employed, and would contribute in particular to an 
understanding (albeit partial) of those activities that cannot be observed 
(Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). That proved to be the case. They also 
provided space for member reflection on researcher interpretation 
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(Tracy 2013), something utilised in the study by virtue of the 
development of interview guides as data emerged. 
 




Organisations produce many documents, in the form of, for example, 
policies, procedures, newsletters, marketing releases and internal emails 
and memos. Much of the work of professionals takes place through the 
drafting, negotiation and exchange of documents. In some instances, such 
as lawyers, they are pored over in an iterative process that seeks to clarify 
meaning and understanding. Professionals may be judged by colleagues 
based on the perceived quality of documents they produce (Rees 1981). A 
review of documents can inform an ethnographic case study (Hammersley 
& Atkinson 2007; Atkinson & Coffey 2011; Prior 2011) as documents are 
said to “actively construct the very organisations they purport to describe” 
(Atkinson & Coffey 2011, p.77). Such a review alerts one to discourses 
that find form through written texts, and which constitute what might be 
called “organisational reality”, and knowledge related that that reality 
(Bloomfield & Vurdubakis 1994). However, like the other methods 
described in this chapter, it is important to bear in mind that such review 
does not seek to access a single “truth”: 
 
Documents are ‘social facts’, in that they are produced, shared and 
used in socially organised ways. They are not, however, transparent 
representations of organisational routines, decision-making 
processes, or professional practices. (Atkinson & Coffey 2011, p.79) 
 
This is no different from other classes of data produced socially; none are 
mirrors of reality (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). However they do 
provide a richer, more nuanced picture of the organisation (Alvesson 
2003). Equally, documents often formed the interface between 
management and partners – through the issue of policies and other 
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communications. In theoretical terms I regarded documents as important 
to the research aim and focal theories adopted, they playing a role in the 
creation of knowledge (Foucault 1978), forming the basis for discipline and 
punishment (Foucault 1977), and being a resource for technologies of the 
self (Foucault 1988). Further detail on the approach taken with respect to 
documents is given below in the section on data analysis. 
 
I complete my analysis of methods adopted by referring to fieldnotes. 
 
Fieldnotes and “headnotes” 
 
In addition to observation, interview and meeting transcripts, and 
document review, fieldnotes were part of data collection. Tracy (2013), 
drawing on Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (Emerson et al. 1995), notes that 
initial fieldnotes are raw records or “jottings” which may be little more 
than hurried shorthand notes. These were the medium through which I 
recorded initial observations and offered interpretations (Wolcott 1995). In 
contrast to commentators who are prescriptive in terms of quantum of 
fieldnotes based on the length of observation (Lindlof & Taylor 2010), and 
those who advise on brevity and focus (Miles & Huberman 1994) I saw 
fieldnotes as a craft rather than a science (Bate 1997), and adopted a 
pragmatic approach to writing them up depending on their context and 
potential contribution to fulfilling the research aim. 
 
Tracy (2013) and Emerson et al. (1995) also refer to “headnotes”, being 
actively taken mental notes that are written up later. These were used 
when overt recording or note-taking was not appropriate or allowed, for 
example in an informal conversation and ad hoc meetings. After retiring 
from the conversation I would either jot down notes in written format, or 
dictate notes and reflections – including parts of the conversation – into 
my recording device. The choice between these was context dependent. If 
I were able to remove myself so as to dictate notes I would. Sometimes I 
would do so in a visit to the restroom, and other times I would go to my 
car. Where that was not practicable, I would jot down notes and write 
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them up as soon as practicable thereafter. It should be noted that 
fieldnotes and headnotes were necessarily selective recollections, and the 
choice of what to record was one of the many data collection decisions 
that I was required to make (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). 
 
Data collection – sampling and management of access 
 
In this section I describe what I set out to review, as well as the data 
actually collected. I also explain the data collection strategy. 
 
In choosing events, interviewees and documents for the research, I 
principally adopted criterion-based sampling (LeCompte et al. 1993), with 
some elements of representative and convenience sampling where 
resource and location constraints demanded (Maxwell 2004). Descriptions 
of criterion applied are given below. I was primarily located at a single site 
(Site) but travelled to events elsewhere as they arose, taking the 
opportunity to interview partners and Function Heads at those sites while 
there. Whereas I began observation by locating myself continuously at the 
Site, it quickly became apparent that meaningful data collection was 
dependent on either (a) pre-organised events taking place, where 
partners interacted in the context of decisions to be made, or wider 
events, or (b) the arrangement of interviews. Thereafter observation 
became punctuated but regular (Davies 2008), with attendance of one 
sort or another taking place each week, and often more than once in a 
week, over a period of 13 months. 
 
My modus operandi was to attend, observe and, where possible, makes 
notes of what was said at key events at different levels of hierarchy and 
formality within the firm, listed in Table 5.4. These were all forms of 
meeting, suggested by Schwartzman (1989) as a key event which is 
constitutive of organisational structures, and the site of both order and 
disorder. Those chosen were either formal, at which management strategy 
and policies were determined, conveyed and discussed, or informal, with 
potential for “back-stage” discussion (Goffman 1969). At formal meetings 
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I took notes and transcribed those as soon as practicable thereafter, 
usually the next day or at worst within a few days of the event occurring. 
That meant I was able to interpret and supplement my notes from my 
memory, using the notes as a guide. 
 
Observed Event Participants 
Governance and Strategy Board (GSB) 
meetings (Monthly, approx) 
Chairman, Managing Partner (MP), 
Elected Members from partners 
Operations Board meetings (Monthly) MP, Department Heads, Function Heads 
– Finance, HR, IT, Marketing 
Partners’ Meetings (Quarterly) Partners, Function Heads 
Partners’ Conference (Annual) Partners, Function Heads 
Departmental Away Days (Annual) All fee earners in the department, plus 
facilitators 
Partners informal lunches (Weekly at 
selected Site) 
Partners and consultants 
(Selected) Divisional meetings Division Head and division partners 
(Selected) Training events Varies – mixture of partners, other 
lawyers, functional managers and other 
staff  
(Selected) Partner objective setting and 
review meetings 
MP, Department Heads, individual 
partners 
Table 5.4: Key events and participants 
 
Informal partners’ lunches took place regularly (weekly, with some 
exceptions) and were a particularly good informal setting, where a smaller 
group of partners discussed issues of interest in a manner more 
apparently open than in more formal meetings. In that case I relied on 
headnotes, sometimes retiring to the restroom to makes notes during the 
lunch, and other times doing so immediately after, either writing up notes 
or dictating them into my voice recorder in an empty meeting room or in 
my car. Subject to doing that first, after formal and informal events, I also 
took the opportunity to “walk the floor”, “bumping into” and “popping in to 
see” partners, thereby prompting more informal contact and discussion of 
recent events as I did so. Again, I made headnotes of these less formal 
conversations and wrote them up or dictated them immediately thereafter. 
Walking the floor, bumping into and popping in to see partners meant I 
maintained regular contact with a number of partners who I came to 
regard as key informants throughout the period. This meant I could get 
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their reflections on events as they happened, rather than solely relying on 
a single interview and reflections at a single point in time (Hammersley & 
Atkinson 2007; Bate 1997; Davies 2008). 
 
Type of Partner/Function Head Number interviewed 
Chairman 1 (of 1) 
Managing Partner 1 (of 1) 
GSB Members 4 (of 5) 
Operations Board Members 6 (of 6) 
Departmental Heads 3 (of 3) 
Division Heads 5 (of 10) 
Line Partners 19 (of 46) 
Function Heads 3 (of 5) 
Table 5.5: Interviewees split by type and number 
 
Table 5.5 contains a list of people interviewed, having been chosen so as 
to include a spread of both decision makers or implementers at different 
hierarchical levels, and those subject to their decisions and processes. The 
sample therefore included partners with management responsibilities 
(Chairman, Managing Partner, GBS Members, Operations Board Members, 
Departmental Heads and Division Heads), Function Heads, and “line” 
partners (being partners without formal management responsibilities). In 
order to ensure some breadth of representation, in addition to senior 
management, I interviewed Department Heads and one or more 
representative Division Heads in each Department; and selected line 
partners across multiple divisions. In order to give anonymity in so far as 
possible I do not give a breakdown here of the line partners chosen in 
terms of the division and department occupied, and their position on the 
equity lockstep (or outside it), and only reveal that in the following 
chapters where necessary to convey meaning. Where a choice was 
available I bore in mind that good informants may themselves be 
“marginal”, an outsider who understands the culture but in some ways 
observes it rather than adheres to it (Davies 2008). This proved to be the 
case, with some partners who might be regarded as more skeptical of 
management imperatives and motives providing a greater depth in terms 
of the events that may have preceded a management initiative, or 
informed a decision. 
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Interviews can be structured, semi-structured and unstructured (Bryman 
& Bell 2011).  Structured interviews are a form of surveyor questionnaire 
in different form.  Unstructured interviews are closer to naturally occurring 
talk, and may have no questions beyond an introductory topic, leaving the 
interview to take its own shape after that.  Semi-structured interviews 
may have set questions, or as likely an interview guide, which provides 
shape to the interview while allowing it to flow more or less naturally. This 
is designed to allow the respondents to offer their own explanations, while 
containing specific questions/topics selected by the researcher. 
 
“Formal” interviews, as distinct from ad hoc meetings, were semi-
structured, making use of an interview guide, to explore broad themes 
including interviewee career choice and history, their role in the firm, their 
experience of management systems and processes, their relationships 
with managers and other partners, and their view of firm and individual 
success. The depth of that exploration varied depending on the individual’s 
position and experience, events in the more recent past, and emerging 
themes. As I found subjects of interest, and those which reached 
exhaustion, I amended the interview questions to address those subjects 
of interest. Hence interviews became more focused as themes were 
identified (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007), promoting “member checking” 
of understandings, hence assisting the quality of research (Flick 2008; 
Tracy 2010). 
 
The exception to this general approach was for individuals who, due to the 
role played in the firm, lent themselves to more specific lines of 
questioning. Examples of this included the firm’s Managing Partner. As the 
person at the centre of adoption and execution of many governance 
processes I considered it a good opportunity to explore with him his role, 
what he is trying to achieve and how certain firm processes work. Likewise 
I also interviewed two members of the firm’s Remuneration Committee 
shortly after the point when the committee deliberated, in order to gain 
insights as close as possible to the execution of the process, and I 
interviewed Function Heads in relation to their role. 
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Unstructured interviews were rather more in the nature of ad hoc 
meetings, where data was collected based largely on themes that reflected 
partner reactions to events as they unfolded, and hence formed an 
important part of the data insofar as it speaks to partner experiences of 
the PSF and its management “in action”. In all cases I adopted a probing 
approach (Potter & Hepburn 2005), using provocations linked to actual 
events to elicit responses that moved the analysis of interviewees from 
the abstract to the actual. 
 
Each formal interview lasted between one and two hours (on average 1.5 
hours), and was audio recorded and transcribed by me. Informal or ad hoc 
conversations with partners were written up in accordance with comments 
above on informal meetings. 
 
A non-exhaustive list of key documents reviewed is shown in Table 5.6.  
 
Documents 
GSB and Operations Board papers  
GSB and Operations Board minutes 
Partners’ Conference papers 
Management email communications to the partner group 
Divisional meeting papers and minutes 
Explanatory documents for relevant management systems and processes e.g. 
• Partner appointment and competence framework 
• Partner review, appraisal and objective setting 
• Partner remuneration 
Emails introducing or referring to the above 
Table 5.6: Documentary review 
 
In addition, by virtue of my inclusion on divisional partner lists for email 
circulation purposes I received emails, and associated documents, where 
those were addressed to the partner group as a whole, or within the three 
divisions followed. This informed the study as a whole, and was another 
means by which I was kept up to date with management communications 
(discourses) as they happened. These documents and emails also 
informed questions to be put to partners and Function Heads during 
interview and ad hoc discussion. Hence my review of documents added 
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depth to my understanding, and provided materials against which 
practices and discussions could be viewed and explored with participants 
(Prior 2011). However, in reviewing documents I was careful to see them 
for what they are: one means through which management communicate 
information and decisions, and “set the tone”, not a means to access the 
“truth”. Issues of authenticity, credibility and representativeness required 
to be considered (Davies 2008). Hence, in using documents, as well as 
other data sources, I saw them as part of a wider picture that had to be 
understood in the context of management initiatives.  
 
Table 5.7 contains a detailed summary of data collected from observation, 
interview and documents. 
 
 
Type Frequency Number attended/read 
Partner interviews (arranged) N/A 32 
Function Head interviews 
(arranged) 
N/A 3 
Partner ad hoc 1 to 1 
meetings/emails (partners) 
Ad hoc 40 (including Remcom ad 
hoc discussions) 
Partner meetings/conferences Quarterly 4 
Partner engagement feedback 
sessions 
Annual 2 
Partner informal lunches c Weekly 21 
Partner review interim and 





Partner review and 360 
feedback – associated papers 
N/A 49 
Governance and Strategy 
Board meetings 
c Monthly 14 
Governance and Strategy 
Board emails/documents 
Ad hoc 60 
Operations Board  
Meetings 
Monthly + 16 
Operations Board 
emails/documents 
Monthly and ad hoc 142 (plus misc loose 
papers) 




Ad hoc 57 
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Type Frequency Number attended/read 
Divisional partner meetings 
(Division 1) 
c Bi-Monthly 6 
Divisional emails/documents 
(Division 1) 
Ad hoc 68 
Divisional partner meetings 
(Division 2) 
c Monthly 6 
Divisional emails/documents 
(Division 2) 
Ad hoc 47 
 
Divisional partner meetings 
(Division 3) 
c Bi-Monthly 5 
Divisional emails/documents 
(Division 3) 
Ad hoc 80 
Divisional sub-business plan 
(Division 4) 
N/A 1 plus associated papers 




emails/documents (Dept 1) 
Ad hoc 27 
Departmental 
emails/documents (Dept 2) 
Ad hoc 21 






Partner appointment papers N/A 34 
Function emails/documents Ad hoc 65 
Function Head meetings Monthly 2 
Department Away days Yearly 1 
Dynamic growth meetings Specific 2 
Dynamic growth papers Specific 3 
Partner training Specific 1 
News bulletins Weekly 56 
“Values” communications Ad hoc 12 
Table 5.7: Type/quantum of data collected 
 
As can be seen I was able to obtain a high level of access over the course 
of the study, including access to meetings, events and interviews, as well 
as associated documentation. I managed access as I went along, asking 
for access at what appeared to be opportune times, for example after an 
ad hoc conversation about the study (often prompted by the partner), or 
after a meeting. This on the whole was very successful. I gathered rich 
data which reveals an enlightening story of the effects of financialisation, 
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and partner experiences, in a contemporary PSF. I should note however 
that I had some restrictions on access. On a small number of occasions I 
was asked to leave a board meeting when a sensitive strategic issue was 
to be discussed (it becoming clear later that these were related to the 
subject matter of a strategy conference which I later attended). I also had 
one partner fail to respond to a request for interview, and another cancel 
with a promise to rearrange which never occurred. Two partners whom I 
asked for access to their performance review refused that request on the 
basis they considered the subject matter private. Other performance 
reviews I missed through diary clashes or holidays. Whereas one can 
never be sure of what one missed, I consider that the depth and richness 
of other data gathered more than makes up for the gaps described, 
allowing a robust analysis based on multiple data sources. 
 
In overall terms, and accepting that any study is inevitably incomplete and 
partial (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007), I became close to the workings of 
the firm, its strategic choices, its operational decision-making and 
processes, and the experience of partners in relation to those workings. I 
therefore believe the study has achieved the important enabling features 
of an ethnographic case study as referred to above. 
 




Data analysis is not, as many research design and methods texts at least 
implicitly suggest (cf. Maxwell 2004; Miles & Huberman 1994; Matthews & 
Ross 2010), a distinct stage severable from research design and data 
collection. Rather, reflection and analysis is an ongoing process from 
development of the research design and throughout its implementation 
(Davies 2008; Thomas 2010). It lasts until the end of the project (and 
perhaps beyond). For this reason, the sections which appear above touch 
on some aspects of data analysis which aren’t repeated here, and the split 
in this chapter is thereby somewhat false. That split does allow me to 
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satisfy the norms associated with academic writing, and to provide space 
for a brief explanation of some of the rather more functional aspects of 
data analysis such as coding. 
 
Following Spradley (1980), Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), Davies 
(2008) and Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009), I regard analysis as an 
“iterative-inductive” (O’Reilly 2008) and reflexive process. It is cyclical, 
the material tasks (observation, interview, analysis, theorisation) are 
reiterated repeatedly (Schwartzman 1993). I consider data as a series of 
representations (Denzin & Lincoln 2005), initially understood through our 
own perspectives (Hanson 1958) and choices of analytical tools, which in 
turn are influenced by interaction with others (Mead 1934), and made 
sense of through our theoretical knowledge and preferences (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg 2009). However these analytical tools and theories should not 
take precedence over empirical work. As Bourdieu states: 
 
There is no doubt a theory in my work or, better, a set of thinking 
tools visible through the results they yield, but it is not built as such… 
It is a temporary construct which takes shape for and by empirical 
work. (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992; in Thomas 2010 p.179) 
 
By being conscious of the fact that we bring our own perspectives and 
preferred tools and theories to the data (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009), we 
can be open reflexively to incorporating alternative tools and theoretical 
angles, thereby seeing data in a new light which may offer greater insight. 
In the present study, for example, my research design started with the 
Foucauldian power lens and Goffman’s (1969) dramaturgical perspective. 
It then expanded to briefly contemplate a wider power perspective based 
on the so-called four dimensions of power (Clegg et al. 2006). However, 
as the study developed, aspects of “logics” offered some insight, in 
particular work by Freidson (2001) on professionalism as a third, 
alternative, logic to that of managerialism and the market. Likewise, in 
seeking to piece together the different aspects of the thesis, and explain 
the motivations and experiences of partners, literature on professional 
identity (e.g. Grey 1994; Ibarra 1999) and tension and contradiction 
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(Putnam et al. 2016) were adopted for their explanatory power. What I 
am getting at here of course is a form of design flexibility, using the twin 
pillars of interpretation and reflection, something which I believe was 
applied in the thesis process, and allowed for necessary shifts in 
theoretical focus so as to deliver the overall analysis that is presented 
here. 
 
I now move to provide more detail of the analytical process. After doing 
that I comment on the role of reflection in qualitative research before I 




According to Costly, Elliott and Gibbs, "[t]he ability to carry out high-
quality work-based research relies on the process of organizing reflection-
on-action into coherent data that can be communicated, understood, 
analysed, and related to other data" (Costley et al. 2010, p.121). They 
suggest a number of stages including observation, experience, purpose, 
reflection-on-action, coding, categorization, analysis, comparison and 
theorization. This is broadly the process I followed. Analysis is the process 
of drawing out implications and inferences from the data and drafting 
conclusions (Costley et al. 2010). Using Schutz’s (1964) distinctions 
between first and second order concepts, Van Maanen (1979) describes 
how first order concepts, the situationally and historically contingent 
“facts” as revealed through ethnographic investigation (Angrosino’s 
patterns), may be analysed through second order concepts, the 
theories/constructs used by the researcher. In my case the analysis stage 
was combined with the stages of “comparison” and “theorisation”. 
Comparison is the placing of findings (in this case the stories that had 
been produced) in the relevant literature, while theorisation (or theorising) 
is the production of “ways of thinking about or categorizing knowledge 
about the world” (Costley et al. 2010, p.125). For Angrosino (2007), 
comparison and theorisation are the stages where patterns are placed 
alongside existing literature, linking to the interpretation of others. 
 107 
 
However, arguably there is a stage before this where early, and tentative, 
analysis takes place. I personally transcribed all meetings, interviews, 
lunches and training events, the latter two based on fieldnotes or 
headnotes, and on an “interesting extracts” basis only. After transcription 
I sought to draft a brief analytic memo drawing out key themes, make 
connections to other data of future events, and note outstanding 
questions. Both transcriptions and analytic memos were stored in a 
qualitative software tool, MAXQDA, as were firm documents and emails 
where made available electronically. In writing analytic memos I aimed to 
not only record observations but also personal reactions and unresolved 
thoughts (Emerson et al. 1995). These analytic memos were also a place 
in which I sought to overcome my own challenge of making the familiar 
seem strange (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009), an exercise which is 
inevitably partial and flawed as no researcher can ever remove himself 
from his own history. Later in the process, the analytic memos played a 
secondary role, themselves being considered for evidence of themes (their 
primary purpose) (Tracy 2010; Hammersley & Atkinson 2007), but also 
for evidence of my own assumptions and reservations (De Laine 2000), a 
subject I return to below. 
 
In the first four months of data collection I limited my data analysis to the 
analytic memos, preferring to gather data and make tentative reflections, 
before reaching any conclusions that might limit my field of vision. At the 
end of the four month period, I drew up a “long list” of emerging themes 
(Tracy 2013; Matthews & Ross 2010). Although I began at that stage to 
see areas of particular interest, in keeping with the advice of my 
supervisors, I chose to continue to keep the field of review and 
questioning open for the following three months. During that second 
period I followed the same routine: data collection – transcription – 
analytic memos, but also began to carry out detailed thematic coding of 
the “spoken” data (interviews, meetings, lunches etc), using MAXQDA. It 
is important to note that MAXQDA does not provide any data coding or 
analysis by itself (Silver & Lewins 2014). Rather, it is a convenient 
receptacle for the data which can then have codes electronically attached 
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(Silver & Lewins 2014). Its functionality allows one to see data organised 
by type, and codes used in a code bar. This allowed me to easily amend, 
reduce or expand codes as I proceeded, helping to provide focus and 
reduce coding duplication. It also enabled me to link analytic memos to 
transcripts and other documents, and add new analytic memos referring 
to specific sections of documents.  
 
In coding the data I chose to put data into themes by reference to their 
natural categories rather than my focal theories. This represented a 
departure from my original research design which had contemplated 
coding initially against a combination of my background framing concepts 
and focal theory. The reasons for this departure were twofold. Firstly, I 
wanted to keep the field open, and not discard data that did not fit neatly 
into the focal theories. Secondly, and more importantly, from early in the 
collection phase I found data that I considered likely to be illuminating for 
a potential re-expression of my field of interest. I did not want to discard 
these by virtue of following a singular focus on, for example, Foucault’s 
characterisation of disciplinary power (e.g. Foucault 1977; 1978). The 
coding structure as adopted was therefore a mixture of descriptive and 
thematic codes, giving me a wider access to the data and themes 
emerging as data collection proceeded, and leaving interesting avenues 
open. 
 
The downside of the coding structure when combined with the amount of 
data collected and considered, was the sheer volume of principal codes 
(16) and sub-codes (for example, 53 sub-codes under a single principal 
code), as well as the number of possibilities for further development of the 
research aim. Several avenues were considered, for example, the 
possibility of presenting an analysis of the data as a juxtaposition of the 
financialisation of the PSF and what are sometimes referred to as the four 
dimensions of power (Clegg et al. 2006), going beyond Foucauldian 
analysis to capture work on power through “power to” (e.g. Parsons 
1954), “non-decision-making” or agenda control (Bachrach & Baratz 1962; 
1963; 1970), Lukes’ (1974) radical view focusing on hegemony, and 
Foucault. However that route, which was investigated in some depth in the 
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run up to the end of the data collection period, was rejected after the 
yearly departmental review panel process as lacking in philosophical 
consistency. Whereas this left the direction of the thesis somewhat 
rudderless for some time thereafter, because the coding had not closed off 
avenues of interest, there was no requirement to re-create the coding 
from scratch. Rather, with a view to narrowing down the possibilities for 
achieving the research aim, which at that stage appeared further from 
delivery than at any point in the PhD process, it was determined that I 
should write a series of 11 empirical accounts. 
 
The empirical accounts focused on presenting the data by reference to (a) 
firm strategy and definitions of success (b) firm governance (c) the 
development appointment and progression of the partners (d) partner 
review and remuneration processes and (e) the experience of partners 
and management of each of the foregoing. In so doing data were 
presented so as to tell an account of how each was constructed and 
undertaken within the firm. The coding structure that had been adopted in 
MAXQDA facilitated the production of these data accounts, which were 
produced over the following three month period. After these accounts 
were completed and reviewed the key aspects in which a revised focus of 
the thesis could take shape were determined, namely the interfaces of 
financialisation, firm strategy and governance. By going backwards and 
forwards between the data presented in the data accounts, supplemented 
as necessary with related data held in MAXQDA, and the literature 
presented in the literature review, the structure of the thesis emerged as 
it is presented here. Each of the results chapters that follow are 
theoretically led, and cut across each of the data accounts, harvesting 
from them the relevant data for analysis in a theoretical context, and 
building towards the wider holistic analysis of the financialised PSF that 
this thesis presents. 
 
I now turn to writing up as part of analysis. 
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Writing up and its link to philosophical assumptions 
 
In many ways writing up of an ethnographic case study can be seen as 
part of analysis and reflection (Watson 2001), and also as part of the 
researcher’s construction of the reality which the write up represents 
(Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). It is here that data reporting, analysis 
and theorisation meet and find tangible form. However, writing up of an 
ethnographic case study can be more than simple reporting of a process, 
it is rhetorical in that theses seek to persuade the reader using devices 
including metaphor and narrative (story) (Davies 2008). It is also here 
that the authors philosophical orientations influence writing style. The 
naturalist writer writes in the third person, reporting the apparent “facts” 
as objectively observed and free from researcher influence (Hammersley & 
Atkinson 2007). The reflexive writer writes in the first person, with the 
researcher revealing himself and reflecting on his own role in creating or 
co-creating the reality reported (Davies 2008). Finally, the postmodern 
writer, using extensive quotes with little commentary, presents the voices 
of those under study to the exclusion of the researcher (Bate 1997). 
These are to some extent a reflection of the “crisis of representation” in 
ethnographic/qualitative research, whereby criticism of structuralist and 
naturalist accounts in anthropology led to the suggestion that 
ethnographic accounts were more works of literary fiction than 
representations of facts (Clifford & Marcus 1986). In response, and with 
roots in the work of Michel Bakhtin (Travers 2001), calls have been made 
for “polyvocality” (Clifford 1983; Clifford & Marcus 1986) and 
“multivocality” (Martin 1992). In contrast Geertz argues for interpretive 
accounts with solid grounding in the culture reported on (Geertz 1988; 
Hastrup 1992). 
 
I have taken account of the criticisms of each writing style in determining 
the choice most appropriate for my study. Whereas the third person 
“detached” writing in the naturalist style is seen by some as a false 
literary appeal to objectivity and the scientific method (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg 2009; Davies 2008) I believe even those most postmodern of 
accounts which seek to show only the voices of research subjects fall foul 
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of a similar notion: the attempt to remove their own role in creating that 
which is represented. Postmodern presentations cannot escape from the 
act of subjective interpretation that sits behind their choice of research 
topic, focus, questions (if any), and framing of quotes. To do otherwise 
simply results in a “cacophony” of voices (Bate 1997) and quickly 
becomes overwhelming and meaningless. 
 
I prefer to accept and acknowledge that the research is neither objective 
nor solely giving voice to the subjects under study. Rather, it sits within a 
tension between giving presence to actors voices, and representing the 
researcher’s voice and interpretation informed by experience and theory 
(Schwartzman 1993). Notwithstanding rigor in data collection, analysis 
and theorisation, what is presented inevitably has some element of 
subjective and interpretive presentation. Hence one must be transparent 
about that, and expressly acknowledge one’s role in creating what is 
presented. Informed by the foregoing I have chosen to present this 
chapter in the first person, thereby acknowledging the personal and 
subjective choices made by me in presenting this thesis. At the same time 
however, I do not wish the reader to become overwhelmed by my voice in 
the rest of the thesis, and have chosen the third person to present that. 
This is not an appeal to objectivity, which I have made clear is not 
achievable. Rather, it is a choice in literary style which, insofar as 
possible, allows the reader to consider what is presented from a position 
slightly detached from my voice, but nevertheless aware of the person 
who has produced it. 
 
Having considered my role and choices in writing up the next section 







Access and reflections on my role as researcher 
 
First steps to access 
 
In order to gain access to the case study firm I considered it essential to 
take this in two discrete stages. Firstly, I realised that I required to gain 
the consent of those known as the “gatekeepers”, being those in the 
senior management positions within the firm under study (Burgess 1991). 
Secondly, as this was a study which was reliant upon the observation of, 
and to some extent the participation of, people, I required to make my 
study known to those outside senior management who were to be the 
subjects of study, explain their rights and when relevant gain necessary 
consents. 
 
I was aware that I would be asking for a high level of access, including at 
strategic and operational board levels, and hence absent the support of 
those “in charge”, was likely to get nowhere. I found that my positionality 
as a professional, and former managing partner of a professional services 
firm, meant that I was able, in the year prior to commencing the research, 
to gain access to the Managing Partner and Chairman of the case study 
firm to inform them of my desire to undertake a study into the 
management of PSFs having regard to change that had taken place over 
the past decades, and the unique dynamics of the PSF structure in terms 
of the partner-owner conjunction. Each was quick to acknowledge that 
there had been considerable change in the methods and structures of 
management in the firm since the mid-1990s and expressed interest in 
the subject matter as a result. My positionality meant that they quickly 
understood that I was in some respects an “insider” (see discussion 
below) (Cunliffe & Karunanayake 2013), and therefore was coming from a 
position that would assist my interpretations. This appeared to put them 
at some ease, albeit subject to understanding more as to what would be 




Notwithstanding that progress, it was shortly after that I met my first 
obstacle. I was contacted by the Managing Partner who suggested that 
Hume Locke would require to be able to vet the thesis, and withdraw 
consent to its submission and publication if the firm’s management 
considered it prudent to do so. However, I explained that I regarded such 
a condition as problematic, and likely fatal to the thesis, by virtue of the 
risk that my interpretations could be affected by a need to present the 
firm in such a light as to be able to garner approval. I explained that such 
a risk would mean that I would not be able to proceed. I was relieved 
when the Managing Partner withdrew that conditionality subject to the 
name of the firm and those within it not being used. 
 
My contact with the firm as I developed the focus of the study in the first 
year of my doctoral studies, was limited. However, once I completed such 
development, I applied for and obtained ethics approval from Lancaster 
University’s ethics committee to proceed, subject to the condition that 
those under observation, being the partners and Function Heads of the 
firm, would be sent an explanatory memorandum in a form approved by 
that committee, and given the opportunity to intimate a desire to be 
excluded after any observation had taken place. Subsequently, after 
gaining the Managing Partner’s approval to the memorandum, it was 
circulated to each partner and manager alongside a confirmation that the 
study had been approved by the firm’s senior management and would be 
commencing forthwith. No objections were received at that point or, 
subject to what I say in the next sub-section, thereafter. In fact, a number 
of partners reverted to me suggesting they would be happy to be 
interviewed. Each person who was interviewed then signed a pre-
approved consent form which I retained. Digital recordings were promptly 
transferred from my digital recording device into my computer (outside 
the firm’s network, and protected) and deleted from the recording device. 
In accordance with University guidelines data will be kept securely for a 
minimum of 10 years. 
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Access in practice: working the hyphen-spaces 
 
In the next stage, fieldwork, I assumed a role of researcher-observer, but 
with a twist. As previously indicated, my professional history gave me 
some level of prior insight into how PSFs operate. That history, as both a 
partner in, and former managing partner of, a PSF, as well as the general 
nature of my doctoral studies, was made known to the Function Heads 
and partners within the firm. The result for me was something of a hybrid 
identity, that of professional, and that of researcher. The emphasis was 
very much on the status of observer when present at the formal aspects 
of the organisation, but with an element of participator in the more 
informal aspects, in particular at informal weekly partners lunches that I 
frequently attended, and at post-divisional meeting discussions that would 
sometimes take place. In considering how to describe this dichotomy, I 
found that Cunliffe and Karunanayake (2013), who draw on Fine (1994), 
offer insight into identity and relational issues and how they affect 
researchers. They conceptualise four “hyphen-spaces” that researchers 
occupy: insiderness-outsiderness, sameness-difference, engagement-
difference, and political activism-active neutrality. Table 5.8 gives brief 
details of the factors involved in each.  
 
Insiderness-Outsiderness 
• Researcher indigenous? 
• Ongoing role? 
• Received as ‘one of us’? 
• Feels ‘at home’? 
Sameness-Difference 
• Similarity, or otherwise of culture, 




• Participation in activities? 
• Emotional involvement? 
• Respondents as creators of 
knowledge? 
• Co-creation of knowledge? 
Political activism-Active neutrality 
• Researcher promotion of respondent 
agendas? 
• Active role in ‘struggles’? 
• Orientation towards organisational 
change? 
Table 5.8: Hyphen-spaces mapping (adapted from Cunliffe and Karunanayake 
2013) 
 
In my case the lines were blurred, my “past” identity having aspects of 
insiderness and sameness, but my “new” identity being more detached. 
These spaces are an elaboration of what Freilich (1970) calls the “marginal 
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native”. The “between” area makes up the “hyphen-space” within which 
possibilities for understanding, and meaning-making, are created (Cunliffe 
& Karunanayake 2013). Following Fine (1994), “working the hyphen” is a 
form of reflexivity whereby the researcher reflects on how his presence 
affects the research subjects, and what they do, recognising that the 
interrelational identities of researcher and respondent are not neutral, but 
may rely on different hyphen-spaces. Getting close to relevant events, 
people and documents required careful maintenance of relationships 
throughout the process, and a sensitivity to the various relationships I had 
(De Laine 2000). I had to be conscious of the potential necessity to 
change my research design if access was restricted (Davies 2008). In 
terms of how partners and Function Heads conducted themselves when I 
was present as an observer it was not apparent to me that those present 
at meetings acted in a manner obviously materially different from what 
might otherwise be expected. From time to time a side-remark would be 
made referring to me as “watching” or “listening in”, often presented with 
some humour, and suggesting they were broadly comfortable with my 
presence. However more often than not people appeared to act as if I 
were no different from anyone else at the meeting in the sense that they 
did not appear to temper their participation. I believe the regularity of my 
attendance, coupled with my connection with a number of them through 
interview and informal contact, meant they were not sufficiently 
concerned by my presence to change their behaviours. Rather people 
were clearly caught up in the cut and thrust of such meetings such that 
debates were conducted actively, with a full gamut of emotions: humour, 
anger, frustration, bemusement included. In turn, observation of such 
emotions formed an element of the analysis of the lived experience of 
partners, and I have sought to note such emotions, where relevant, in the 
representation that follows. 
 
In practice, although I required to maintain sensitivity to the relationships 
I had, I found that those being observed, and being asked to participate at 
interview, were welcoming and accommodating. As I contacted people for 
formal interview I sent them the explanatory memorandum again and 
explained I would require them to sign the consent and acknowledgement 
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attached which all who attended interview duly did. At that stage a 
number of partners and Function Heads engaged me in a brief 
conversation about the nature of the research, asking how it was going, 
and appeared to satisfy themselves that they were happy to proceed. On 
reflection, they appeared to accept me as someone who (a) was to some 
extent “like them” or “one of us”, having been a partner in a PSF (hence, 
in Cunliffe and Karunanayake’s (2013) mapping, attributing both 
“insiderness” and “sameness”) and (b) was undertaking a study which 
they considered interesting, and to which they were happy to contribute, 
in some cases perhaps seeing me as a conduit through which their voice 
could be heard, or frustrations vented. 
 
The latter aspect can be seen as demonstrating, perhaps, a view on their 
part that that my position lent itself to a promotion on some low level of 
their agenda, an element of Cunliffe and Karunanayake’s (2013)  “political 
activism” hyphen-space. Although unsaid, and not promoted by me, I 
wondered whether some partners thought that, despite my emphasis on 
the study being an academic one, there was the possibility that I might 
provide some form of report to management, and through that their voice 
might be heard, but on an unattributed basis. If that subject was 
expressly referred to, I was quick to confirm that access was not 
conditional on such a report, and that no such report had been asked for 
nor was expected on my part. Nevertheless I considered that this 
“impression”, if indeed it was one and not simply a figment of my own 
imagination, meant that people opened up and offered me insights that 
were helpful in articulating the partners’ experience of management and 
the processes of financialisation, and hence facilitated the research aim. 
 
Further, on occasion, I used self-disclosures, and knowledge sharing, as a 
strategy for opening up the interviewee to wider disclosure, another 
aspect supporting the view of the interview as a “joint exploration” 
(Davies 2008). Whereas it might be suggested that, as a result of these 
factors and my approach, I elicited data that might not have been 
forthcoming to an “outsider” researcher, I consider that to be a strength of 
the study, rather than a weakness. My philosophy does not support any 
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suggestion that, in order to be “reliable” all researchers must be able to 
repeat the study and obtain the same data (Matthews & Ross 2010). This 
is a positivist appeal to science which has no place in research of this 
nature, being research that is enriched by joint exploration (Davies 2008), 
not harmed by it. 
 
At a lesser level of “activism”, if indeed that is a useful term, I would 
frequently be stopped by partners to ask “how is the study going?” which 
gave me the chance to re-engage, and to ask for thoughts on current 
events. This was helpful in both maintaining relationships, and informing 
the study as events unfolded. It meant that, at those times, and also in 
the more informal aspects of observation such as partners’ lunches, my 
level of participation increased. I was no longer simply an observer, and 
would remark or ask questions to elicit responses and insights into 
subjects that arose. By so doing I sought to check some of my own 
interpretations from prior data (Jeffrey & Troman 2004; Tracy 2010) while 
at the same time observing partners debate issues and demonstrate their 
own inner struggles. However, I also recognise that in participating in this 
way, in Cunliffe and Karunanayake’s (2013) mapping of engagement-
difference, I became a co-creator of knowledge, promoting the 
intersubjective element of meaning and knowledge creation. This is 
consistent with my philosophical orientations, and rejection of the naïve 
empiricist’s view that might suggest that anything other than a detached 
and hidden observation somehow spoils the data. 
 
The net result was a set of interviews, meetings and informal encounters 
in which partners were proactive participants in the co-creation of 
knowledge. At interview or informal encounter, the act of asking partners 
what they thought about the instantiations of management and 
financialisation in which they were entwined in some cases led to an 
outpouring of emotion, often anger and frustration, evidencing the stress 
and tension under which they were living out their existence within the 
firm, and pointing me towards an analysis of the tensions and 
contradictions inherent in the financialisation of the PSF. Interviews in 
particular appeared to have a therapeutic value, several partners 
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becoming caught up in the moment as they expressed their views and 
feelings, and at the end confirming how much they had enjoyed the 
experience of being interviewed, conveying a sense of relief and 
unburdening. I felt empathy for line partners, partners with management 
responsibilities, and functional management, recalling how much pressure 
I myself had been operating under for so many years in line partner and 
management roles. I also thought of how that had affected my home life, 
my wife and children having to tread carefully as I wrestled with the latest 
work travails even when away from the work setting, extending into 
leisure activities and family holidays, the smart phone being “always on”. I 
saw the same tension etched on the faces of partners as they described 
their own experiences of balancing commitments, and dealing with the 
pressures of performing as a partner in Hume Locke. 
 
“Outsiderness” was not much in evidence. Only two interview requests did 
not result in an interview taking place. One through a failure to reply to an 
email making that request, and the other through the interview being 
cancelled due to other commitments, and not being re-arranged. The 
same individual who failed to reply to an interview request also initially 
resisted my attending two divisional meetings early in the study, but then, 
after the intervention of the Divisional Head whom I had interviewed early 
in the study, and formed a good relationship, agreed to allow me to be 
present from then on. It is of course impossible to say how the thoughts 
of those who did not attend interview would have affected this thesis. 
Likewise, I could not faithfully replicate those meetings which I missed, 
albeit other attendees were happy to give their own accounts of 
happenings, which were useful but required to be carefully considered 
given their partial and perspectivised nature. 
 
There was also the classic ethnographic risk of “going native”; becoming 
too close to those under study and hence failing to stand back and see the 
study from an outsider’s perspective (Gold 1958; Junker 1960). My 
philosophical position accepts that all researchers bring their own 




Researchers, too, are ‘situated’, i.e. they will bring a particular socio-
political, historical, gender, generational, ethnic and racial 
background to the research projects. (Tietze 2012, p.54) 
 
The search for unbiased objectivity is therefore futile. A more meaningful 
issue for me was that, as the research was conducted with a PSF, and I 
had a long history working within a PSF, unlike those who seek to make 
the strange familiar, I required to make the familiar strange (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg 2009; Costley et al. 2010). Becker sums up the problem: 
 
[It is] a matter of it all being so familiar that it becomes impossible to 
single out events… even when they happen right in front of you… [I]t 
takes tremendous effort of will and imagination to stop seeing only 
the things that are conventionally ‘there’ to be seen… beyond what 
‘everyone’ knows. (Becker 1971, p.10; in Hammersley & Atkinson 
2007, p.82) 
 
I therefore required to problematise that which people within the firm, 
including myself, had taken for granted; to question everything (De Laine 
2000). I had to undertake "a precarious balancing act between 
‘strangeness’ and ‘familiarity’" (Tietze 2012, p.56). Member reflections at 
ad hoc meetings and subsequent interviews, and memo writing after 
transcribing observed events, were ways I adopted to encourage this 
(Jeffrey & Troman 2004; Tracy 2010). Indeed, by keeping open a number 
of avenues for further consideration and development as data emerged, 
and updating interview guides to account for events and interviews as 
they took place, I feel I adopted a position that allowed for “strangeness” 
to guide decisions on what to focus on, and hence to overcome, to the 
extent that one can, my pre-conceptions. Indeed, in so doing the 
emphasis in the study moved away from a direct investigation of 
managerialism “versus” professionalism, an early part of the thesis title 
and research design, towards an exploration of the manifestation of 
financialisation in the firm, and Foucauldian insights on control and 
identity. Whereas financialisation was familiar to me in some ways, I 
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found the depth of its influence in Hume Locke a strangeness. Indeed I 
was at times unnerved by an unwavering focus on financial outcomes in 
some meetings, in particular at the Operations Board. At times that 
extended to an almost visceral unease when what appeared to be the 
legitimate concerns of individuals were given little, if any, credence when 
juxtaposed with a financial imperative, confirming that to some extent at 
least I had neither “gone native” nor simply accepted that as a natural and 
unquestionable pursuit of a commercial ethos. Of course this serves to 
simply reconfirm my own subjectivity and values, something that has 
undoubtedly influenced what appears here. 
 
Conclusions and Final Thoughts 
 
In pursuing my methodology I sought to adopt the ethnographic attitude 
described by Bate (1997), and the analytic mentality described by 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007). This included the avoidance of drawing 
early conclusions, attention to appearances while problematising that 
appearance, seeking an understanding of players perspectives while 
avoiding seeing these as “truths”, and analysing the circumstances 
surrounding actions in the case study. In so doing I have pursued a 
reflexive approach, accepting that I am the research tool and that, 
alongside the perspectives of those under study, I have brought my own 
perspectives. To that end I locate the study within the subjective to 
intersubjective realms (Cunliffe 2011; Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009), 
focusing on those aspects that contribute to the constitution of the firm on 
an ongoing, but historically situated basis, through discursive practices. 
The research is an analytical interpretation of these, based on empirical 
but inevitably partial and interpreted findings, themselves influenced by 
my theoretical preferences. However, this has not been a formula for 
“anything goes” (Feyerabend 2010). Rather, the research remains based 
in research practice through rigorous pursuit of the data; and in 
enactment of the methodology I have sought to present a credible and 
reflective thesis based in existing theory (Maxwell 2004; Flick 2007; 
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Flyvbjerg 2006). The writing up process and final presentation has been a 
material part of that exercise. 
 
Application of the methodology set out in this chapter supported the 
research aim in a number of ways. Firstly, it revealed the process by 
which financial logics are meditated into the firm by accounting practices 
(Miller & Power 2013), and are reflected in the strategic discourses 
employed by management (Alvesson & Sveningsson 2011; Knights & 
Morgan 1991; Gleadle & Cornelius 2008). Secondly, it demonstrated how 
technologies of measurement, discipline and control are employed to 
create the conditions under which knowledge of partners can be produced, 
rendering partners knowable, calculable and governable (Foucault 1977; 
Foucault 1978; Townley 1994). Thirdly, it showed how managerial 
imperatives and technologies of control have resulted in the creation of a 
new subjectivity, what the organisation constitutes as performance and 
contribution, and hence what it considers to be the requirements for 
partnership (cf. Hanlon 1997; Faulconbridge & Muzio 2008). Fourthly, it 
extracted the views of partners on their motivations and experiences, and 
the tensions and contradictions they reveal (Grey 1994; Thornborrow & 
Brown 2009; Gill 2015; Brown & Coupland 2015; Putnam et al. 2016). 
Fifth, it paid heed to the logics of “traditional” professionalism and their 
associated discourses, knowledge claims and technologies (Abbott 1988; 
Freidson 2001), which may still be at work, influencing partners as well as 









This chapter introduces the case study firm. It then begins an analysis of 
how financialisation is affecting Hume Locke, the chosen case study PSF, 
by addressing the first research question, namely: Has PSF strategy been 
financialised? Or more specifically: do PSFs adopt “narrative and numbers” 
and if so, are there performative effects? 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a cultural economy view of corporate strategy 
sees it as a set of practices that have a constitutive effect, defining 
problems, solutions, and measures of success or failure (Knights & Morgan 
1991). Froud and colleagues (2006) adopt such a view when connecting 
corporate strategising and financialisation, suggesting “narratives of 
strategic purpose” are used as the means of defining strategic solutions to 
market developments and competitive pressure. According to them 
metrics are adopted ex post to prove the success of the chosen strategy. 
Further, a cultural economy view suggests that when metrics are adopted 
to measure activities, or to determine progress or success, they have the 
potential to become performative (Froud et al. 2006; Knights & Morgan 
1991); to bring into being that which is measured (MacKenzie 2006; 
Muniesa 2014). When organisational actors behave so as to enact such 
measures, and describe the organisation in terms of the measures, the 
measures play a constitutive role: the organisation becomes that which is 
measured (Erturk et al. 2008; Du Gay & Pryke 2002). 
 
This chapter notes the firm’s “narrative of strategic purpose” (Froud et al. 
2006) and connection to metrics and rankings. Thereafter it explores the 
continuing application and reinforcement of narrative and numbers in 
senior management discourse, constituting the firm and its success in 
commensurable terms. In so doing the chapter distinguishes its findings 
from, and thereby develops, Froud and colleagues’ concept of “narrative 
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and numbers” (Froud et al. 2006). It further exemplifies the performativity 




Hume Locke is a UK law firm operating from multiple centres in a region of 
the UK. In terms of revenue and number of lawyers it is one of the UK’s 
top 100 law firms (Chambers 2016a). The firm is a Limited Liability 
Partnership (LLP), a structure which offers its owners, more commonly 
referred to as “partners”, a form of limited liability. In contrast to silent 
investors in large listed corporations, partners are not detached owners 
who invest solely to receive a return on investment. First and foremost 
they are the most senior lawyers practising within the firm, having 
qualified to do so in accordance with certification by one of the UK’s law 
societies. They both win and discharge client work, running teams of non-
partner lawyers (also known as “junior lawyers”), and other “fee earners” 
of various grades and titles, to do so. They have the rights and obligations 
defined in the firm’s Members Agreement, and share in firm profits. 
 
There are two types of partner in Hume Locke: equity partners and “fixed 
share partners”. Fixed share partners receive a fixed profit share, and 
have a lower level of capital committed to the firm. Equity partners share 
what is left of the profits after fixed shares are deducted (known as 
“equity profit”) in accordance with a points system known as the 
“lockstep”. The lockstep is a ladder, new equity partners starting at the 
bottom number of points, and progressing up year on year in increments 
until they reach maximum points. Progression in this manner is subject to 
review and alteration by a Remuneration Committee (“Remcom”) which 
considers lockstep progression every second year. In each year equity 
profits are split into a “per point” amount, and the share of any partner is 
that amount multiplied by his/her points allocation. 
 
In terms of firm governance Hume Locke have adopted many aspects of 
so-called “managerial best practice”, including hierarchical management 
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structures and the appointment of functional managers (finance, human 
resources, marketing etc.). Senior executive authority is vested in two 
elected partners, the Chairman and Managing Partner (“the senior 
management”), each of whom had been in place for some years. The 
Chairman and Managing Partner chair and set the agenda in two executive 
boards respectively: the Governance and Strategy Board (“the GSB”) and 
the Operations Board. 
 
The GSB has 5 members: the Chairman and Managing Partner ex officio, 
and 3 elected partners. Its remit is to consider firm-wide strategic and 
governance matters, the latter relating to the relationship between the 
partners inter se, and between partners and the firm. The Operations 
Board has a wide operational remit, including the implementation of 
strategy, and oversight of functional matters such as finance, HR, 
business development and marketing (“BD”), and IT. References in this 
thesis to “functional management” and “functions” are to those areas, 
each of which is headed by a “Director” (commonly referred to as a 
“Function Head”) who reports to the Managing Partner, and oversees a 
number of staff who deliver those functions. The Operations Board is 
manned by the Finance Director, HR Director, and the Heads of the firm’s 
three legal Departments, each of whom is a working partner within that 
Department. Hence the Operations Board is a mixture of lawyer and non-
lawyers. 
 
The legal or client facing structure of Hume Locke is split into Departments 
and Divisions. Each Department is an umbrella structure for multiple 
loosely connected Divisions, administering and reporting to the Operations 
Board on each. Department Heads are partners within the firm and hence 
are working lawyers, and are selected by the Managing Partner. 
Department Heads report to the Operations Board, and are broadly 
responsible for taking Operations Board decisions to Divisions, and 
Divisional proposals to the Operations Board. In turn, Divisions, organised 
by legal specialism, are led by a Division Head who reports to the 
Department Head, and is responsible for enacting Operations Board 
decisions within the Division, and the general administration of the 
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Division. In addition to the Division Head, Divisions comprise a number of 
“line partners” each of whom runs a team of lawyers who discharge client 
work. 
 
Function Heads are not lawyers but rather are employees of the firm and 
report to the Managing Partner, and in turn the Operations Board, They 
also have direct lines of communication with Departments, Divisions and 
line partners insofar as their functional responsibilities interface with them. 
 
The Remuneration Committee (Remcom) operates the firm’s partner profit 
sharing system. Its membership comprises the Chairman and Managing 
Partner ex officio, plus 3 elected partners. It is therefore exclusively 
manned by partners, albeit with Function Heads having a reporting role. 
 
The above description demonstrates Hume Locke as apposite for the 
study: it has followed the route of many PSFs in the introduction of 
managerial best practices, functionalisation of management, hierarchical 
structures, financial reporting and partner remuneration review. These are 
features of the development of the PSF over the last two decades (Hanlon 
1994; Cooper et al. 1996; Brock 2006; Muzio & Flood 2012), and the 
context in which the research aim is set. 
 
The financialisation of strategy: the business plan 
 
Around two years prior to the study senior management of Hume Locke 
proposed a business plan stating the firm’s “vision” of being recognised as 
the “top commercial law firm” in the region. The plan contained a series of 
targeted metrics, including targets for growth in revenue, top equity 
profit, profit margin and gearing, and progress towards meeting each 
target split out over sub-periods within the three year period of the plan. 
Table 6.1 contains an explanation of each financial metric referred to, the 
relevance of each of which will become clear as this analysis proceeds. 
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Each of revenue, profit and profit margin are accounting measures 
conventionally set out in the statutory accounts prepared in accordance 
with the law and accounting standards in the UK. They measure the 
amount of accounting receipts (revenue) made by the firm in any year, 
the profit (or loss) derived from that after costs (other than partner 
remuneration) are met, and how much of the revenue is represented by 
profit (margin). Profit per equity point, and top equity profit are products 
of the particular type of organisation the firm is: a PSF which divides profit 




Revenue (turnover) The revenue of the firm in the financial year 
Profit The amount by which revenue in the year exceeds 
costs in the year, before partner remuneration 
Profit margin That part of revenue that represents profit, 
expressed as a percentage of total revenue 
Profit per equity point The amount of profit attributable to a single point 
in the firm’s lockstep remuneration system in the 
year in question 
Top equity profit The profit share of a partner at the top of the 
firm’s lockstep remuneration system, in the year in 
question 
Gearing (leverage) The ratio of the number of non-partner fee earners 
to the number of partners 
Utilisation That proportion which the number of chargeable 
hours actually recorded by all fee earners bears to 
the aggregate of the capacity for all such fee 
earners, expressed as a percentage 
Lock-up The number of days from the undertaking of 
chargeable work to the receipt of payment for such 
work, expressed as an average across the firm 
Fee earner target The annual target number of chargeable hours for 
an individual fee earner 
Table 6.1: Metrics used in business plan 
 
The remaining measures form internal targets which have tactical 
significance in delivering revenue and profit; hence improvement in these 
metrics leads to improvement in revenue and/or profit. Gearing, also know 
as leverage, is a ratio equal to the number of fee earners (junior lawyers) 
that the firm engages “per partner”. In principle, higher gearing implies 
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greater profit potential by virtue of the assumption that each fee earner 
should generate revenue exceeding his/her cost. Utilisation is a measure 
of efficiency based on capacity, the aim being to utilise all available fee 
earning capacity. Finally lock-up is also a measure of efficiency, in this 
case measuring the time taken to converting work done into cash. The 
aim is to convert work into cash as soon as possible, assisting cash-flow 
and reducing firm working capital and borrowing requirements, each a 
cost to the firm or its partners. 
 
In addition, the plan contained a set of “Directory Objectives”. This 
referred to the yearly publications by Chambers and Legal 500 which claim 
to be “researching the world’s best lawyers” (Chambers 2016a) and “the 
clients’ guide to the best law firms” (Legal 500 2016b). These form part of 
what Galanter and Henderson term “a new, celebratory legal press” 
(2008, p.1881) and are akin to the rankings of law schools examined by 
Sauder and Espeland (Sauder 2008; Sauder & Espeland 2009). Both 
publications include “tiered” or “banded” rankings of firms according to 
legal specialism on a national and regional basis. The Legal 500 describes 
the rankings as follows: 
 
The rankings are based on a series of criteria, but simply put, we 
highlight the practice area teams who are providing the most cutting 
edge and innovative advice to corporate counsel. Our research is 
based on feedback from 250,000 clients worldwide, submissions from 
law firms and interviews with leading private practice lawyers, and a 
team of researchers who have unrivalled experience in the legal 
market. (Legal 500 2016a) 
 
Chambers, in describing its methodology, says: 
 
Individual lawyers are ranked (in their practice-area(s)) on the basis 
of their legal knowledge and experience, their ability, their 
effectiveness, and their client-service… Law-firm departments are 
ranked on the qualities of their lawyers as above. In addition, we 
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consider the effectiveness and capability of the department as a 
whole – its strength and depth. (Chambers 2016b) 
 
From these descriptions the rankings can be seen as a proxy comparison 
of the knowledge, experience and client service levels of the firms in 
question, what might be regarded as a comparison of “quality” (Sauder 
2008). This, the Directories claim, informs client choice, enabling them to 
select lawyers who lead the field in any given specialism, nationally or in a 
region of the UK. The extent to which clients actually utilise the rankings 
in making decisions is not known. However, firms use these rankings, 
when regarded as favourable, in their marketing materials. The rankings 
are also reported and commented upon in the regional and national press. 
Hence both firms and the press lend credibility and legitimacy to the 
rankings (cf. Sauder 2008). 
 
In addition to the ranking of firms by specialism, the Legal 500 includes a 
short list of regional heavyweights under its “regional review” in which it 
comments on the legal market in each region and refers to each firm on 
the list. This is also reported in the regional press. Neither the term 
heavyweight, nor the basis for the choice, is explained. However, by 
implication, the firms included as regional heavyweights are those which 
Legal 500 considers most dominant in terms of specialisms and reputation 
in the region. This may be influenced by the size of the firm in the region 
(or overall), and perceived depth of specialism by reference to the number 
of lawyers listed in the submissions made by firms. The business plan set 
out a list of specialist areas as ranked by the Directories, and targeted 
tier/band levels (level 1 or 2) for each of the next 2 years. The plan 
showed “progress” over each year towards an ever increasing number of 
tier/band 1 rankings in the firm’s chosen practice areas. 
 
The business plan set its targets within two key contexts. Firstly, that of 
change in its market characterised by competitors increasing in size by 
through takeovers and mergers, suggestive of a fast changing market 
(Pettigrew 1985a) in which the forces applying to the firm’s chances of 
strategic success were altering, suggesting a need for rational analysis 
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and re-setting of strategic initiatives (Porter 1979). Secondly, that by 
setting its “strategic vision” Hume Locke was adhering to a functional view 
of strategy, whereby strategy is passed down in tiers, from a vision or 
mission, to a set of steps taken to achieve that vision (Collins & Porras 
1996; De Wit & Meyer 2010). 
 
Taking a cultural-economy perspective, these two key contexts can be 
seen as forming a powerful background narrative: a sense of urgency 
comes from highlighting how the firm’s place in the market, and by 
extension its prosperity, may be affected by external change over which 
the firm has no control; the plan conveys a sense that the targeting of 
specific financial metrics, and Directory rankings, will improve the firm’s 
fortunes and deliver its rightful place at the top of the market. In other 
words strategic measures of success are set out in the plan. This 
combination of “narrative and numbers” ex ante the plan being executed 
contrasts with Froud and colleagues (2006) finding that numbers are used 
ex post plan execution to prove the success of a strategy in hindsight. 
Instead, in the case of Hume Locke, the numbers are used as a means of 
advocating a strategy prior to execution. 
 
In this construction metrics and rankings form part of a compelling 
narrative of strategic purpose (Froud et al. 2006) that promises to secure 
the future of the firm and the prosperity of its owners: the partners. 
Senior management thereby assume the subjectivity of “visionary leaders” 
and grand strategists (Knights & Morgan 1991), who have assessed the 
firm’s environment  and planned for the delivery of a better future, all in 
the face of a changing market and increasingly robust competition. Such 
strategising is lent a sense of “objectivity” by reference to a number of 
measures of strategic success. Achievement of the target sets is thereby 
painted as an essential element in delivering the firm’s strategic vision. 
 
Whereas this sets important context for the required analysis, to make 
sense of the data from the year of study it is necessary to follow and trace 
the strategic narrative, and the measures used, in the year of study. 
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Narrative and numbers in the year of study 
 
This section considers whether and to what extent, in the year of study, 
there was a continuing narrative of strategic purpose connected with 
numbers. It moves past the document based analysis given above to 
setting context, and gives voice to senior management’s view of the firm 
as a “business”, and how that connects to its strategy and success. It then 
moves to consider key communications between senior management and 
the partners, including a partners conference, and strategic narratives 
adopted before and after. In so doing it confirms the continuing relevance 
of narrative and numbers in the discourse of firm success and strategic 
considerations. 
 
Establishing a path to success: benchmarking the “business” 
 
Early in the study it was reported that the year prior had delivered, ahead 
of plan, significant growth in revenue and profit. Ken Hall, the firm’s 
Chairman, communicated in the firm’s newsletter: 
 
The firm has achieved a lot over the last few years, and our 
responsibility, along with the rest of the leadership team, is to ensure 
that the firm continues on its successful trajectory. We want to be the 
best {region} law firm in the world - nothing less. 
 
This demonstrates that the vision of “top” or “best” in the region 
continued. However, references to “achievement” and “successful 
trajectory” are vague terms capable of multiple interpretations. Traditional 
professional logics would associate achievement and success with the 
expertise and reputation of a firm’s lawyers, each associated with “quality” 
(Abbott 1988; Macdonald 1995; Freidson 2001). However, the Managing 
Partner, James Williams, in an exchange with a line partner, Jade, and in 
the context of the failure of a long standing law firm in the region, made it 
clear that success should be regarded as something more: 
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Jade: I was very sad to hear about [Firm X]’s demise… They were a 
good firm. 
 
James: I suppose it's an example of having good clients and good 
lawyers doesn't necessarily mean that you are going to have a 
successful business. 
 
This reflects a view of the firm as “a business”, and success as being seen 
in that light. Businesses are commercial enterprises designed to make 
financial returns for their owners. They come with a set of commercial 
logics based on delivering financial returns (Thornton et al. 2012), 
something James referred to at interview: 
 
[H]ow do you define success?... [I]t would be a number of things. 
There's obviously the financial success… an important measure… in a 
competitive environment… [T]here is the reputational profile side of 
things, to be recognised as a leading law firm… And ultimately there 
is the benchmarking against the rest of the marketplace. I suppose 
you can only really tell whether you've been successful within your 
own market. You are benchmarking yourself against your peer group. 
 
James adopts a commercialised view of success focused on financial and 
reputational measures as benchmarked against a chosen peer group. 
Benchmarking is a logic of the financial markets, where success is not 
seen in terms of absolute performance (the profit the company makes, or 
some other measure), but rather assessed relative to the market 
(Anderson & McAdam 2004). This view of the firm as a business, with 
financial success benchmarked against competitors, was also reflected in 
comments made by Function Heads: 
 
Sinead Murray {HR Director}: In simple terms [success is where] the 
financial results are good… Profitability is important and I think that, 
from a business measure, that's important to see as it obviously 
drives lots of things from the business. 
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Brian McLean {Finance Director}: I think people always look at the 
financial performance of the business… [T]here is a lot of press 
around the results… comparisons between the firms… Internally a lot 
of the partners like to look at how we are doing and compare it to 
how the other firms are doing. 
 
Hence firm success, while not wholly detached from reputation, was 
primarily seen by senior and functional management in terms of 
measurable financial outcomes, assessed comparatively with the chosen 
peer group through benchmarking (Callon 1998; MacKenzie & Millo 2003; 
Muniesa 2014). Put another way, this is an exercise in commensurability, 
something exemplified in the Chairman’s review of the firm’s position at 
the first partners meeting in the year of study: 
 
Ken: {Slide: Lawyer Magazine top 20 [region] firms by turnover}. 
This shows the top 20 {region} firms by turnover. It shows that we 
are slightly behind {Firm X} but the point to be taken from this is 
how used we now are of being part of the big 4… We are top of the 
firms by net profit… 
 
Ken: {Slide: [region] firms from the Legal Business 100}. There is 
also an interesting section which Legal Business does called "behind 
the numbers". This shows profit per lawyer, margin, PEP. Brian 
{Finance Director} would say margin is the most important. On this 
list we are {X}th in the UK which is an amazing achievement. {Firm 
Z} who are one of our biggest rivals are not as impressive – our 
margin is {X}% and they are only {X/2}%... 
 
This excerpt is important. League tables published by The Lawyer and 
Legal Business, two specialist legal publications, were used here to 
benchmark the firm against those identified by senior management as the 
firm’s competitors, creating a market for comparison (Callon 1998; 
MacKenzie & Millo 2003; Muniesa 2014). Revenue, profit, and profit 
margin, three of the metrics chosen in the business plan, are quoted so as 
to support a rhetoric of firm success. This is an exercise in financial 
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commensurability; the firm has been rendered knowable and 
commensurable by metrics published by the UK legal press. The metrics 
and rankings they produce are used as a substitute for professional regard 
and reputation (Galanter & Henderson 2008). Further, progress towards 
the strategic vision of being “top” is implicitly referred to in Ken’s 
reference to the firm now appearing in the “big 4” in the region, a 
metricised view of progress towards that vision. Narrative is thereby 
combined with numbers, in this case ex post to demonstrate the merit of 
the firm’s strategy (Froud et al. 2006). The theme continued when the 
firm’s accounts for the prior year heralded an “outstanding year”: 
 
{Year} was an outstanding year for the firm… translated into 
increased turnover and profitability in every division of the firm… The 
key figures… were…: 
 • Turnover £{X} (an increase of {Y}% against the 
annualised turnover for {prior year} of £{X}); 
 • Profit £{X}m (an increase of {Y}% against the annualised 
profit for {prior year} of £{X}m); 
 • Profit margin {X}% (an increase on the margin… of {X}%). 
(Source: Hume Locke accounts) 
 
Once again the same three metrics were used to measure firm success: 
revenue, profit and profit margin, this time compared to the firm’s prior 
year. This supports the narrative of progress and successful trajectory 
promoted by the Chairman in communications {Ken: above}. In so doing, 
senior management performed these key metrics (Muniesa 2014), making 
them known, and constituting the firm in their terms (Erturk et al. 2008; 
Du Gay & Pryke 2002). 
 
It can be concluded that revenue, profit and profit margin are strategic 
measures; they are the measures directly employed to determine the 
success of the firm’s strategy, the “numbers” that go with the narrative in 
Froud and colleagues’ conceptualisation (Froud et al. 2006). However, 
strategic measures were not limited to those three metrics. Rather, 
objectives in the business plan also extended to progress in terms of the 
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annual law firm rankings published by the Directories, Chambers and 
Legal 500. As explained in Chapter 3, these are not financial metrics. 
Rather, they are proxies for quality and reputation, but the form of a 
league table of tiered rankings. Indeed, in the case of the Directories, the 
Chairman referred to the number of tier 1 rankings as an indicator of 
progress, and to set a target: 
 
The Legal 500 rankings were published last week. The results chart 
our continuing progress. First of all, we have consolidated our place 
as a Regional Heavyweight… {Lists number of “tier 1” rankings}… 
That is an amazing turnabout in under two years of which we should 
be proud… But I think in line with our strategic aspirations we must 
aim to improve even further next year. We currently lie fourth in 
terms of Tier 1 rankings in {region}. Let’s aim to be second next year 
and top the year after... 
 
This shows how externally compiled rankings across legal specialisms, 
based in principle on a proxy for quality and reputation, were metricised 
by the Chairman into a simple piece of arithmetic: the number of tier 1 
rankings. Targets were reduced to that blunt metric, with success defined 
relative to the firm’s number relative to the chosen peer group. In so 
doing, the Chairman constituted the firm in terms of such position (Erturk 
et al. 2008; Du Gay & Pryke 2002), thereby eschewing a more 
sophisticated analysis taking account of the practice areas that the firm 
had chosen to pursue, compared to the wider offerings of its competitors. 
 
Ken’s email to partners after the results were announced is revealing: 
 
I am attaching the Legal 500 results... Let me say at the outset that 
they are a bit disappointing and perplexing… Despite going up by two 
Tier 1 rankings to {X} in total, we are now fourth. On the one hand, 
we have pulled away from {Firm X} and {Firm Y}. On the other, the 
leaders have pulled away from us. You may say that the directories 
are irrelevant or wrong. Nevertheless, we have to accept that they 
are used as a benchmark of quality and that they are based on the 
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strength of our submissions coupled with client and peer feedback… 
To implement our strategic aim, we need to be in touching distance of 
the very top firms. We need to ensure that this year we do a better 
job and learn lessons from last… For your part, I need you to invest 
time and energy in producing strong, fresh submissions… We must 
not on any account be complacent. 
 
Here Ken again adds up tier 1 rankings to derive a number and create a 
league table (the Directories do not include a table of number of tier 1 
rankings). Quality, something inherently qualitative, has thereby been 
quantified and tabularised by reference to that number. Ken implies 
partners believe the rankings fail to represent the quality of Hume Locke, 
and may be inclined to ignore a flawed measure. However, Ken beseeches 
them to put this to one side stating the rankings are a “benchmark of 
quality”, thereby giving credence to the rankings, and suggesting the 
ranking agencies are established players in the field (Sauder 2008; Sauder 
& Espeland 2009). Partners “investing” in the submissions suggests a 
financial logic, implying a return will be received on the investment, and 
reinforcing a link between rankings and the firm’s financial imperatives. 
Ken completes his call to action by invoking the firm’s “strategic aim”, 
thereby reinforcing the narrative of strategic purpose laid out by senior 
management, its basis in numbers, and its role in defining success. 
 
Further, the regional heavyweight category referred to by Ken is a proxy 
for recognition and relative importance, but is not expressly defined with 
reference to firm size or revenues. After the rankings and heavyweight 
categorisation were published, Ken referred to the results at the GSB: 
 
[O]ne thing which is pleasing is that part that deals with regional 
heavyweights. We are now in that and heavily referred to. We cannot 
afford to lose that. It is key to our strategy of being the best in 
{region}. With {Firm Y} taking over {Firm T} there is already talk in 
The Lawyer and Legal Business of the £{X}m+ club. There is no point 
growing for the sake of it but we do need to be at the top table. {Firm 
X} and {Firm Y} are £{X}m+. We need to be too. 
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Here we see Ken use a number of narrative devices to support a 
connection between the firm’s narrative of strategic purpose, and the 
necessity for growth in a single metric: revenue. Ken connects the 
regional heavyweights of the Legal 500 with the £{X}m+ club, the latter a 
narrative device used by the legal press to delineate firms with revenue 
above a threshold. These narrative devices are locations that have no 
physical existence, but are brought into being in the discourse that is 
made possible by reference to measures, and experienced as real by those 
who speak of them (Muniesa 2014). Ken’s move introduces a form of 
financial commensurability to the heavyweight category, him asserting 
that being part of the club is a key part of being a regional heavyweight. 
That combination is then linked by Ken through the device of the top 
table, a place at which is “needed” for delivery of the firm’s vision, being 
“best” in the region. In so doing Ken is constituting the firm in terms of its 
membership of the club, its heavyweight status, and its place at the top 
table, each being dependent on the revenue metric. Hence numbers are 
appearing in the narrative rather than, as Froud and colleagues’ (2006) 
analysis would suggest, after the event as a post hoc marker of success.  
 
These combinations of narrative device and the numbers attached to them 
can be conceptualised as narrative-metricised categorisations. They play 
an important role in the financialisation of the firm, operating as powerful 
and beguiling rhetorical connections between the firm’s narrative of 
strategic purpose and the numbers which are referred to as measures of 
strategic success. They become performative when they support calls to 
action intended to deliver results in terms of those measures, constituting 
the firm as a narrative-metricised conjunction. 
 
At the same GSB meeting Ken used another device connected to the 
Directories, this time a two by two matrix produced by a strategy 
consultant (Spencer Hammond): 
 
I was thinking about what we should be thinking about at this stage. 
Remember that when Spencer Hammond came to see us we had the 
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quality-reputation matrix. If we want to remain a regional 
heavyweight we need to be on the right place on this matrix… So 
should we be thinking about a merger or taking on a team? 
 
There are parallels here to the findings of Froud and colleagues (2006), 
who highlight the role of consultants such as Stern Stewart and Boston 
Consulting Group as the medium through which certain metrics were 
introduced into the discourse of corporate performance. This reflects a 
wider role of management consultants as spreaders of managerial 
fashions in the form of products for sale to the world or corporations 
(Kipping 1999; McKenna 2006). One axis of the matrix showed firms in 
the region by number of lawyers, and the other the number of tier 1 
Directory rankings. 
 
Spencer Hammond suggested those that occupying the upper right hand 
quadrant of the matrix correlate with the regional heavyweights. Taken 
together with Ken’s comments linking heavyweight status to revenue, a 
picture emerges whereby Ken connects revenue, number of lawyers and 
number of tier 1 rankings with the firm’s strategic vision, a narrative-
metricised categorisation. This categorisation became performative in 
Ken’s strategic response: the suggesting of recruiting more lawyers, either 
through merger or team hires. These would increase the number of 
lawyers, increase revenue (the assumption being that team hires result in 
client work following the team) and, implicitly, come with the future 
possibility of an increase in tier 1 rankings. This is a means by which the 
firm comes to reflect the metrics, rather than the metric reflecting the firm 
(MacKenzie 2006). By extension, increasing the firm’s revenue secures its 
place in the £{X}m club and at the top table. Hence commensurability, 
enabled by measures made available in the legal press and the 
Directories, and extended to make heavyweight status a product of 
metrics, informs strategy. This goes beyond Froud and colleagues (Froud 
et al. 2006) because it is an ex ante use of metrics to support a future 




Testing the strategy: metrics on both sides of the debate 
 
By virtue of the Members Agreement, even if GSB supported Ken’s view, it 
could not effect a merger without the approval of a qualified majority of 
the partners. Engagement with, and buy-in from, partners was therefore 
required. Recognising this, GSB used the medium of the annual partners 
conference to sponsor a discussion on strategic options, including the 
possibility of merging with (or rather being taken over by) a national firm 
as a means of securing “top” status. Ken began the conference by giving 
an overview of the firm’s existing strategy and strategic possibilities: 
 
{Slide – Purpose: to be the top commercial law firm in [region]}. Our 
current purpose is to be the top commercial law firm in {region}… We 
want to compete at the top of the market. We don't want to go back 
to mid-market. How do we achieve it? Last time we decided we 
wanted to have the status quo, or “status quo plus”… As has been 
commented to me by Spencer Hammond and Robert Carruthers, 
realistically you have to be in the top 3 to get the top quality work. 
What is the top 3? It's a somewhat nebulous concept. It's partly 
about size. Profit and rankings are important. And also what clients 
say about us. So we need to be in the top 3… 
 
Ken did a lot of work here, meriting detailed consideration. He utilised a 
number of narrative devices to support a desired conclusion: the implicit 
recommendation that the firm should consider a takeover by a national 
firm. Firstly, his reference to “last time” and status quo plus was to the 
output of a prior strategy review where partners determined that the firm 
should not seek a takeover but should remain independent. By eschewing 
takeover, influence over major decision-making (such as further mergers, 
or changes in partner remuneration structures) would remain with the 
existing partner group, something lost if the firm was taken over by a 
larger player. However, from senior management’s perspective there was 
a problem as the absence of change was not in keeping with the growth 
envisaged by the business plan, hence senior management’s interpreted 
the earlier decision to the effect that independence was not to be seen as 
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“all things are equal”. Rather the firm should pursue further organic 
growth and expansion, hence the “plus” element added to “status quo”. 
 
Here Ken’s naming of the earlier decision as status quo can be seen as a 
narrative device. It may be intentionally pejorative, to characterise the 
previous decision as lacking in ambition, as stuck in time. Business 
clichés, fondly adopted in Hume Locke, suggest “if you stand still you go 
backwards”, a phrase used by one of the partners at interview. Indeed, in 
a move that suggested that the name given to a strategy was as 
important, if not more so, than its substance, one of the partners in giving 
feedback at the conference suggested a new name for the existing 
strategy should be sought as “status quo” was somehow lacking. 
 
Further, the addition of plus to status quo brings out a stark contrast 
between things staying the same, yet changing for the better. This is an 
oxymoron, an incoherent combination that requires challenge. It 
problematises the present, and problems need solutions. Hence Ken’s use 
of status quo plus was a narrative device to contrast the past with an 
alternative and brighter future delivered by merger with a national firm, 
something that would come with an immediate leap in revenue, number of 
lawyers, and profit, thereby securing the hallowed “top 3” status. 
 
Secondly, Ken suggested that top 3 has no natural meaning, it being a 
“nebulous concept”. Ken therefore had the opportunity to define it, doing 
so with reference to size (meaning revenue and number of lawyers), 
profit, Directory rankings and “what clients say”. All but the last of those 
are numerically comparable with the peer group, and complete the 
narrative and numbers combination. Ken was thereby performing the 
metrics, constituting the firm in their terms (Knights & Morgan 1991; 
Muniesa 2014; Callon et al. 2007). 
 
Thirdly, he used the device of top repeatedly, to link a number of aspects 
to his ultimate conclusion. He migrated through the firm’s vision, to 
competing at “the top of the market” and, by virtue of that, to securing 
“top quality work”. The final move in particular has appeal to Hume Locke 
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partners, many of whom placed value on undertaking “quality” work, 
being challenging work which allows them to problem solve. This is a 
rhetorical appeal to traditional professionalism: the application of esoteric 
knowledge to service client needs (Abbott 1988; Macdonald 1995; 
Freidson 2001). Ken then used the “expert knowledge” of a strategy 
consultant, Spencer Hammond, and a senior partner at another firm, 
Robert Carruthers, to migrate “top” to “top 3”, and linked that status with 
winning top quality work. Ken suggests this is not him telling partners his 
view; rather it is the considered view of the expert, the holder of 
knowledge, and hence someone to whom the partners should listen. The 
result: top 3 was established as an important strategic goal, absent which 
quality work would be lost and the firm’s vision become unrealisable. 
 
How did partners react? After Ken’s introduction group discussions took 
place and feedback was given. Partners, seemingly emboldened by an 
ability to express views in a larger group rather than having to stand up to 
management on an individual or small group basis, and possibly reflecting 
informal conversations pre-conference {see for example Chapter 9 
below}, again determined in favour of independence. They spoke actively 
and decisively in their criticism of the possibility of merger, apparently 
relishing the opportunity to speak their minds in an open forum, that 
opportunity being in stark contrast to other partners’ meetings where a 
series of management presentations were given on an informational basis 
with little pretense of seeking partner participation. This demonstrated a 
continuing desire of partners to have a say in how the firm is run and 
what it should be seeking to do, and a desire to do so in open discussion 
with their partners, something associated with traditional professional 
logics (Abbott 1988; Macdonald 1995; Freidson 2001) Partner groups 
cited a range of reasons including the retention of decision-making 
influence, the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and, crucially, the 
assertion that the firm’s current financial results were regarded as 
delivering strong profits for partners. Hence, the firm’s performance 
against existing measures, and partner profits in particular, appear to 
have provided the partners with a reason to reject Ken’s construction of 
merger as securing a brighter future. 
 141 
 
This suggests the use of narrative and numbers as an ex ante device in 
determining strategy may act as a double-edged sword for senior 
management. Whereas the commensurability of metrics, enabled by 
external sources such as Companies House, the legal press, and the 
Directories, was instrumental in bringing them to describe strategic 
measures of success with reference to measures, some of the same 
measures were also instrumental in forming partners’ views that stood 
against significant strategic moves. This is suggests measures are both 
ambiguous and flexible; they are capable of being employed within 
apparently contradictory discourses. While profit levels, translated by 
partners into “take home pay”, were regarded as good by reference to 
published league tables and the firm’s own strategic measures of success 
set out in the business plan, there was little impetus to accept the risks 
involved in a major strategic initiative such as a takeover by a larger 
player. 
 
This is relevant as it shows that, even though strategy, and the act of 
strategising, has a constitutive effect in defining problems, defining 
individuals as strategists, and carries an assumption that strategy is the 
means of resolution (Knights & Morgan 1991, p.262), its connection to 
metrics in the PSF also gives rise to the potential for resistance. While 
strategy legitimises actions and thereby power effects, in this case the 
prompting of a strategic review with the option of merger, the connection 
of strategy with metrics enables partners to construct an alternative view 
of the firm and its success. 
 
This is important as it tells us that the tools of strategy in the financialised 
PSF may also the tools of resistance to that strategy. This takes us beyond 
the effects of financialisation as manifest in the process of reviewing 
strategic success, as revealed by Froud and colleagues (2006), and the ex 
ante use of metrics to support future strategy as revealed above, into the 
micro-dynamics of resistance to the power effects of strategic discourse 
within the firm. This provides insight into the financialised PSF, by linking 
structures, governance, strategy and metrics. The “partnership” ownership 
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structure, from which governance rules which insist that certain key 
decisions be ratified by partners are made, gives a means of resistance. 
This tells us that, notwithstanding the increasingly managerialisation of 
the decision-making processes within PSFs, there may still be scope for 
resistance from the partner group, and that such resistance comes from 
the most unlikely of sources: the financialisation of the firm, and its use of 
metrics.  
 
Re-establishing the narrative 
 
How did senior management react to the decision of the partners? Did 
they simply concede defeat as regards the “top 3”, and the pursuit of 
growth? At a GSB meeting convened shortly after the conference, Ken 
threw down the gauntlet: 
 
Where do we go from here? … If we believe we need to be in the top 
3 to execute our business plan then we are at risk … I think we need 
to do more than organic growth to retain our position at number 3… If 
we are going to achieve our objectives we need not just growth, but 
dynamic growth… 
 
The result was that the GSB authorised an email to partners setting out 
the firm’s future measures of success, and making a claim towards an 
“agreed strategy”: 
 
[T]he GSB has reflected on the output of the partners’ conference and 
considered how best to take forward the agreed strategy of Dynamic 
Growth. We want to be the top commercial law firm operating from 
{region}… Our ambition will require us to be bracketed with the top 






· Client base 




… Dynamism is essential… [U]nder our Status Quo Plus strategy, we 
have not been sufficiently ambitious and aggressive in building out 
from the excellent platform that we have… 
 
Notably, the email boldly asserts that the outcome of the partners 
conference was an “agreed” strategy of dynamic growth. This is an 
interpretation designed to align the conference decision with a continuing 
senior management imperative to pursue revenue growth to keep up with 
the chosen peer group, to remain in the club and be regarded as a 
heavyweight. Narrative devices were again put to work, the use of 
dynamic suggesting the energetic and ambitious pursuit of growth, 
stimulated by new ideas within a state of constant change. This stands in 
contrast to the negative connotations identified with status quo plus; it is 
imbued with positivity. 
 
As importantly, the email takes the nebulous concept of “top 3”, connects 
that to the narrative device of dynamism, and places both within a 
structure based on benchmarking and commensurability, thereby creating 
a narrative-metricised categorisation. Turnover (revenue) and profitability 
are metrics derived from accounting information and league tables. 
Rankings, which can also include quality, are measured by reference to 
the number of tier 1 rankings in the Directories. Although employer 
attractiveness and client base are included they were little referred to in 
other strategic narratives and likely appear here in order to appeal to the 
values of some partners. Indeed, the primacy given to financial metrics 
was demonstrated when GSB determined the necessity of having a new 




Ken: {Business Plan} We have overshot and need to start again… I 
think we need to develop a two to three-year business plan… We 
need objectives and measurements… On the basis that what gets 
measured gets done… I suggest Brian comes to the next meeting so 
we can start working on the development of targets… 
 
It is clear that any such targets, where generated by the Finance Director, 
would be financial. Given Ken’s focus on Directories it is also legitimate to 
expect Directory rankings to appear. Hence targets set against financial 
and Directory outcomes were once again invoked in the discourse of 
strategy in order to target ever greater revenue, profit and rankings. And 
so the cycle of measurement, comparison, and strategic review had begun 
again. This suggests that measures, once introduced as part of the 
narrative of strategic purpose, have an enduring influence, leading to the 
firm being iteratively reconstituted as a body seeking to perform to the 
next level, and when such level is reached, the cycle begins again. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter has addressed the first research question, namely: Has PSF 
strategy been financialised? More specifically, and following Froud and 
colleagues (2006): do PSFs adopt “narrative and numbers” and if so, are 
there performative effects? It demonstrates that the firm adopted a 
“narrative of strategic purpose” (Froud et al. 2006) and makes a 
contribution by both exemplifying and contrasting against the work of 
Froud and colleagues (2006). 
 
First, it was found that a narrative of strategic purpose was created by the 
firm’s senior management through the adoption of a strategic vision. In 
this case it was the vision of top commercial law firm in the region. 
However, in contrast to Froud and colleagues (2006), the metrics of 
strategic success were attached ex ante rather than as a means, ex post, 
of demonstrating success. The measures were used as a means of 
creating a financialised strategy, opening up the possibility for governance 
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based on such targets. Thus, the relationship between narrative and 
numbers formed a mutually symbiotic relationship. Each relied on the 
other to find its expression. Metrics added substance to the “nebulous 
concept” that is “top” or “top 3”, with reference to a set of accounting 
metrics and Directory rankings. But metrics also required a narrative such 
as “top commercial law firm”, to connect them with a higher level strategic 
aim that appealed to organisation members beyond raw numbers. Hence 
both the strategic rhetoric, and its expression through metrics, dressed 
the other. This combination of “narrative and numbers” can be seen as a 
further development of Froud and colleagues’ (2006) use of the term. 
Instead of using numbers ex post to prove the success of a strategy, the 
numbers are used as a means of advocating a strategy: they form part of 
a compelling narrative of strategic purpose which promises to secure the 
future of the firm. The metrics give a sense of “objectivity” and operate as 
the means to demonstrate the necessity of pursuit of the advocated 
strategy. Achievement of these targets is painted as an essential element 
in delivering the firm’s strategic vision. 
 
Second, this exemplifies the performativity of metrics; they bring into 
being that which is measured (MacKenzie 2006), and narrative devices 
lubricate the process by connecting hard metrics with powerful rhetorical 
descriptors (Froud et al. 2006). In this case it is the firm and its 
competitors that are reconstituted in the image of chosen metrics. This 
happens when metrics are brought to life, and given significance, by the 
act of senior management making them known, referring to them in its 
strategic discourse, and thereby performing them (Muniesa 2014). 
Narrative devices, as part of discourse, connect to privileged metrics, and 
act as rhetorical descriptors to create places such as the club of firms with 
revenues exceeding an arbitrary threshold, and the top table. In turn 
these are given substance through links to other adopted metrics or quasi-
metrics such as achieving a certain ranking (or number of rankings) or 
being a heavyweight in the eyes of the Directories. The result is the 
reconstitution of the firm in terms of metrics, with the firm becoming both 
that which is measured (Erturk et al. 2008; Du Gay & Pryke 2002) or 
ranked (Sauder 2008; Sauder & Espeland 2009), and that which is 
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described in associated narratives introduced by management. Hence 
senior management, external consultants and commentators such as 
strategy consultants (Kipping 1999; McKenna 2006), the legal press and 
the Directories, create and mediate what can be conceptualised as 
narrative-metricised categorisations, being categorisations which link 
narrative description with a form of measurement or ranking. These 
narrative-metricised categorisations have performative effects as PSF 
leaders to define their own success as leaders in such terms, and set 
strategy for the firm with reference to a form of ex ante narrative and 
numbers (Knights & Morgan 1991; Froud et al. 2006) creating a 
financialised strategy. Further, it demonstrates that in the field of law, 
those who compile league tables and rankings are both recognised field 
players and have a significant performative influence (Sauder 2008; 
Sauder & Espeland 2009). 
 
Third, although a range of metrics and quasi-metrics were originally set 
out in the firm’s business plan, a smaller number of those dominated the 
strategy discourse adopted by senior management: revenue, profit, profit 
margin, and Directory rankings. For the PSF these can be regarded as 
strategic measures – those given strategic significance within the firm’s 
strategic narrative. Other accounting metrics and quasi-metrics (rankings) 
can be regarded as operational, or tactical, designed to support the 
delivery of strategic measures, and are explored further in Chapter 7. 
While a further category still is those that are little more than window 
dressing, designed to appeal to traditional professional logics, or the 
values of partners, but playing little further role in the strategic decision-
making or operations of the firm. This tells us that not all measures are 
powerful agents at the firm level. Rather, the special feature of those that 
are is that each is readily commensurable against those firms identified by 
senior management as the firm’s competitors, thereby constructing a 
market for comparison and benchmarking (Callon 1998; MacKenzie & Millo 
2003; Muniesa 2014).  
 
Fourth, the appeal to metrics to measure success may be double edged. It 
may be used to justify both strategic moves, and their rejection. In this 
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case partners rejected the takeover option, citing firm profit levels, one of 
the metrics used in the firm’s narrative of strategic purpose, as a reason 
to conclude the firm was strong enough in its current form. This 
demonstrates that metrics do not dictate a single answer to strategic 
choices. They do not have a single natural conclusion but are capable of 
interpretation to support different ends. This is important as it tells us that 
the tools of strategy in the financialised PSF may also be the tools of 
resistance to that strategy. This takes us beyond the direct effects of 
financialisation as manifest in the process of making strategy into the 
micro-dynamics of resistance. In so doing this provides insight into the 
financialised PSF, by linking structures, governance, strategy and metrics. 
By virtue of the “partnership” ownership structure, combined with the 
governance rules which insist that certain key decisions be ratified by 
partners, a means of resistance arises. As noted in the literature review in 
Chapter 4, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to seek to make a 
contribution to the literature on resistance, and the foregoing point is 
made to illustrate the scope for future research into financialisation and 
resistance in the PSF. 
 
A number of key questions arise from the above analysis that are still to 
be addressed such as: why are certain metrics chosen? How do 
management structure the firm so as to put metrics to work within the 
firm? What role do metrics play in determining success or failure? And 
how does this affect how parts of the firm, and individuals, are 
characterised and controlled? On the face of things it might be argued that 
these aspects are separate, or at best loosely connected. However, the 
cultural-economy perspective would suggest that accounting and 
accounting practices are the nexus for each of these aspects, and operate 
so as to connect the logics of financialisation to the firm and its practices. 
Chapter 7 considers this by reference to the second research question: 
How do the logics of financialistion enter and take effect in the PSF? In 
particular, and following Miller and Power (2013): does accounting act as 
the agent of the financialisation of the PSF and if so how?  
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Chapter 6 showed how financialisation manifests in the higher echelons of 
firm decision-making through the adoption of a narrative of strategic 
purpose, combining a vision, or strategic goal, with numbers, or metrics, 
to measure strategic success. This chapter is an empirical exploration of 
the role of accounting as the agent of financialisation within the PSF, 
acting to support delivery of the firm’s financialised strategy. It unpacks 
how financial logics, and associated metrics, are translated and 
transferred into firm processes through accounting, and how those enable 
management control. In so doing it addresses the second research 
question, namely: How do the logics of financialistion enter and take effect 
in the PSF? In particular, and following Miller and Power (2013): does 
accounting act as the agent of the financialisation of the PSF and if so 
how? 
 
This chapter adopts two complementary theoretical lenses through which 
to explore the empirical data. Firstly, at a general level, accounting 
metrics are seen as a form of Foucauldian mathesis (Foucault 1973), a 
system of comparison which orders individuals numerically, and thereby 
renders them knowable, calculable and governable (Foucault 1977; Clegg 
et al. 2006). Secondly, Miller and Power’s (2013) framework is used to 
explain how accounting plays a role at multiple levels in the firm. 
Following work by Callon (1998) and MacKenzie (2006) on the 
performativity of markets, this framework attributes agency to accounting, 
understood here as the firm’s accounting function and its practices, as 
part of a wider complex (Miller & Power 2013) described in Chapter 3, it 
does things and has effects on the organisation. 
 
Moving from the general to the specific, Miller and Power’s (2013) 
framework is used to show how, within Hume Locke, accounting 
constructs or utilises abstract spaces in which actors are made calculable 
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(territorialisation), informs the choice of metrics to be applied and put to 
work within the firm, connecting those with, and giving presence to, 
financial logics (mediation), and determines success and failure 
(adjudication). This chapter also shows how accounting provides part of 
the building blocks necessary to bring into being a certain subjectivity 
(subjectification), that of the performing and contributing partner. The 
analysis of that subjectivity is completed in the next chapter. Hence the 
purpose of the chapter is not simply to show that the firm uses metrics. 
Rather, it examines how the chosen metrics reflect and mediate the logics 
of financialisation and how those contrast with traditional professional 
logics, and how accounting, as the agent of financialisation, makes the 
firm, and the divisions and individuals within it, knowable, calculable, and 
governable. 
 
Set in context, the analysis in this chapter informs our understanding of 
the how financialisation manifests in the firm. The examination starts with 
the first part of Miller and Power’s (2013) framework, territorialisation, 
and then moves on to consider the role of accounting as mediator, 
adjudicator and in the subjectification of partners. 
 
Accounting as the agent of financialisation: territorialisation 
 
According to the first element of Miller and Power’s (2013) conceptual 
framework, accounting territorialises by constructing or utilising real or 
abstract spaces, such as a division or office, which can then be made the 
subject of measurement (Miller & Power 2013). This section unpacks both 
the performance measures set within the firm, and the practices used for 
their realisation. In so doing the efficacy of the creation of territories is 
brought out: by creating or utilising territories metrics can be applied, 
rendering those territories, and the people within them, calculable and 
commensurable by virtue of mathesis. This creates the means by which 
internal competition can take place, thus contributing to the 
financialisation of the PSF and its partners.  
 
 150 
Before examining how accounting territorialises within the firm a wider 
form of territorialisation should be acknowledged to set context: the firm 
is territorialised, and made commensurable with its competitors, by 
accounting. As Chapter 6 noted, the firm, as an LLP, is obliged to file 
statutory accounts each year. Those accounts are the product of 
accounting, include revenue and other key metrics, and are available to 
the public through UK Companies House. UK legal publications list the firm 
in league tables based on metrics reported in those accounts. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 6, these league tables enable benchmarking and 
commensurability which in turn lead to the constitution of the firm in 
management discourse as an entity which primarily exists relative to its 
peer group, rather than in its own right. Firm strategic discourses, and the 
“narrative and numbers” conjunction (Froud et al. 2006) refer to this 
relativity and the metrics that underpin it. Contextually, this is noted here 
because this chapter examines how decisions as to strategic measures of 
success, informed by the territorialisation of the firm in its market, are 
operationalised within the firm itself. 
 
Moving on to intra-firm aspects, historically the firm had been organised 
into departments, each a very broad umbrella for a number of specialisms. 
Due to the quantity of partners and fee earners within each department, 
reporting and analysis of performance was broad brush, the specific being 
hidden by the general nature of what was reported. More recently, 
departments were split into a number of divisions. This reflected both a 
move towards greater specialisation and a thirst for greater transparency 
of performance within the firm, part of the evolution of professional 
services (Brock et al. 1999; Empson & Chapman 2007; Lawrence et al. 
2012). Accounting offered the ability to measure the performance of the 
new divisions, thereby territorialising them (Miller & Power 2013) and 
making divisional performance commensurable. A new and apparently 
objective form of information was thereby made available, one which 
could inform senior management, the GSB and the Operations Board, as 
well as the divisions themselves, and thereby be a tool to assist decision-
making and intervention. The principal metrics used in to measure 




Fees rendered The total amount of matter manager fees 
(billings) to clients by partners in the division 
concerned 
Fees rendered against Budget 
and % 
The amount by which actual fees rendered bears 
to the divisional fee budget; expressed as a % 
Gross Profit and Gross Profit 
% 
Fees rendered less the direct costs (excluding 
fixed costs or overheads, but including a notional 
partner cost at a set level); and the % 
representing the proportion which gross profit 
bears to total fees rendered 
Net Contribution and Net 
Contribution % 
As per gross profit but replacing the notional 
partner cost with actual partner profit shares 
Gearing (leverage) The ratio of the number of non-partner fee 
earners in the division to the number of partners 
in the division 
Capacity The aggregate annual capacity of all divisional fee 
earners to record chargeable hours, based on 
their chargeable hours targets 
Utilisation The percentage representing the number of 
chargeable hours actually recorded by all 
divisional fee earners relative to capacity 
Work-in-progress The amount in monetary terms that represents 
the sum of chargeable work undertaken by 
divisional fee earners which has not yet been 
billed to clients 
Lock-up The number of days from the undertaking of 
chargeable work to the receipt of payment for 
such work, expressed as an average across the 
division 
Recovery The percentage representing the amount of fees 
actually recovered by the division on work 
undertaken on divisional client files, compared to 
the amount which would represent the charge 
out rates quoted for such work 
Table 7.1: Divisional metrics 
 
As can be seen the metrics adopted are inherently financial, and can be 
said to represent financial logics (Thornton et al. 2012). To unpack more 
clearly the ways in which metrics reflect financial logics, and how they 
support the firms strategic measures of success referred to in Chapter 6, 
the analysis turns to ask why such metrics were picked, and what they do, 
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adopting the second part of Miller and Power’s (2013) framework, 
mediation, as the means of explanation. 
 
Accounting as Mediator 
 
Miller and Power (2013) tell us that accounting carries ideas and 
articulates a discursive rationality. It “mediates” by linking accounting 
practices with ideas and people within territorialised spaces. This explains 
how financial discourses, and the ideas they articulate, become embodied 
in practices adopted by the organisation (MacKenzie & Millo 2003; 
MacKenzie 2006). Those practices connect to people by virtue of their 
location within the territorialised spaces created by the organisation, in 
this case the firm’s divisions. When people perform to the measurements 
introduced, those measurements and the ideas they represent become 
embedded in the firm and part of firm “reality” as experienced by its 
actors (MacKenzie 2006; Miller & Power 2013). 
 
Miller and Power (2013) tell us that accounting carries out this function by 
introducing metrics for application in the spaces created, such metrics 
being based on the logics which underpin the metric itself. An example is 
the logic of “efficiency”. Financial and commercial logics promote the idea 
of efficiency as a means to increase profit, and that idea is linked to the 
measurement of activities, using accounting practice, with a view to 
changing the actions of internal agents, such that efficiency becomes the 
outcome. The result is that accounting is “both agent and outcome, both 
idea and practice” (Miller & Power 2013, p.582). This section 
demonstrates how accounting mediates the logics of the financial markets 
and business into the firm, connecting to people and spaces within the 
firm, and thereby acting as the agent of financialisation, and enabling 
control. The first logic is that of growth, explained first with reference to 
revenue and the accounting process of budget setting, and then profit with 
reference to the accounting metric net contribution. 
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Growth (Revenue) – Budgets 
 
A logic of the financial markets, and commercial businesses, is the pursuit 
of growth (Mishina et al. 2004). Growth, mediated into the firm through 
the accounting concepts of revenue and profit, is reflected in the firm’s 
measures of strategic success described in Chapter 6. This sub-section 
looks at revenue growth. Within the firm accounting utilised divisional 
territorialisation, and the measurement of divisional revenue, to enable a 
form of management control through the creation of annual divisional 
revenue budgets, operating as revenue targets for each division. The 
firm’s finance function, as the vanguard of accounting within the firm, 
reported performance against budget for all divisions, as well as matter 
manager fees for all partners and other fee earners, on a monthly basis, a 
mathesis which made visible and commensurable both divisional and 
partner performance. 
 
Each divisional fee budget integrated into and formed part of the firm’s 
overall revenue budget for the financial year. The firm’s budget in the year 
of study was explicitly set with reference to the firm’s strategy and its 
expression of success by reference to revenue growth and increase profit: 
 
James {Managing Partner, at partners meeting}: Our objectives in 
setting the budget are to support the strategy, invest, retain and 
attract the best people, meet operating costs and improve profit. No 
business plans to reduce its profit on a year-on-year basis so we 
should be aiming to increase profit and the budget reflects that. 
 
Whereas James prefaced the improvement of profit with a number of 
other features, each can be seen as a means to the delivery of revenue 
growth and increased profit, two of the firm’s strategic measures of 
success described in Chapter 6. Investment and attracting the best people 
ensure future service quality, believed to underpin client choices and 
support future revenue streams. Meeting operating costs is a function of 
being in business, and necessary before profit is taken. Hence all roads in 
James’s statement lead to the same place: revenue generation and profit. 
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But how did the setting of budgets enable a form of control so as to drive 
partner behaviours towards the production of increased revenue? The 
answer is by the application of stretch, the process by which the Finance 
Director and Department Head, under review of the Operations Board, 
encouraged divisions to set budgets higher than divisional partners may 
believe will be delivered in the normal course of events, thereby 
“stretching” themselves. This is seen as striving for success, and a means 
of showing ambition, something encouraged by senior management as 
part of the rhetoric of the striving, successful, partner (and by extension 
division) which is returned to in Chapter 8. Casey, a Department Head 
responsible for taking divisional budgets to the Operations Board for 
approval, explained at interview: 
 
[T]here are a number of ways you can arrive at a budget and I'm 
sure you do a combination of them… [T]he first part… is to find out 
what your capacity is… You say: this is the number of people we 
have, this is their charge out rate, this is their target…  [W]hat you 
find… is that people are immensely conservative. So I think there has 
to be a… bit of stretch given. And that stretch can be encouraged 
when you look at capacity. 
 
Capacity (Table 7.1) is the total amount of chargeable time available 
within the relevant division, calculated as the aggregate individual 
capacities of fee earners in the division. Combining this with the charging 
rates of fee earners, the division’s notional target, which Casey refers to, 
is revealed. However, in practice, chargeable time is lost when there is 
less work to be done than available capacity, and Division Heads take 
account of that when proposing a budget. Casey uses capacity as a means 
of control, to sponsor a conversation with a Division Head that encourages 
that Division Head to propose a less conservative and hence more 
ambitious, or stretching, budget. The idea is to say: “your division has 
more capacity than your budget, you should aim to be closer to full 
capacity”. There are overtones of the logic of efficiency here too: one 
accounting logic, efficiency, enables and supports another, growth and 
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they become mutually fulfilling. This demonstrates how accounting 
enables further accounting, and in turn mediates financial logics. 
 
The Operations Board also sought to encourage stretch, as revealed in 
board minutes: 
 
The board agreed that we should aim for a budget that is stretching… 
that increases profitability.  To achieve that we would need a revenue 
budget at around £{X}m… [I]t was agreed that a number of divisions 
should be asked to review their budgeted fee income… 
 
Here the concept of stretch was linked with the strategic imperative of 
growth, and used to justify the Board’s decision to require less ambitious 
divisions to increase their budgets. This quest for growth is exemplified by 
how budget proposals from two divisions in Lesley’s department were 
dealt with at the Operations Board {explanations in italics}: 
 
Brian: {Division B} are [proposing a budget increase of only] 4%. 
{Compared with an average of 10%} 
 
Lesley {Explaining the Division Head’s detailed methodology in 
support of 4%}: Sara {Division Head of B} has gone through the 
people in great detail on a line by line basis looking at what they've 
done last year and what they might do this year including assuming 
growth.  
 
James {Apparently ignoring Lesley’s comments, and seeking to 
increase Division B’s budget}: What if we use a different 
methodology? If we take the partners from last year and add Ben’s 
£{X} that is due to come from WIP? {work-in-progress unbilled from 
prior year} 
 
Lesley: {Adds further detail regarding Sara’s methodology then… 
makes another plea for clemency} …Sara has explained that it's 
unfair to measure against target because they are always below…  
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James {Again ignoring Lesley’s plea}: How about £{Y}? I've just 
picked a figure out of the air… 
 
Brian: Well that's 10% so it should be okay… {hence looks to the 
result, ignoring Lesley’s explanation} 
 
James: {Division C}? 
 
Lesley: {Again explains how Division Head, this time of Division C, 
has adopted a detailed line by line methodology}. … 
 
James {Again ignoring Lesley’s plea}:  What would 10% look like? 
How about £{Z}? This is not very scientific! 
 
Casey: This is where we always get to! {Laughter} 
 
James: Well we need to show a budget with growth in profit. {Higher 
budget levels for B and C then set} 
 
This demonstrates how detailed consideration given by Division Heads 
before proposing budgets were put to one side in favour of numbers 
“plucked from the air”, and designed to achieve a firm revenue budget 
showing growth at the desired level. The Operations Board was forcing 
stretch onto two reluctant Division Heads, putting to one side explanations 
offered to the Board to justify a lower proposal. Moreover, to my surprise, 
the explanations of Lesley as Department Head were ignored as if 
irrelevant in the context of the wider aim. Latterly she told me she found 
this disheartening, the approach of James and others leaving her feeling 
powerless and inconsequential, her role devoid of any meaning other than 
as a messenger for the predeterminations of senior management and the 
Finance Director. As the year drew to a close Lesley sought to relinquish 
her role as Department Head, citing a lack of true purpose, and a feeling 
that her efforts to represent the interests of partners and staff were 
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repeatedly thwarted in favour of a decision-making process favouring 
functional management. She was persuaded to stay. 
 
The foregoing demonstrates how the accounting rationality of stretch 
supported and enforced the dominant discursive rationality of growth. 
Indeed, later in the year, the quest for stretch was reported to have 
worked: 
 
Peter {Department Head}: {Jonathan’s division} look like they will 
make budget. 
 




Sinead {HR Director}: Absolutely! 
 
Hence, not only did accounting mediate the idea of stretch, but was then 
understood by members of the Board to have caused the required result: 
it is both the idea and outcome (Miller & Power 2013). I was struck by the 
absence of acknowledgement as to the several divisions (approximately 
half) who had not achieved budget despite stretch, and concluded that 
both groupthink and confirmation bias were evident, reflecting the 
pervasive influence of financial and accounting rationalities on some 
Operations Board members. 
 
Growth (Profit) – Gross Profit and Net Contribution 
 
The firm’s strategy also focused on growth in profit, a logic of the financial 
markets (Keown et al. 2004). Prior to the year of study the metric used to 
measure this was gross profit (Tables 7.1 and 7.2). However, at the 
beginning of the year of study, accounting enabled the introduction of a 
new divisional metric, net contribution (Table 7.1). At interview Casey 
explained the rationale: 
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[W]hat you look at is… money in, money out… [T]hat includes the full 
partner [profit] take… [W]hat is left over is the [net] contribution… 
[T]hat gives you a very good measure of… how well that particular 
[division] is doing. Because you can have [a division] where… the 
gross profit looks tremendous, but actually when you work it out you 
think: well, hmm, gross profit may be tremendous, but partners are 
taking out everything that comes in and are not contributing to the 
overhead of the business. So not really producing a profit. 
 
This is a key description in the context of PSFs. Whereas revenue is 
largely an uncontested metric, divisional profit or contribution depends on 
what is counted as cost. Casey’s explanation highlights a key difference 
between gross profit and the newly introduced metric, net contribution. 
The latter takes account of actual divisional partner profit take in 
determining what is left as a “contribution”, whereas gross profit assumed 
only a notional salary for partners, significantly below the actual profit 
take. Casey’s explanation reveals a desire on the part of senior 
management, and the Operations Board, to encourage divisional partners 
to focus on growth as a means of making the division a contributing 
division; one whose revenue exceeds the sum of its direct costs, its share 
of central costs, and the profit take of its partners. 
 
The insight here derives from net contribution’s treatment of partners as 
costs, rather than as owners extracting profits. This contrasts with 
corporations where returns to owners (shareholders) are regarded as a 
return on investment, not a cost which reduces profit. Hence an 
accounting process has both used the abstract space for measurement, 
the divisions, and created a view of partners as a cost, all in the pursuit of 
the discursive rationality of growth. This is as a fundamental shift from the 
professional logic of partners as worker-owners, towards a financial logic 
of partners as costs whose continued existence as partners is justified only 
by virtue of their financial contribution to the business. This is akin to a 
financial logic which values employees solely based on their output, acting 
to displace a traditional professional logic which valued partners based on 
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their expertise and reputation (Freidson 2001; Thornton et al. 2012). The 
implications of this are further examined below under Adjudication. 
 
The final financial discursive rationality to be mediated into the firm by 
accounting is that of efficiency, considered next. 
 
Efficiency – Gearing, Capacity, Utilisation, Lock-up and Recovery 
 
As stated, one of the logics of finance and business is the maximisation of 
profit through the pursuit of efficiency (Martinez & Dacin 1999; Miller & 
Power 2013). At interview Brian, the Finance Director, put efficiency at the 
centre of his role in the firm: 
 
I have overall responsibility for the management and control of the 
firm's finances… I see my role very much also in terms of driving the 
firm's performance. Trying to make us as efficient and effective as we 
possibly can be. To make us as profitable as we can be as a business. 
I suppose internally looking at how we can be more efficient. 
 
Various accounting practices are overseen by Brian to support the drive 
for efficiency. By measuring gearing, capacity, utilisation, lock-up and 
recovery (Table 7.1), accounting connects efficiency with the division.  
 
Gearing relates to efficiency in terms of how the choice of fee earner 
translates into profit margins. Profit margins are greater when the work is 
discharged by junior fee earners in preference to partners. Junior fee 
earners are, in the words of the Finance Director, “less expensive than 
partners”, a comment confirming that, in the financialised PSF, partners 
are seen as a cost rather than experts and owners of the firm, a 
transformed subjectivity explored further below under Accounting and 
Subjectification, and in Chapter 8. The result is partners are encouraged 
to grow their teams to allow more work to be discharged by juniors, hence 
giving their practice greater “gearing” or “leverage”, terms carried over 
from the world of finance. Pursuant to this desire for greater profitability, 
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divisional gearing levels in Hume Locke were made the subject of a target, 
monitored, and reported on at Operations Board level where recruitment 
requests were analysed against gearing levels (among other measures). 
 
Capacity and utilisation relate to the efficient use of fee earner time. As 
noted above capacity is based on the premise that each fee earner has 
space to record a certain number of chargeable hours each day, week, 
month and year, and the “utilisation rate” is the actual billable hours 
recorded as a percentage of total capacity. The aim for divisions and 
partners is to get as close to, or exceed, a utilisation of 100% for all of the 
fee earners in the division; hence be operating at full capacity, maximising 
efficiency and thereby profit. 
 
Beyond the divisions, accounting also operates to report on individual 
partners across a range of metrics, as set out in Table 7.2, making them 
commensurable within the cohort of partners. 
 
Metric Description 
Matter Manager Fees  The total amount of fees (billings) rendered to 
clients on files for which the partner is designated 
the “matter manager” 
Gross Profit % Matter manager fees less the direct costs 
(excluding fixed costs or “overhead” but including 
a notional partner cost) attributable to the work 
undertaken, giving a gross profit, which is then 
expressed as a percentage of the total matter 
managed fees of that partner 
Work-in-progress The amount in monetary terms that represents 
the sum of chargeable work undertaken by 
divisional fee earners on files for which the 
partner is designated the “matter manager” 
which has not yet been billed to clients 
Lock-up The number of days from the undertaking of 
chargeable work to the receipt of payment for 
such work, expressed as an average across the 
partner’s matter managed files 
Recovery The percentage representing the amount of fees 
actually recovered from clients on the partner’s 
client files compared to the amount which would 
represent the full charge out rates for such work. 
Table 7.2: Individual metrics 
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These metrics mediate the logic of efficiency in a number of ways. 
Monitoring and reporting to divisions and partners of their work-in-
progress, and the holding of work-in-progress meetings, are intended to 
encourage swift conversion of work into bills to ensure cash is collected as 
quickly as possible. These actions reduce lock-up which contributes to 
efficiency in terms of the firm’s cash flow requirements; the quicker work 
is converted into fees, and then fees recovered, the lower the firm’s 
requirement for capital and external interest bearing debt, each of which 
comes at a cost and hence reduces effective profit levels. Timely billing is 
also considered to maximise recovery: by billing timeously the client is 
considered most likely to remember the extent of the work undertaken 
and hence support full(er) recovery. 
 
At interview partners recognised both the imperative of efficiency, and the 
role of the finance function in lock-up and recovery efficiencies, and their 
effect on cash flow: 
 
Lesley: We are trying to achieve an efficient, profitable business. 
Having mechanisms in place that will help you do that and as part of 
that you've got one side making sure that you've got work coming in, 
so that’s your BD {Business Development} side and that's part of 
your brand and your marketing and, and then making sure that the 
work is discharged well and properly. And then {Laughs} get the fees 




Caroline: Brian… is very good on the day-to-day… I think we are run 
very efficiently… At peak borrowing time at the end of January this 
year, according to the board minutes, we didn't even dip into 
overdraft. 
 
Here Lesley, a member of the firm’s Operations Board, makes a direct 
connection between efficiency and profit, and links it to the work cycle – 
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from winning the work, to executing it, and being paid. As Miller and 
Power (2013) suggest, efficiency as an idea implicitly informs all aspects, 
and also becomes the outcome. One of those outcomes is that described 
by Caroline, a line partner: efficient use of cash and debt. 
 
Linking to strategy 
 
As Chapter 6 demonstrated, the firm’s narrative of strategic purpose 
adopted the metrics of revenue, profit and profit margin as strategic 
measures of success. The above analysis shows that accounting mediates 
into the firm the financial logics of growth in both revenue and profit which 
are in turn reflected in the divisional budget setting process, with the idea 
of “stretch” being a key underpinning discourse and practice reflected in 
that process. The measurement of gross profit and net contribution, 
support the logic of profit through a promotion of revenue growth and cost 
control. 
 
On the other hand, gearing, capacity, utilisation, work-in-progress, lock-
up and recovery can be considered as operational or tactical measures. In 
contrast to those strategic measures that are privileged as being part of 
the firm’s narrative of strategic purpose, tactical measures are not ends in 
themselves. Rather, the outcomes that they measure are tactical steps, 
reinforced by operational practices, towards the delivery of metrics which 
form part of the firm’s measures of strategic success. By measuring these 
operational drivers, and circulating them as statistics which all can see, 
the finance function uses a form of mathesis (Foucault 1973), thereby 
enabling a form of Foucauldian control over partners through knowledge 
generated and circulated, something which is returned to under 
Accounting as Adjudicator below, and linked to wider human resource 
management practices in Chapter 8. 
 
Having demonstrated how accounting links the logics of the financial 
markets with ideas and people within spaces, and thereby carries and 
articulates a discursive rationality which is understood by senior 
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management and partners alike, the analysis now turns to consider how 
metrics work so as to judge success and failure in the firm. To do so Miller 
and Power’s (2013) third element, adjudication, is adopted. 
 
Accounting as Adjudicator 
 
According to Miller and Power’s (2013) formulation, accounting has an 
“adjudicating” role, measuring the performance of individuals and 
organisations, making them accountable, calculable and knowable in 
comparison to others, and ultimately determining their success or failure. 
Adjudication occurs within the abstract spaces created or utilised by 
territorialisation. This section explores how adjudication occurs within the 
firm. It begins by making a contextual point regarding the firm, then 
moves on to refer to metrics which are used in adjudication, and finally 
looks at how such adjudication occurs within firm processes. 
 
A contextual point was made above that is also relevant here. The firm is 
territorialised by accounting within a space that might be called the wider 
legal market. This point extends into adjudication. The firm’s revenue and 
profit are routinely commented upon in the business pages of the press as 
well as specialist legal publications. Based on this, and information 
demanded of firms, The Lawyer and Legal Business produce an annual 
league table of the “Top 100/200” UK law firms, ranked by revenue. 
Accompanying the league table are reports with multiple tables of metrics, 
including revenue, year on year revenue growth, profit and profit margin. 
Accounting enables these reports, making firms knowable and 
commensurable, and adjudicating on their success or failure by reference 
to the metrics shown. Further, as has been demonstrated in Chapter 6, 
these reports and league tables have performative effects, evidenced by 
the adoption of a strategy informed by reference to the league tables, and 
focusing on growth in revenue, profit and profit margin. 
 
As narrated above, the firm’s divisions are reported on for management 
accounting purposes. Multiple metrics include performance against budget 
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(revenue), gross profit, net contribution, lock-up, utilisation, and recovery 
(Table 7.1). The implicit goal for divisions is the maximisation of each 
metric. For individual partners the firm reported on matter manager fees, 
the measure of revenue generated by a partner (including his team of fee 
earners), gross profit, lock-up and recovery (Table 7.2), all based on the 
client files for which that partner was designated the partner in charge (or 
“matter manager”). The act of measurement is seen to drive partners to 
maximise each of these metrics: 
 
Sinead {at interview}: [W]hen I think about performance 
management it's probably no different for partners albeit they are 
owners, it's about what do you do and how do you do it… And I'm a 
great believer that what gets measured gets done. And the more 
people have clear measurements, whether you are partners, whether 
you are employees, the more likely people are to deliver against 
those measurements. 
 
I found the reference to “what’s get measured gets done” little more than 
a painful management cliché, but one which clearly had traction within the 
firm and guided its decision-making. The following sub-sections analyse in 
more detail how metrics adjudicate success and failure, done by reference 
to key firm processes, starting with the budget. 
 
Revenue (Divisional Budgets) 
 
As narrated above, driven by the financial logic of revenue growth, stretch 
budgets were set for each division at the beginning of the year of study. 
Accounting enabled the finance function to report on divisional 
performance throughout the year, creating a discourse of success focused 
on monthly divisional performance against budget. For example, after four 
months Brian emailed partners with a report and a table showing 
performance against budget for each division: 
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We have exceeded budget for the month by £{Z}k. Fees after 4 
months sit at £{A.B}m, which is some £{C}k ahead of budget… Fees 
raised by each division in November are as follows: 
 
Division Budget Billed Billed % Shortfall £ 
A X Y Z% £A 
B {and so on} … … … 
C … … … … 
… … … … … 
 
 
This form of reporting amounts to a league table of performance against 
the revenue target, a Foucauldian mathesis (Foucault 1973), which makes 
divisions visible and commensurable. Brian explained the rationale at 
interview: 
 
[I]n terms of the drive for turnover it's about putting messages out to 
the whole firm in terms of…: we are needing £X to hit the budget, or 
that sort of thing. 
 
The reference here to “putting messages out” is telling. The key message 
is that the budget is a paramount measure of success, hence divisions are 
expected to do whatever is necessary to make budget. Reporting makes 
public those divisions who meet that expectation, and those that do not. It 
adjudicates and names the successful and the unsuccessful, asking the 
latter to recognise their failing, and to take remedial action. However 
“messages” did not stop with the finance function. Rather, the focus on 
budget went much deeper into the firm. Department Heads sent monthly 
emails to fee earners in their department, the dominant theme of which 
was performance against budget for each of the constituent divisions, with 
comparisons between them made, and tables attached. And success or 
failure of the department, and the divisions within it, was made public 
after year end, as the following email from a Department Head shows: 
 
… I attach the final set of statistics, for the Department and each 
Division, up to the end of {the financial year}… You may remember 
that our Departmental budget was £{X}m and we came up a little bit 
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short of that figure at £{X-4%} (96%). At Divisional level, both 
{division A} and {division B} exceeded budget (107 and 104% 
respectively), but, despite best efforts, {division C} were unable to 
overcome their budget deficit and ended at 92%... 
 
Hence two divisions were a success and the third a failure. Thereafter 
adjudication continued at the Operations Board, where Department Heads 
were required to explain why divisions did not make budget. Finally, the 
Governance and Strategy Board (GSB) undertook a performance review at 
which divisional performance was characterised principally in terms of 
budget: 
 
Brian: … It is interesting looking at each division. Approximately half 
hit the budget and half missed. {Kyle’s division} is the standout, 
having missed by £{X} million. They are the primary reason why the 
{firm’s} fees budget was not hit… 
 
Ken {Chairman}: Which divisions decreased? 
 
Brian: {Division D}, and {division F}, have gone down quite a bit. I 
did speak to Beth {Head of division D} about it and she was not 
surprised. The {case} had quite a large write off of fees, and others 
too. So she is not surprised. {Division H} is the other… 
 
Ken: So there are no divisions you'd be saying: I'm worried, you 
should look at these? 
 
Brian: There are no red flags… 
 
The adjudication role, and the characterisation of failure, is exemplified by 
Ken’s question as to whether any division should be “looked at”, and 
Brian’s reference to “red flags”, a metaphor for trouble or problems that 
require to be fixed. Each suggests that, by measuring performance against 
budget, knowledge is gained which could prompt GSB to review a division, 
potentially leading to a management intervention and possible 
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restructuring at partner level. The effect of such on partners was not 
vocalised here, apparently being accepted as a necessary exercise of 
proper management. I was left wondering whether the effect of one 
metric should be given such significance in light of the inevitability of good 
years and bad years in business, and the lack of control of the market. 
 
In conclusion, data show that the revenue budget is the principal means 
by which divisions are rendered knowable and commensurable, and 
thereby governed. It provides a key measure by which divisional success 
is adjudicated, that of revenue generation. The “work done” by this is 
thereby clear, it promotes the pursuit of revenue in support of the firm’s 
growth strategy. This leads to in-year and year-end reviews. Accounting 
creates or utilises the space within which the metric can be applied, 
mediates into the firm the financial logic of growth, and carries out the 
work to show performance against the metric. It is a key agent in each 
step in the process. Moreover, the outputs have effects. Ultimately 
divisions who fail to meet budget are under scrutiny, and may be “red 
flagged”, implying a further review and possible further consequences, a 
subject that becomes all the more pertinent in terms of the next 
considered metric, net contribution. 
 
Net Contribution (Divisions) 
 
As noted above, net contribution was introduced in the year of study, and 
swiftly became a key metric by which divisional success or failure was 
judged. The Finance Director explained its introduction: 
 
Brian {at interview}: I think that we felt the need to just have a more 
rounded view of KPIs {Key Performance Indicators}… I think what is 
relevant for the business is that the GSB in particular understand 
where partner profit share is going so that they are informed when 
making decisions like who is moving up the lockstep, in which areas, 
and which promotions they are making… So it's about 
understanding… the dynamics of the business. 
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Hence net contribution creates knowledge that enables the divisional 
commensurability and by extension the partners within them, necessary to 
assist in decision-making, including partner remuneration and promotion 
decisions. By referring to the firm as “the business”, financial and 
commercial logics are privileged, and traditional professional logics, which 
look to expertise and reputation (Abbott 1988; Freidson 2001), weakened. 
Brian’s description exemplifies how accounting applies net contribution to 
reflect a new financial logic, that of treating partners as costs. Partners 
are thereby financialised, seen as an input and output equation: revenue 
being generated (the input) and profit being extracted (the output). In 
turn, decisions are “informed”, a term implying that metrics produce value 
neutral knowledge. Such decisions include partner remuneration, 
considered further below in the consideration of the activities of the firm’s 
Remuneration Committee. 
 
The adjudicatory function of net contribution can be further exemplified by 
tracing some of the history of its initial introduction and use. When the 
metric was first applied James, the Managing Partner, emailed Division 
Heads: 
 
Brian has now completed… calculations for the year just ended and 
will shortly circulate to each of you (i) a graph showing as a %age of 
revenue the Net Contribution for all divisions and (ii) a more detailed 
analysis for your own division. 
 
Overall our central costs accounted last year for about {X}% of our 
revenue so divisions should aspire to that level… I would like you to 
share this with the partners in your division so that there is 
transparency on this measure… 
 
Here James made public for the first time how divisions compared to one 
another in terms of their performance against the new metric, as well as 
the level which divisions “should aspire to”, thereby introducing a measure 
of success. This was to be shared with partners, masked by the rhetoric of 
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transparency, something frequently used by members of the Operations 
Board to avoid admitting the circulation of statistics amounted to little 
more than a visible financial standard by which partners and fee earners 
were to be judged, thereby engendering internal competition. Of course 
transparency was only applied when it suited; in order to drive 
performance. I found this hypocritical, and as the following analyses will 
show {Chapter 9}, those experiencing the same were in little doubt that 
their worth was determined by a metric, rendering them financial assets, 
and the means to a financial end rather than ends in themselves. Shortly 
after, Brian provided Division Heads the net contribution chart along with 
a commentary. The following is an extract from emails to two Division 
Heads: 
  
{To Lesley} At {X}% contribution, {your division} was just shy of the 
firm contribution level of {Y}%, so an acceptable performance… If the 
division achieves budgeted fee income… then it should be very close 
to achieving the firm wide contribution level… 
 
{To Findlay} At {Z}% contribution, {your division} was unfortunately 
considerably below the firm contribution level… The division needs to 
be getting more from its senior people and ultimately growing fee 
income significantly… If the division achieves budget… then you would 
still be considerably short of achieving the firm wide contribution 
level, so it's important to aim beyond fee budget. 
 
What is of interest here is how the performance of Lesley’s division was 
rated as “acceptable”, being close to the benchmark provided, whereas 
the review of Finlay’s division is markedly less positive and implicitly 
“unacceptable”, an uncomfortable form of othering generated by the 
introduction of a new metric. It was not the absolute monetary 
contribution that mattered, it was how it compared to a given benchmark, 
or target, the firm average. This point was further emphasised when, 
midway through the year, Brian issued to the Operations Board a 
comparative chart showing net contribution, together with an analysis in 
which he ranked the performance of each as either “good” (above firm 
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wide performance), “fine” (close to firm average), “disappointing” (below) 
and “poor” (significantly below). No acknowledgement was given to the 
fact that benchmarking individual divisions against an average of all 
divisions necessarily renders some divisions above and others below the 
average, meaning there will always be those who outperform and those 
who underperform. Failure is thereby built into the system, insistent on 
the naming and shaming of an unacceptable other, and potentially driven 
by an exceptional performance elsewhere such that a division could be 
acceptable one year, repeat the same performance, but be unacceptable 
the next. This makes net contribution distinct from divisional revenue 
budgets in two ways. Firstly, making the revenue budget is technically 
possible for all divisions, being independent from an average. Secondly, 
the budget is focused on revenue, not directly linked to costs, whereas net 
contribution is the product of revenue and costs. The most significant cost 
included is that of partner profit take in that division, and as has been 
noted, this has the effect of characterising partners as both revenue 
generators and as costs. The work done by net contribution is therefore to 
make divisions and their partners (collectively) profit centres, and 
partners revenue generators and costs. Financial logics are king. 
Moroever, success and failure is inherent in the system. 
 
However, in contrast to the profit centre view encouraged by net 
contribution, a different logic applies to how partners share profits. Such 
profit sharing includes profit generated elsewhere in the firm. This can be 
seen as part of a professional and collegial logic, based on the sharing of 
the fruits of the labours of all partners, each with their own expertise, and 
each contributing that expertise to the firm in a joint enterprise, part of 
professionalism (Greenwood et al. 1990; Empson & Chapman 2006; 
Mintzberg 1989). These starkly contrasting views give rise to the potential 
for tension and contradiction, a subject that is considered in Chapter 9. 
 
The work done by net contribution also relates to the operation of the 
firm’s Remuneration Committee (Remcom), considered next. 
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Partner Performance (Remcom) 
 
Remcom is the nexus of equity partner commensurability and 
adjudication, its remit being to determine, on a biennial basis, equity 
partner progress on the firm’s lockstep. As narrated in Chapter 6, a new 
equity partner starts with a base number of points, and climbs to the 
maximum in seven annual “steps”. Such progression is stated as a 
“principle”. However, this principle is subject to a Remcom “correction” 
which can result in progress being arrested, points being reduced, or a 
greater number of points allocated. Hence “corrections” can be negative or 
positive. 
 
According to the Remcom Protocol each partner is subject to review in 
terms of that partner’s performance and contribution, the latter not to be 
confused with divisional net contribution. Performance is described as 
covering: “revenue generation, profitability and financial management 
(billing, debt collection etc.)”. It is to “be assessed over a two year period 
to match the review cycle”. Hence performance is used in reference to 
financial criteria judged in terms of the accounting metrics set out in Table 
11, a form of Foucauldian mathesis (Foucault 1973; Townley 1994). 
Contribution on the other hand is a wider term covering defined skills, 
attributes and behaviours, such as business development skills and 
citizenship, under a form of Foucauldian taxinomia (Foucault 1973; 
Townley 1994). The control effects of these are further analysed in 
Chapter 8 in the context of Townley’s (1993a; 1994; 1995a; 1997) 
Foucauldian interpretation of HRM practices. 
 
The principle of commensurability is enshrined in the Remcom Protocol 
when it states that “overall contribution”, a term which implicitly includes 
both financial performance and each partner’s wider contribution, is to “be 
compared relatively with their peer group as a whole, and having regard 
to the equity placings”. Whereas the references here are to individual 
efforts, the financial performance of each partner’s division is also 
relevant, with accounting providing the input through measuring 
performance against revenue budget, and net contribution, as considered 
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above. Hence adjudication is not only done with reference to partners as 
individuals, but rather linked with divisional “success”, placing partners 
into commensurable groups reflecting territorialisation {above}. 
 
Remcom was informed by various reports. A key part was the Divisional 
Finance Report, completed by the Division Head. The template of this 
report begins with division financial metrics as shown in Table 7.3. These 
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Table 7.3: Extract from Divisional Finance Report 
 
Division Heads are then asked to identify “outliers”, being partners who 
have “performed materially less well (or contributed materially less)” and 
the converse (who are “materially better”), in either case “than would be 
expected of a partner at the same level who you would regard as 
performing at a satisfactory level”. This is coupled with a section called 
“inconsistencies” in which the Division Head is to identify any partner 
whose lockstep position is out of step with others in the division who 
“make a similar level of contribution”. Division Heads are thereby asked to 
judge individual success and failure on a financial basis, comparatively 
with other divisional partners. The term “outlier” is a stark expression, 
another form of othering, and an invidious subjectivity sponsored by the 
application of metrics. It reduces people to dots on a chart, and further 
evidences the view of partners in the financialised PSF as means to an end 
rather than ends in themselves. 
 
Separately Division Heads and Function Heads are also to report on 
partner behaviours across a number of non-financial criteria, and applying 
a “traffic lighting” system: 
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[T]he reporter… would highlight any partner with a clear and material 
departure below expected levels of performance with a red light, 
those who have a clear departure which may or may not be 
considered material with an amber light, those who meet expected 
levels with a green light… 
 
Thus each Division Head is an adjudicator of partner performance, using 
metrics produced by accounting, potentially placing them in a difficult 
position; each must balance her/his relationship and loyalty to divisional 
partners against an obligation to Remcom to identify outliers. Further, 
although financial metrics, including a partner’s matter manager fees and 
gross profit are each relative measures against other partners, non-
financial contributions and behaviours have no readily quantifiable scale. 
The Remcom Protocol and associated documents appear to assume a 
commensurable qualitative assessment can be made which equates in 
some way to the hard financial metrics. 
 
The foregoing represents what documents constituting Remcom and those 
envisaging reporting, tell us. However the actual practice of Remcom tell 
us more as to the role of accounting. The key role was in identifying 
outliers: 
 
Finlay {at interview}: … [I]t was very clear who the high performers 
were, and it was clear who the lower performers were… [Y]ou would 
have the data in front of you to make those kinds of comparisons – 
position on lockstep to the financial metrics that you had. 
 
The benchmarks applied for the identification of outliers were two of the 
metrics referred to above: individual matter manager fees and gross profit 
percentage (Tables 7.1 and 7.2): 
 
Finlay: The outlier approach would be your individual matter manager 
[fees] and gross profit… There were a couple of benchmarkings, in 
terms of… what we should be striving for as a gross profit number 
and where people were materially below that you would see it… When 
 174 
you looked at… the top of lockstep you would see what a cohort of 
top lockstep partners were producing and that would almost by 




Bradley {at interview}:  … If you were at £{X} or below [in matter 
manager fees] you were probably being looked at… You would look at 
it in the context of whether that number was an outlier one way or 
another, and the other stuff would go on top of that. 
 
Hence a norm for performance levels at top of lockstep was derived from 
metrics provided by accounting, with the “top lockstep” cohort used as a 
starting point. Bradley’s reference to “other stuff” going on top suggests 
that non-financial contribution, against the taxinomia referred to above, 
was looked at after outliers were identified and categorised through 
metrics. This order of consideration, looking at metrics first, privileged 
financial performance over non-financial contribution, suggesting that 
“hard” financial metrics were privileged over “soft” non-financial forms of 
contribution (cf. Alvehus & Spicer 2012). 
 
However, the analysis did not stop at individual commensurability. In 
keeping with the divisional angle, part of the assessment of partners as 
outliers looked to divisional net contribution, as was apparent from the 
feedback given to partners who did not progress on the lockstep: 
 
…While the {division} benefits from the synergies and economies of 
scale in operating as part of a larger practice, the Net Contribution of 
the Division for {year} and as projected for {year} is materially 
below the firm’s average. 
 
Growth prospects of the division and the individual’s practice, were also 
taken into account: 
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Finlay: [We would ask] is this a partner who is, let's say, performing 
well on lower lockstep in a division which has a contribution that’s 
low? Is that because there is a concern about its growth? There was 
an interrogation as to… [w]ould this person progress in the way that 
you would expect them to? They are performing well now but is there 
something about them or their division in particular that would cause 
an issue about progressing up? 
 
This focus on contribution and growth further reflect the view of a partner 
as a cost borne by each division as a profit centre, and in the context of 
lockstep, with the principle of progression, an increasing cost. The analysis 
suggested by Finlay is whether partners climbing the lockstep, and their 
division, are going to sufficiently grow their practices, and hence add to 
revenue and profit, so as to “pay for” the incremental points assumed 
within the lockstep progression. Again this privileges financial logics over 
traditional professional logics, the former looking to financial outcomes, 
and the latter expertise, reputation and collegiality (Thornton et al. 2012; 
Abbott 1988; Greenwood et al. 1990; Freidson 2001; Mintzberg 1989). 
Whereas non-financial contribution would in principle take account of 
increasing expertise and recognition, Finlay’s comments tell us that a 
partner would still be regarded as an outlier if those aspects were not 
accompanied by incremental revenue and profit. 
 
Hence the work done by accounting, as adjudicator, is enabling 
commensurability, and providing the basis on which success and failure of 
both divisions and individual partners is determined. The above analysis 
shows that, in Hume Locke, accounting used divisions as spaces for 
collective examination (territorialisation), then applied specific metrics 
designed to measure outcomes consistent with the logics of 
financialisation: revenue and profit growth. Matter manager fees and 
gross profit, both drivers of revenue and profit growth, were used by 
Remcom to determine outliers, suggesting those metrics which directly 
contribute to the firm’s strategy are given prominence. Moreover, by 
viewing partners as a cost that has to be justified, rather than owner-
experts entitled to a share of profits, the relationship between the firm 
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and its partners has been financialised. Partners are expected to deliver a 
return on the investment made by the firm when that partner was 
promoted to equity, or given more equity points through the application of 
lockstep. Accounting, operating through Remcom, adjudicates on partner 
and divisional success and failure, and makes profit sharing decisions 
accordingly. Whereas non-financial, and hence non-metricised, 
contributions were also taken into account in Remcom determinations, the 
extent to which they were significant in dislodging the conclusions derived 
from metrics is unclear. This begs the question: how did partners 
experience the process in light of the uneasy relationship between clear 
metrics and qualitative non-financial contributions? Chapter 9 returns to 
this question. 
 
Accounting and Subjectification 
 
The final element of Miller and Power’s (2013) framework is 
subjectification. By this they mean that accounting “subjectivises” 
individuals; it “presupposes and brings into being a certain kind of self” 
(Miller & Power 2013, p.586), the calculable self, and one capable of being 
controlled. This chapter has demonstrated how partners, directly and 
through their divisions, are made the subjects of accounting. They are 
financial assets: revenue generators with associated costs. They are 
required to act as guardians of firm profitability. In turn, their success is 
determined in accordance with a cost-benefit analysis which seeks to show 
a return on investment for the firm. This determination is made using a 
Foucauldian mathesis (Foucault 1973) created by accounting, and set out 
in the metrics described in this chapter. However, data show the 
subjectification of partners by accounting did not operate on a standalone 
basis. Rather, the accounting mathesis exists, sometimes uncomfortably, 
alongside elements of partner subjectivity which are not based in 
measurable financial contribution, but rather in narrative definitions, a 
Foucauldian taxinomia (Foucault 1973) operating through HRM practices. 
Partner subjectification must therefore been seen in light not only of the 
accounting measures set out here, but also of the system of HRM controls 
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operated by the firm. Chapter 8 examines these controls and shows how 
accounting and HRM form an ecology of power which proffers partners the 
subjectivity of the performing and contributing partner, thereby 
disciplining them to act in accordance with the callings of accounting, and 
rendering themselves as economised beings (Rose 1988; 1999; Miller 




This chapter addresses the second research question: How do the logics of 
financialistion enter and take effect in the PSF? In particular, and following 
Miller and Power (2013): does accounting act as the agent of the 
financialisation of the PSF and if so how? 
 
Through the adoption of a cultural economy perspective, and the 
theoretical insights of Miller and Power (2013), this chapter informs our 
understanding of the financialisation of the PSF. It shows how accounting 
operates in the PSF as an agent of financialisation, enabling or making use 
of an organisational structure that is capable of measurement, mediating 
rationalities and logics from finance and business in the choice of metrics 
to be applied within the firm, and adjudicating on the success or failure of 
divisions and individuals in the firm based on such metrics (Miller & Power 
2013). A Foucauldian mathesis (Foucault 1973; Townley 1994) enables 
management control; a mechanism to render divisions and partners 
knowable, and to direct the attention and actions of divisions and partners 
towards certain operational, or tactical, actions which contribute to the 
delivery of the firm’s strategic goals, as expressed in certain key metrics. 
 
This chapter contributes to the literature on financialisation (Froud et al. 
2006; Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009; Alvehus & Spicer 2012) within the PSF 
by identifying and defining the metrics that are put to use within the 
financialised PSF, both in terms of divisions of the firm, and individuals. 
This takes us beyond the financial market metrics identified by Froud and 
colleagues (2006), the focus on profit per partner (“PEP”) by 
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Faulconbridge and Muzio (2009), and the focus on chargeable hours by 
Alvehus and Spicer (2012). Rather it shows how a wider range of metrics 
are applied, forming an integrated ecology of metrics which operate in a 
mutually supportive manner to deliver the firm’s financialised strategy; 
certain metrics go directly towards the meeting of strategic measures of 
success, while others play an operational or tactical role in contributing to 
such strategic measures. In so doing this chapter shows how the outcome 
reported by Faulconbridge and Muzio (2009), PEP, is an achievement of 
the ecology of metrics applied within the firm. Further, it shows that the 
focus by some on chargeable hours (Karreman & Alvesson 2004; Brown & 
Lewis 2011; Alvehus & Spicer 2012), while informative, merely scratches 
the surface of the role of accounting in the financialisation of the firm. 
 








































Efficiency Revenue Profit 
Utilisation Target 
Measure 
Efficiency Revenue Profit 
Work-in-
progress 
Measure Efficiency Revenue Profit 
Lock-up Target 
Measure 
Efficiency Revenue Profit 
Recovery Target 
Measure 
Efficiency Revenue Profit 
Table 7.4: Metrics, processes, logics and outcomes 
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The chapter also shows how these metrics reflect the financial logics of 
growth and efficiency, and how certain firm processes based in 
accounting, namely the setting of divisional revenue budgets as targets, 
and the measurement of net contribution, operate as governance 
mechanisms which also work on the subjectivity of partners, defining 
them as financial assets: revenue generators on the one hand, and costs 
on the other. Table 7.4 draws each of the foregoing strands together, 
showing how each metric is linked to intra-firm processes of budgeting, 
targeting and measurement, the logics mediated, and the outcomes 
supported. 
 
Further, this chapter shows how accounting enables the operation of the 
firm’s partner remuneration system, underlining the subjectivity of the 
partner as an asset and cost. This financial logic stands in contrast to a  
traditional professional logic which values partners based on their 
expertise and reputation (Alvehus & Spicer 2012; Brown & Lewis 2011) 
something which goes to the heart of the partners’ experience of life 
within the financialised PSF, a subject returned to in Chapter 9. 
 
However, whereas this chapter draws our attention to the operation of 
accounting in the financialisation of the PSF, it does not act alone as a 
governance mechanism. Rather, there is a second functional role which 
plays a key part in the governance of partners: HRM. As Townley states: 
 
Personnel‘s relationship with accounting is one area ripe for 
reinterpretation... [B]oth personnel and accounting constitute 
systems of recording, classifying, and measuring. They represent the 
operation of governance through calculative order. They render power 
invisible by presenting information as an objective fact independent of 
the interests of those who produce and use it (Roberts 1991). They 
express a belief in the ‘reality’ which is produced, to the effect that 
this becomes the basis upon which decisions are made. They are 
participants in enhancing rationalization… [H]ow these combine is a 
 180 
matter for detailed empirical investigation… (Townley 1994, pp.144–
145) 
 
Following Townley’s (1994) call for empirical investigation, and applying 
the insights gained in this chapter, Chapter 8 reviews the role of HRM 
practices as a governance mechanism with the financialised PSF. It seeks 
to answer the third research question: How are professionals managed to 
deliver the financial imperative implied by financialisation? More 
specifically, and following Foucault (1977; 1978) and Townley (1993b; 
1994), do the technologies of HRM, operating alongside metrics, proffer 
partners a financialised subjectivity that redefines professionalism in the 
PSF? In so doing it builds towards an argument that, seen as operating 
together, accounting and HRM practices form an ecology of power, acting 
so as to render partners calculable and known, and thereby governable. In 
so doing it develops a more detailed understanding of the subjectivity of 








Chapter 7 showed how accounting operates in the PSF as an agent of 
financialisation, creating or making use of an organisational structure that 
enables measurement, mediating rationalities and logics from finance and 
business in the choice of metrics to be applied within the firm, and 
adjudicating on the success or failure of divisions and individuals in the 
firm based on such metrics (Miller & Power 2013). Further, it showed how 
accounting enables the operation of the firm’s partner remuneration 
system, underlining partner subjectivity as both revenue generator and 
cost. Building on Chapter 7, this chapter explores HRM practices as 
governance mechanisms employed alongside accounting metrics to 
support the firm’s financialised strategy. In so doing it addresses the third 
research question: How are professionals managed to deliver the financial 
imperative implied by financialisation? More specifically, and following 
Foucault (1977; 1978) and Townley (1993b; 1994), do the technologies of 
HRM, operating alongside metrics, proffer partners a financialised 
subjectivity that redefines professionalism in the PSF? 
 
In seeking to answer that question, this chapter utilises Townley (1993b; 
1994; 1995b) and Legge’s (2005) work on HRM practices as technologies 
of knowledge production and discipline, rendering partners both the object 
and subject of power, and thereby governable to organisational ends. This 
employs Foucault’s conceptualisation of the disciplinary technology of the 
examination (Foucault 1977), and the notion of governmentality, the 
latter referring to “the activity aimed at shaping or influencing the conduct 
of people”, and based on the premise that “something must be known 
before it can be governed” (Legge 2005, p.334). Each is enabled by two 
systems of comparison drawn from The Order of Things (Foucault 1973), 
namely taxinomia, which uses descriptive language, and mathesis, which 
orders numerically. This chapter demonstrates that, through HRM, the 
firm disciplines and shapes the individual to the subjectivity of the 
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performing and contributing partner as to support delivery of the firm’s 
financialised strategy. 
 
This chapter begins by exploring how HRM practices are employed in 
making partners the object of power. It then moves on to analyse how 
partners participate in making themselves the subject of power. The 
chapter concludes that accounting and HRM practices combine to form an 
ecology of power that operates on, and is used by partners, so as to 
constitute each as the performing and contributing partner, and contrasts 
it with traditional professional logics. 
 
The individual as an object of power: the making of partners as 
financialised assets 
 
The traditional view sees the appointment of the lawyer to partnership, or 
“being made partner”, as a marker implying a desired expert status has 
been attained. Within Hume Locke lawyers seeking partnership, and those 
assumed as partners, engage with a series of processes: 
 
1. Definition of the ideal partner (“Partner Criteria”) 
2. The Developing Leaders Programme (“Developing Leaders”).  
3. Partner assumption, or “promotion” to equity.  
4. 360 feedback (“360”). 
5. Partner Performance Review (“PPR”). 
6. Remuneration review. 
 
This section argues that these processes form a linear construction 
process which “makes partners” by rendering each an object of power. It 
disciplines them to perform to a subjectivity created by senior 
management in support of the firm’s financialised strategy. This section 




Partner Criteria: a Taxinomia 
 
Managerial “competencies” use a taxonomy of skills, characteristics, and 
behaviours that define what’s important in achieving success in a role 
(Townley 1994). These have a constitutive function: they make the role. 
This thesis argues that when such definitions are combined in a 
Foucauldian ecology of power, it is not only the role that is made, but the 
individual who occupies it.  
 
The process starts with the definition of “Partner Criteria” under the 
headings: 
 
• Technical ability 
• Communication and interpersonal skills 
• Drive and attitude 
• Client care 
• Citizenship 
• Business development 
• Financial management 
• People management 
 
These form a taxinomia (Foucault 1973) of skills, competences and 
behaviours, which represent an expanded form of Hanlon’s four main 
functions of a partner (Hanlon 1997). They establish the norms against 
which potential partners are assessed through normalising judgement 
(Foucault 1977), and a form of Faulconbridge and Muzio’s (2008) 
“organisational professionalism”, being professional as defined by the 
organisation, as opposed to the traditional view informed by the 
profession as a whole and focused on expertise (knowledge) and 
reputation (Abbott 1988; Macdonald 1995). 
 
In the following analysis attention will be drawn to how Partner Criteria 
are applied, and what that tells us about how such Criteria and their 
application act as governance and control mechanisms, alongside 





Townley (1994) identifies selection and testing processes as aspects of 
Foucauldian examination. They are intended to examine the individual to 
determine whether he/she has the skills and behaviours necessary, as set 
out in the Partner Criteria. Developing Leaders is a selection and testing 
technology which operates as a both as a Foucauldian observation, and as 
a normalising judgement (Foucault 1977). 
 
Developing Leaders has to be understood with reference to what preceded 
it: the High Potential Development Programme (HPD). HPD was led by PII, 
a leadership development consultancy offering “talent management” 
services to ensure clients “pick the right people”. HPD was described as: 
 
…an initial in-depth assessment and interview by PII that identifies 
the candidate’s areas of strengths and areas of development in 
relation to the partner criteria, training, one-to one coaching, and 
mentoring... [It] includes a range of psychometric tools and is carried 
out by an occupational psychologist who… is experienced in 
partner/executive assessment. The process finishes with the 
candidate pulling together a portfolio evidencing what they have done 
to build on their strengths and address their areas of development 
and a final report from PII. 
 
Hence the Partner Criteria were specifically referenced, reinforcing that as 
a taxinomia operating as a set of norms against which candidates were 
assessed. Implicit in the reference to assessment, training, coaching and 
mentoring is the suggestion that (a) there is knowledge of the candidate 
essential in determining whether the individual is the “right choice” for 
partnership (b) that is inaccessible through daily interaction even over a 
period of many years (c) it can be drawn out by psychometric tools and 
interview, and (d) weaknesses in the candidate’s profile as against the 
Partner Criteria will be identified, which can be addressed and remedied 
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by consultant led training. A number of these implications appear difficult 
to support, but are taken for granted, or at least unchallenged within 
Hume Locke. The PII assessment, something carried over into Developing 
Leaders, subjects candidates to observation and documentation, thereby 
making them visible to the gaze of management. In the training and 
mentoring that follows, candidates are “made” into the desired subject, 
with the attributes set out in the referenced taxinomia.  
 
Developing Leaders built on and broadened HPD into a 2 year period of 
“development”. Sinead, the firm’s HR Director, described at interview her 
influence in this: 
 
I learn[ed] from {InsuranceCo} that… you never bring someone into 
a senior management role without them going through a very 
structured development programme… [B]eing a partner is a senior 
management role… It would be madness to put someone into a role 
and you haven't prepared them in any way, shape or form to be 
successful… 
 
Sinead sees no distinction between the operation of a listed company and 
a PSF, a view many partners might not support. Rather, for Sinead, 
partners are to be regarded as equivalent to managers in a corporation 
such that there is "a set of verifiable, predictable management 
characteristics" (Townley 1994, p.100) associated with both managers and 
partners, suggesting managerial homogeneity (Alvesson & Sveningsson 
2011). 
 
Developing Leaders begins with candidates stating why they believe they 
should be nominated, referring to the Partner Criteria, and reinforcing it. 
After nomination candidates complete psychometric and aptitude tests for 
which they are given a numeric score between zero and 100, a form of 
Foucauldian mathesis (Foucault 1973; Townley 1994). These place 
candidates in grid of measurement which renders them observable, 
quantifiable and commensurable (Rose 1988). Where there is a shortfall 
or deficiency, Developing Leaders trains, disciplines and shapes candidates 
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to fit the criteria, a form of Foucauldian discipline (Foucault 1977). 
Ultimately the intention is to shape partners before they enter the partner 
assumption process, considered next. 
 
Partner assumption and elevation to equity 
 
A memo to partners regarding the process for appointment to partner or 
promotion to equity states: 
 
{Fixed share} promotions are essentially about assessing potential, 
particularly in areas such as business development, financial 
management and people management. Equity promotions are about a 
track record as a partner and measuring actual performance in role. 
 
Hence, at the stage of fixed share partnership, emphasis is placed on 
“potential”, with particular reference to “business development, financial 
management and people management”. These skills relate to the ability to 
win business, build a team to service it, and manage the financial 
consequences. Each points to the same outcome: profitable revenue 
generation. Other aspects of the taxinomia are taken for granted. 
 
Progress to equity is dependent upon “measuring actual performance”. As 
Chapter 7 demonstrated, references to partner performance are 
references to financial results. Hence for equity partners a financial 
mathesis replaces potential. Measurable financial outputs at levels 
considered appropriate, are essential to equity progression. Hence the 
equity partner is a financialised asset, one that produces an appropriate 
amount of profitable revenue. This reflects the findings of Galanter and 
Henderson’s (2008) study of large US law firms where the “equity core is 
reserved primarily for partners who control access to key clients” 
(Galanter & Henderson 2008, p.1867), key clients being those who 
produce large revenues. However, in Hume Locke a partner who produces 
the appropriate amount of profitable revenue by virtue of his/her own 
matter manager fees (see Chapter 7), whether controlling access to key 
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clients or not, may also given access to equity. However, implicitly, if such 
a partner is only a “work horse”, rather than a winner of work through 
business development skills and hence the controller of key client 
connections, that may limit progress through equity. 
 
Developing this further, but in contrast to the atomistic environment found 
by Galanter and Henderson (2008), within Hume Locke measurement is 
not restricted to the individual. Rather, the Managing Partner noted in an 
email to partners: “fulfilling the [partner] criteria will not in itself ensure 
promotion… the business case needs to stack up as well”. An outline 
business case, produced first, refers to the market, other macro issues 
and “the division financials, profitability, succession planning, and other 
division-level matters”. Illustrating this, in the year before the year of 
study, two partners in one division were nominated for promotion to 
equity. In the subsequent year’s process, the Chairman described the 
outcome to partners: 
 
[L]ast year the GSB concluded… there was room at that stage for the 
appointment in the … division … of only one… Equity Partner.  Both 
Neil Moore and Damian McKenzie were invited to apply… After 
consideration, the GSB recommended the elevation of Neil Moore. 
 
The crux was divisional profit levels being insufficient to support the 
appointment of two equity partners. Brian, the Finance Director, explained 
at interview the importance of forecasting future revenues and profit:  
 
[Y]ou need to look at: can the division support the partner promotion 
going forward… because at that point the person [promoted to 
equity] is getting a much larger share of the profit pie. So you need 
to be looking at… how many partners does each division have at the 
moment, what is the spread of them, how is the division 
performing…? 
 
This serves to underline the view of the firm as a business, and the 
dominance of financial logics over professional logics. Expertise and 
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reputation are no longer the defining feature of equity partner status, as a 
traditional professional logic would suggest (2001; Abbott 1988). Instead 
the logics of the market, profit and market positioning (Thornton et al. 
2012), dictate. This also attacks partner autonomy, a mainstay of the 
traditional view of the professional (Empson & Chapman 2006; Bailyn 
1985), as it insists on the individual being seen first as part of a collective, 
rather than valued for her/his own skills and performance. Ultimately it 
protects the firm’s most valuable asset, its rainmakers and stars, from the 
economically dilutive effects of equity assumptions where not 
accompanied by sufficient financial performance (Galanter & Henderson 
2008). 
 
At the next stage reports on the candidate are garnered from the Division 
Head, Function Heads and PII. The candidate is thereby constituted as 
"the inscribed subject", situated within "a network of writing" (Townley 
1994, p.101) in which "real lives are converted into written case notes" 
(Burrell 1988, p.226; cited in Townley 1994, p.101). In addition individual 
financial metrics are made explicit: fees, gross profit, recovery, and 
utilisation. Each of these metrics supports the firm’s metricised strategy, 
and treats the partner as a tool for strategy implementation. 
 
Once partners are assumed they became subject to two further HRM 




360 was introduced for partners during the year of study. 360 can be seen 
as a technology for governance based on hierarchical observation and 
normalising judgement (Foucault 1977; Townley 1994). The Managing 
Partner stated the purpose to the Operations Board: 
 
It will give a more powerful way to give feedback at partner review. A 
more objective way to reinforce feedback. 
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The reference to 360 as a powerful tool is apt, reflecting its disciplinary 
properties. James is also wooed by a false sense of objectivity, provided 
by the reflection of 360 in written report (Townley 1994).  Furthermore, 
the connection to partner performance, and fitting to the mould of the 
Partner Criteria was made clear when an HR Advisor explained 360 to 
partners in a pilot study: 
 
The purpose of 360 degree feedback is to help improve partner 
performance. It will focus primarily on the behaviours partners need 
to demonstrate under the Partner Criteria and will link in to Partner 
Practice Reviews… 
 
Hence 360 is not simply a means whereby partners are given information, 
it is a governance technology linked to the Partner Criteria, providing 
partners with knowledge of themselves to enhance their “performance” 
through correct (and corrected) behaviours. Hence the acceptability of 
telling partners how to behave, something which would have been taboo 
in the past, appears to now be unproblematic, even where referred to in 
an email from a junior member of the HR team. James then made this 
explicit to all partners when 360 was rolled out: 
 
The aim… is to provide you with more detailed, rounded, feedback, 
particularly in relation to what you do well, what you could improve 
on and more generally on your behaviours as a partner. 
 
… [360] will provide you with a fuller, more detailed, picture to go 
along with the financial data, objectives and other feedback that we 
have for the PPR… [Y]ou told me that you would like your PPR to be 
more open and informed so that there should be no surprises at 
Remcom. The 360 degree feedback will be an added part of the 
toolkit in ensuring that this is the case… 
 
360 as “an added part of the toolkit” is a metaphor confirming the Partner 
Criteria, 360, PPR and Remcom form a grid of disciplinary technologies 
(Foucault 1977) by which senior management sets norms, observes, 
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informs of aberrations, trains, disciplines and punishes (Townley 1993b). 
Partners are held to account in respect of their feedback at PPR, and are 
on notice that Remcom may take the feedback into account in assessing 
performance and determining partner remuneration (reward and 
punishment). The latter stands in contrast to HRM “best practice” which 
suggests 360 should be a developmental process, rather than a means of 
discipline and punishment (e.g. McCarthy & Garavan 1999). Ultimately 
360 is a performance management tool aimed at facilitating self-reflection 
and behavioural change, such change to align with norms set by 
management and reviewed at PPR, considered next. 
 
Partner Performance Review  
 
Performance appraisals are dividing practices which measure and rank 
workers against standards of performance and behaviour based on 
taxonomies (Townley 1993b; 1994). They may be attached to a rating 
scale (mathesis) which allows individuals to be ranked against one 
another. Appraisals may incorporate management by objectives as a 
means of aligning the activities of workers with the goals of the 
organisation (Townley 1993b; 1994). Such objectives may be “SMART” 
(specific, meaningful, ambitious, reachable and trackable) (Townley 
1994), thereby controlling activities through the definition of specific 
goals. The result is that performance appraisal is “placed at the nexus of 
several disciplinary practices or matrices - allocation of rewards, 
identification of skill deficiencies, promotion potential” (Townley 1994, 
p.72). 
 
The introduction of PPR, and its development as a management tool, was 
an initiative of Sinead, HR Director: 
 
{At interview} When I joined the firm I don't think partners had any 
reviews at all... [It] gradually developed to become a… proper 
review… It started with a very gentle chat and… you can't possibly 
ask about the figures or about objectives. And then has got into 
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more a fully functioned review… So I'd like to think that I've played 
a significant part… 
 
The previous absence of partner appraisals is explained by the different 
logics. Traditional professional logics privilege autonomy and the 
application of knowledge to esoteric issues by the professional working 
within an ethical code which promotes the public good (Freidson 2001; 
Bailyn 1985; Empson & Chapman 2006). The professional does not require 
to be managed; to do so would impugn her/his professional status, and 
obstruct the work (Greenwood et al. 1990). However, the introduction of 
commercial logics into PSFs (Hanlon 1994; Cooper et al. 1996), and the 
increasing functionalisation of PSF management (Brock et al. 1999), mean 
logics more readily applied to the manager-worker relationship enter the 
firm-partner relationship. 
 
The PPR form explains: 
 
Partner reviews are set in the context of, and should support the 
implementation of, the firm and divisional business plans, as well as 
facilitating each partner’s personal development. 
 
The purpose is to reflect on partner performance and development in 
the prior year, to set objectives for the coming year, and to record 
training/development requirements. 
 
At your review constructive feedback should be given by your head of 
division (or head of department) and the managing partner. 
 
This reveals a number of interconnected themes. Firstly, partners are part 
of a group whose purpose is to implement "plans". These plans reflect the 
firm’s strategy, and the metrics included within it. Hence partners are 
tools of strategy implementation, deliverers of metricised targets. By 
extension, the performing and contributing partner is one who enables 
achievement of divisional and firm targets, expressed in terms of key 
metrics. Secondly, reference to personal development is not a neutral 
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statement implying partner betterment as an end in itself. It is set in the 
context of performance, objectives, feedback and training requirements. 
Hence development aims to shape or “make” the partner into the 
performing and contributing partner. 
 
The PPR form itself requires partners to self-report against the Remcom 
Criteria, being those which are to be taken account of when assessing 
partner lockstep positioning and thereby profit share. The list is as follows, 
with the broadly analogous Partner Criteria added by the researcher in 
brackets: 
 
• Cross-selling, business and relationship development (Business 
development/Client care/Communication and interpersonal skills) 
• Financial performance (Financial management) 
• Development of expertise and firm profile (Technical 
ability/Business development) 
• Contribution to achievement of division’s business plan and 
performance against personal objectives (Citizenship/Drive and 
attitude) 
• Employee and team development (People 
management/Communication and interpersonal skills) 
• Knowledge management and training (Citizenship/People 
management) 
• Firm management (Citizenship/People management) 
• Good citizenship and compliance with firm practices and protocols 
(Citizenship) 
 
This demonstrates that Partner Criteria extend from Developing Leaders 
through partner appointment, 360, PPR and into the Remcom Criteria. 
This acts as a form of discipline (Foucault 1977), again aimed at making 
the partner meet the desired subjectivity. 
 
However, the form itself is only part of the process. Thus was 
accompanied by a meeting, being the oral form of a Foucauldian 
examination, chaired by James, the Managing Partner, along with the 
 193 
reviewed partner’s Head of Division or Department. Prior to the formal 
meeting, James met with the relevant Head: 
 
{At interview} [I] sit down with the Head of Division and say, let's 
talk about this individual… What are the messages we need to get 
across here? … [A]nd [we] agree between us… how the script would 
run in terms of how to get the messages across. 
 
This oral “messaging” is a form of normalising judgement, reliant upon 
hierarchical observation on the part of the Managing Partner and the 
Department or Division Head, supplemented by reports from Function 
Heads and 360. A common aspect of feedback, linked to the Partner and 
Remcom Criteria, was encouraging partners to undertake more business 
development:  
 
James: [A]t the partner reviews… we would be saying "you need to 
up your game on business development, we are giving you the 
support, training has been offered so I'm expecting you to sign up for 
that"… I think it's an important part, should be an important part of 
every partner’s role. 
 
The links to the firm’s strategy is once again made: only by winning new 
work, the purpose of business development, will the firm grow revenue 
and profits, key metrics in the firm’s metricised measures of success. 
Hence partners are expected to move beyond the role of knowledgeable 
professional into the role of business winner. This is a proactive role, 
rather than one based on reputation. It is judged on measured results: 
revenue generated. 
 
Feedback at PPR is also supplemented by training: 
 
James: … [P]art of how we would try to manage partners is… the 
training and development programme… We are giving you very 
bespoke business development training… So that's [a] kind of nudge 
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to the partners to get them more engaged with the business 
development process. 
 
Training is itself a classic form of Foucauldian discipline, training both the 
body (Foucault 1977) and the mind or “soul” (Rose 1999) and contributing 
to an ecology of power that sets norms, observes, trains, judges, rewards 
and punishes. In this case, once again, the training that is mentioned 
relates to business development: the winning of clients, and hence 
revenue generation. 
 
The focus on business development stands in contrast to the lack of 
comment at PPR on the technical skill and knowledge which appears taken 
for granted (Hanlon 1997). Whereas they are a necessary condition for 
assumption to partnership, only their combination with the winning of 
work, through business development skills, and the generation of 
sufficient revenue and profit from that work, does it contribute to the 
firm’s strategic measures of success. Hence skill and knowledge are no 
longer ends in themselves, they must produce revenue, something taken 
into account in the next part of the regime: Remcom. 
 
Remuneration Committee (Remcom) 
 
The organisation of geneses (Foucault 1977) orders individuals according 
to rank and seniority, a temporal sequence whereby individuals in placed a 
classification system. Steps up in seniority imply progression in career 
paths based on a hierarchy (Townley 1994). Remcom is a form of the 
organisation of geneses, it being the forum in which progression on the 
firm’s equity lockstep towards “top equity”, being both the maximum 
number of equity points, is reviewed and determined. 
 
Remcom was constituted and determined partner equity placings for the 
first time during the year of study. It’s influence as a disciplinary 
technology (Foucault 1977) began with the inclusion of explicit reference 
to the Remcom Criteria in the PPR form: 
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James {at interview}: [W]e asked partners to comment on how they 
performed against the [Remcom] Criteria [in the PPR form]… 
[P]artner engagement in this round of reviews was fantastic… 
{laughs}… compared to the previous year where a number of 
partners would come up with the form blank… They had pre-
populated… Some had even done appendices to detail all that they 
had been doing. 
 
Hence partners showed much greater levels of engagement with PPR once 
the Remcom connection was made explicit. Before the PPR had been seen 
differently, as Fred, a line partner and member of the Remcom, explained 
at interview: 
 
Fred: … Historically… you kind of always wondered {about the 
purpose of partner review}… [I]n a pure lockstep, does it really have 
any purpose?… If in a pure lockstep… management… [was] saying we 
don't like you doing this or we want you to do more of this… it was 
pretty pointless because, you know, so what? 
 
A “pure lockstep” is a system where equity partners automatically climb 
the lockstep each year until they reach the top. It reflects traditional 
professional logics, and the building of expertise and reputation over time 
(Freidson 1994; 2001; Abbott 1988; Macdonald 1995). However, Fred 
suggests the absence of punishment meant PPR was seen by some as 
having little purpose. But with the introduction of Remcom things 
changed, as two line partners explained at interview: 
 
Jordan: … [I]t was only when Bradley told me that [the PPR] form 
was going to be used for Remcom purposes that I thought: okay, I'll 
better focus on the form then! {laughs} 
 
Lewis: … There was a section stuck in [the PPR form] about Remcom 
criterion… It does up the ante… You are aware that the detail that 
you put in this form will also be shared with Remcom. And my 
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understanding from speaking to other partners is that this meant that 
this was a process that they were pretty diligent about completing. 
 
Hence the introduction of Remcom gave clout to an otherwise anemic PPR 
process. Punishment was added to discipline. Partners became acutely 
aware that adherence to the norms specified in Partner and Remcom 
Criteria, as reviewed in 360 and PPR, feed into the Remcom machine, 
resulting in reward or punishment, heightening the need to be seen to 
conform, and further impinging on partner autonomy. However, controls 
did not operate only through making her/him an object of power. 
Foucault’s insights (Foucault 1978) also see the individual as the subject 
of power, as discussed below. 
 
The partner as the subject of power 
 
The principal Foucauldian technology utilised to render the individual the 
subject of power is the confessional (Foucault 1978). The confessional 
makes the individual the subject of his own knowledge, operating 
therapeutically (Foucault 1978; Fornet-Betancourt et al. 1987) so as to 
encourage the subject to know himself and to reconstitute himself. The 
confessional accesses hidden knowledge of the individual, confirming 
identity through avowal, the act of revealing oneself while speaking to a 
master, or authority figure, who verifies the truth of what is disclosed, and 
thereby judges, punishes and rewards (Costea et al. 2008). The subject is 
given the opportunity to renounce his/her past self and declare a new self, 
thereby reconstituting himself (Foucault 1988; Townley 1994). This 
section explores how these take effect within Hume Locke. 
 
The Partner Interview as Confessional 
 
Townley (1994) characterises the selection interview as a confessional 
technology whereby the individual is to narrate their weaknesses and 
strengths, details of work experiences, and professional goals, something 
unlikely to have been expected of the traditional PSF partner, as revealed 
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by comments from Sinead {above}. Questions are aligned with job 
competences, on the assumption they can be revealed at interview by 
reference to actual events in the interviewee’s history (Townley 1994).  
 
In Hume Locke the GSB (Governance and Strategy Board) carry out 
interviews of candidates for partnership, and elevation to equity. They are 
given a “Partner Interview Guide” which instructs them to: 
 
Explain that you are looking for specific examples of what they have 
achieved in the past.  You want to know what the situation or task 
was, what did they do and what was the result. 
 
Hence interviewers, themselves partners and Function Heads who might in 
the past have been trusted to know relevant questions to ask, are to 
interview in a way that encourages the interviewee to divulge the inner 
truth (Townley 1994). The Interview Guide lists “key themes”, explaining 
that these are aligned to the Partner Criteria, serving to reinforce these as 
norms. Of note are questions listed under the heading Drive and Attitude: 
 
Q1: How have you improved and developed yourself to help you get 
to where you are now? 
 
Q2: What does success mean to you? 
 
Q3: What have you done to increase your self-awareness? What have 
you learned about yourself? 
 
Q4: What areas do you need to develop in? What’s your biggest 
weakness? 
 
These questions fit the mould of the confessional, demanding the 
candidate reveal hidden knowledge. By requiring the candidate to reveal 
areas of weakness and development, and to demonstrate an appetite for 
self-awareness and self-improvement, the interviewee is to constitute 
her/himself as the self-aware improving individual. Interviewers stand in 
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judgement of answers given, as arbiters of the truth, and facilitators of 
individual development, all aimed at producing the appropriate individual 
(cf. Covaleski et al. 1998; Costea et al. 2008). 
 
Q2 seeks articulation of the candidate’s view of “success”, hence what 
they are striving to achieve, and what they value. This facilitates a check 
on whether it aligns with that which assists the firm in delivering its 
strategic measures of success. Of course, “savvy” candidates may simply 
narrate back to the interview committee what they consider GSB want to 
hear, for fear of appearing to be out of line and thereby damaging career 
progression, a subject which is returned to in Chapter 9. However, by 
vocalising this, the candidate becomes committed to it (Foucault 1978). 
 
The firm’s strategy, and the role of the partner as a tool of strategy 
implementation, is further emphasised under the heading Citizenship, 
where candidates are asked: 
 
What have you done to contribute to, and support, the strategy of 
the firm and the delivery of your divisional plan? Tell me about a time 
when you didn’t agree with a management decision? 
 
By implication the candidate must demonstrate his/her utility as a tool for 
strategy implementation, as reflected in the delivery of divisional plans, 
and explain when she/he complied with a management decision 
notwithstanding objection. By virtue of where this appears, Citizenship, 
implies such support for the strategy, the divisional plan, and 
management decisions, are qualities of the “good citizen”. Hence a good 
citizen is compliant, subordinating her/his own interests to those of society 
(the firm), the latter defined by senior management and reflected in their 
decisions. In asking this question, a candidate is asked to constitute 
her/himself (Townley 1994) as a good citizen, who respects 
“management’s right to manage” (Alvesson & Sveningsson 2011) for the 




{With some bitterness} [Y]ou had to… be on message to progress 
to… equity partnership… [M]y being active and vocal was detrimental. 
So the year I actually achieved equity partnership I followed a 
strategy of dampening down my involvement and being quite quiet. 
And I was praised as being a great partner now and I made it. And I 
learned my lesson. 
 
Hence Caroline became the good citizen, suppressing what she had to say, 
and progressed to equity partnership. She stifled her desire to be heard in 
favour of acceptance of management decisions, all with a view to career 
progression, a subject returned to in Chapter 9. Such approach, while 
delivering Caroline’s goal, had clearly left her embittered and disavowed. 
The lesson learned was not taken to be welcome knowledge. Rather, she 
felt forced into a position where her participation at partnership level, 
something she associated with being valued, was eliminated, 
impoverishing her experience of partnership. 
 
However, being compliant is not enough. Questions suggest a partner 
must also demonstrate contribution, something brought out under the 
heading Financials: 
 
Q2:   What do you see as being the key indicators in measuring the 
contribution of a partner? 
 
Q3:   Tell me about how you manage key measures such as 
chargeable hours, fees, utilisation, recovery and profitability? 
 
The fact Q2 appears under the heading Financials implies the right 
thinking partner regards financial performance as the key indicator of 
contribution. Indeed, by extension, Q3 implicitly answers Q2 when 
referring to fees and other metrics used within the firm as key measures, 
something synonymous with key indicators. The terminology here is 
confused, as references elsewhere to performance tend to be financial 
aspects, and references to contribution tend to refer to non-financial 
aspects, as combined in the subjectivity of the performing and 
 200 
contributing partner. The message given here is that primacy is given to 
financial metrics which support the firm’s strategic measures of success. 
Candidates are invited to vocalise and commit to their financial 
performance as “key” to their subjectivity. 
 
PPR as Confessional 
 
PPR was considered earlier as a technology that makes partners the object 
of power. Townley (1993b; 1994) also identifies appraisal as a 
confessional technology whereby the appraisee is encouraged to reflect on 
performance and thereby participate in his own discipline. In Hume Locke 
the PPR involves two forms of reflection. Firstly, partners are to self-report 
on progress made in meeting objectives and training/development 
initiatives set in the previous review. Secondly, partners are instructed to 
“complete a commentary on your performance in the prior year including 
a commentary on contribution as against the relevant RemCom criteria”. 
Hence partners are required to explain their actions as against criteria on 
which their performance will be judged. And following the analysis above, 
each candidate is invited to constitute himself as a performing and 
contributing partner and, as part of that, as a good citizen. 
 
As part of the reflection on performance every completed PPR form 
contained some detail on metrics. Most frequently personal or divisional 
fee levels (for line partners and Division Heads respectively) were given, 
in some cases accompanied by an explanation of why these were to be 
regarded as good: 
 
{Jonathan PPR}: I regard {year} as a successful year on all fronts 
looking at financial performance, my management role and practice 
development… I am confident of billing £{X}k this year at a gross 
profit of {Y}%, which brings out a net contribution figure which 
compares well with other Division partners, certainly when my other 
commitments are considered… Our fees target for {year} was £{Z}M 
and I am confident we will pass that, possibly reaching £{Z+}M. 
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{Rory PPR}: MM fees are a record high…  
 
{Caroline PPR}: Another very busy and successful year for my team.  
Fees generated are again guaranteed to exceed £{X}… Recovery 
above average at {Y}%... Excellent conversion rate of WIP to cash… 
Team utilisation at or above {Z}% 
 
In explaining fee levels, and claiming that proves “success”, each partner 
constitutes her/himself in terms of revenue generated; as a financial asset 
contributing revenue and profit to the firm, and thereby helping it meet its 
strategic measures of success. There is a confessional element here too, 
and an attempt to satisfy the subjectivity of the performing and 
contributing partner with reference to fees and other measures. 
 
The PPR form precedes, and forms a reference point for, the PPR meeting. 
This began with the question: “how was your year?”. As an open question 
partners required to indicate not only whether their year was good or 
otherwise, but also, in explaining the same, indicate what they think is 
important. Declan, a line partner, explained at interview how he wrestled 
with the question: 
 
One of the questions was: how did I think I had done? Was it a good 
year? Which I thought was quite a difficult one to think about because 
it goes back to, what are we measuring against?… In terms of have I 
been busy? Yes, I thought I had been busy… My own view of what I 
do if you come up against the Remcom sort of stuff, I think I do the 
work, execute the work and manage that process relatively well… 
 
Here Declan, with echoes of the comment made by Sinead {above: 
Chapter 6} that “what gets measured gets done”, defaulted to seeking 
measurements for determining what constitutes a good year. Declan 
refers to being “busy”, itself a proxy for fee generation {above: Caroline}. 
Given the focus on metrics in the strategic discourse of management, in 
divisional financial targets, and in financial reporting throughout the year, 
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it is perhaps unsurprising that partners take financial metrics as the key 
indicator of what is valued, and how they should consider their 
performance. Their confessions of success against those parameters act to 
constitute themselves as financial assets, and devalue what many 
partners referred to at interview as being what they valued in their role, 
such as problem solving for the benefit of clients. Declan’s response, and 
his reference to the difficulty of responding to the “was it a good year?” 
question, suggests he has been led into a cycle of “busy” fee production as 
the measure of his worth, setting aside other views of what is “good” in 
favour of the measurable. Indeed, later, Declan informed me that he now 
prefers not to think about such questions, as he finds they give rise to 
conflicting feelings that leave him with a sense of unease. One cannot help 
but think that things of a greater intrinsic value than the measurable are 
being lost as a result. 
 
As has been noted, the other side of the coin to winning work is 
developing a team to profitably discharge it. However, reflecting 
traditional professional logics which privilege public service over financial 
gain (Freidson 1994; 2001; Abbott 1988; Macdonald 1995), some 
partners are concerned to retain service excellence – the “quality” of 
advice – and see themselves as the medium for delivery of that advice. 
Lack of “delegation” from partners to junior lawyers can therefore pose an 
issue for profitability, for example in relation to Beth, a Division Head, at 
her PPR: 
 
James: On the constructive side of things some people fed back you 
delegated more. And when we were talking earlier I think you 
recognised that there was maybe a need to [delegate]… The children 
are growing up! 
 
Beth: There is. I'm a bit of a control freak which I recognise… I tend 
to hang on and make sure things are done the way I want it done. 




Hence Beth experienced negative feedback, dressed up as “constructive” 
and being for her benefit and the wider benefit of the firm, suggesting the 
process of 360 and PPR was a positive one. She was prompted to, and did, 
confess to her shortcomings, committing to future change so as to 
delegate more, and control less. She recognised herself as a “control 
freak”, a negative subjectivity she should confess and commit to change. 
But she did so willingly and without any apparent discomfort, apparently 
deriving some therapeutic value in the process. But in so doing she 
reconstituted herself (Townley 1994) as the profit conscious partner, 
recognising her duty to privilege profit over traditional professionalism, 
part of Beth’s experience of financialisation, a subject returned to in 
Chapter 9. 
 
Reconstituting the subject 
 
Beth’s example references the second part of Foucault’s view of the 
individual as the subject of power, that of reconstitution. Linked to HRM, 
reconstitution sees HRM techniques as “schemes which introduce a very 
specific aspect of identity – that of the individual as a productive subject… 
to encourage individuals to constitute themselves in a productive role” 
(Townley 1994, p.126). Townley describes an extension of this as the 
“entrepreneurial subject”, being an “owner of production” (Townley 1994, 
p.126). Arguably equity partners in the PSF are already entrepreneurial 
subjects, being owners who provide capital which is thereby at risk, and 
share profits. However, ownership in Hume Locke also goes with a 
requirement for partners to reconstitute themselves within a productive 
role, part of the subjectivity of the contributing and performing partner. 
This may occur alongside confession, and the separation here is for 
analytical convenience only. 
 
The constitution of partners in a productive role occurs in the setting of 
individual partner objectives. Lesley explained that Division Heads are all 
given the objective of “delivering the divisional business plan”, and went 
on to explain: 
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{At interview} [T]he divisional plan… [is] structured around financial 
objectives, targets, clients, winning new work, intermediary 
programs… It might be to improve your rankings to go from a 2 in 
Legal 500 to tier 1, and therefore how are you going to achieve that.  
 
Hence the firm’s strategic measures of success are achieved by passing 
them to divisions as the objectives of the Division Head, and thereafter 
from Division Heads and line partners: 
 
James {at interview}: … We get… [objectives] to feed back up into 
the division plan so that there is an alignment between the individual 
objectives and the divisional business plan… [T]he partner would 
provide the completed form to the head of division and me, and we 
would then be looking at… [w]here does this fit into the division 
business plan? 
 
Divisional objectives are divided and passed on to line partners, for 
example: 
 
{Declan PPR}: Ensure full utilisation of team 
 
{Caroline PPR}: Achieve tier 1 ranking for {specialty} in Chambers. 
 
{Jake PPR}: Bring in another significant client from the {industry} 
 
Each of these examples, typical of objectives set, is directly or indirectly 
aligned with the firm’s metricised goals. In fulfilling them partners are 
constituted as Townley’s (1994) productive subjects. This stands in 
contrast to the autonomous professional described by Bailyn (1985), 
Abbott (1988), Macdonald (1995) and others, being professionals who 
would have set their own professional goals. Instead, in Hume Locke, 
partners are required to reconstitute themselves as a productive subject, 
to contribute to deliver the firm’s strategic and metricised goals. 
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Like objective setting, partner development/training, can be seen as part 
of reconstitution, being something that:  
 
…should focus on developing your personal knowledge, skill and/or 
behaviour. These should, where possible, provide you with the 
development necessary to help you achieve your objectives… 
 
The reference here to developing knowledge and skill is in keeping with a 
traditional view of professionalism (Abbott 1988; Freidson 2001). 
However, reference to choosing development necessary to achieve partner 
objectives brings the choice into the context of the business plans as 
examined above. Hence knowledge and skill are valued only to the extent 
they deliver the firm’s strategy, again suggesting the valuable is being 
lost. For example, one development objective was attendance on “critical 
conversations training”, designed to give partners the skills to become 
adept at performance management of their teams, hence driving greater 
productivity and in turn supporting the firm’s profitability. A second was 
training on innovative pricing mechanisms, again to drive maximum 
revenue and profit from work done. Each of these encouraged a partner 
subjectivity that leaned towards revenue and profit growth, acting to 
reconstitute the partner (Townley 1994) as a revenue generating asset, 
and part of the subjectivity of the partner as a contributing and 
performing partner. 
  
360 feedback, discussed above, can also be seen as a mechanism for the 
reconstitution of the subject, such being reflected in an email when 360 
feedback was first sent to partners: 
 
You may feel that some of the comments are unfair… It’s important 
that you put any critical comments and lower scores into perspective 
and recognise that the intention is positive, it’s to help you improve… 
The greater your self-awareness the more you’ll understand the 
impact you have on others and… be able make changes.   
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The message delivered is that recipients should use the report as a tool for 
self-awareness and behavioural improvement. Of course what is regarded 
as improvement is pre-defined by the firm, and to meet its aims, 
irrespective of whether the partners may value other aspects. This is an 
example of reconstitution done with the help of others (Townley 1994). 
Hence 360, while rendering the recipient the object of knowledge, the 
truth about which has been revealed in 360, also seeks to turn the 
recipient into the subject of his/her own knowledge; to trigger a reflective 
response and a commitment to change and improve. Indeed, to further 
facilitate this, partners were also provided with a workbook suggesting 
how to deal with feedback, and a form on which to build a detailed plan to 
commit in writing to improve. 
 
Indeed, as regards the help of others, the PPR meeting combined with 360 
to form a therapeutic element, the Managing Partner prompting partners 
towards self-reflection, for example at Finlay’s PPR: 
 
James: 360… [P]eople would sometimes just like you to make a 
decision, accept that decision had been made, and that would be it. 
 
Finlay: I think that's absolutely fair. I'm probably overly consultative… 
 
James: …It sounds like there is awareness on your part… [T]his is 
both the impetus and the license to do something about it. 
 
Finlay: That's right… I think there has definitely been more 
cohesiveness since some of that feedback…  
 
Hence 360 was used as a means of sponsoring a reflective response in 
Finlay, beginning with acceptance or confession of a failing, and followed 
by a statement whereby he engages with both the PPR and 360, 
committing to improvement, and working towards reformed behaviours. 
Like Beth, Finlay appeared as a willing recipient of feedback, and went 
further, claiming an improvement in divisional cohesiveness. For Finlay the 
experience was a developmental and therapeutic one: he becoming a 
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“better” manager, and by virtue of that, a better person. Indeed, it was 
not only partners in management positions that were positive about their 
experience of 360 feedback, and its facilitation of their personal 
reconstitution. At least some line partners appeared to actively seek to 
reconstitute themselves in light of feedback, for example: 
 
Jade {at interview}: The 360 review. I was relatively sceptical about 
the thing when it was introduced, but… having been through the 
process I see the value in it… We give feedback but we don't naturally 
tend to ask for feedback. And it’s quite a good discipline to have 
that… But it's also intended to check, or allow individuals to check, 
whether their own self-perception is aligned with others perception of 
them. To identify any discrepancies there, and to identify areas where 
things can be improved. Which is not a bad thing I don't think. 
 
This is informative because, whereas Finlay was an advocate of 360 before 
its introduction, Jade was a skeptic. Nevertheless, like Finlay, on reflection 
Jade experienced it as developmental and therapeutic; an opportunity to 
ensure she saw herself as others see her, a biblical expression of the 
“good”, and something to be welcomed. She felt confirmed, and connected 
with others in the firm, happy to seek to alter behaviours. This supports a 
view that processes such as PPR and 360, albeit part of an ecology of 
power and control, also play a role in giving people knowledge of 
themselves, to gain a sense of self, and form or reform their identity as a 
result (Townley 1994). This is part of Foucault’s view of power as 
productive, not simply as coercive and dominating (Foucault 1978). It 
further demonstrates how partners find reasons to engage with 
disciplinary technologies, and thereby place themselves within the 




This chapter, informed by the insights of Chapter 7, has addressed the 
third research question: How are professionals managed to deliver the 
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financial imperative implied by financialisation? More specifically, and 
following Foucault (1977; 1978) and Townley (1993b; 1994), do the 
technologies of HRM, operating alongside metrics, proffer partners a 
financialised subjectivity that redefines professionalism in the PSF? 
 
Following Foucault (1973; 1977; 1978; 1988) and Townley (1993a; 
1993b; 1994; 1995a) this chapter has demonstrated that HRM practices 
render individuals the object and subject of power. In Hume Locke this 
begins with the Partner Criteria, a taxinomia (Foucault 1973; Townley 
1994) which defines norms for partner skills, attributes and behaviours. 
These norms combine with processes for development of potential 
partners, partner assumption, 360, performance review, and the 
accounting mathesis analysed in Chapter 7, to form an ecology of power 
than renders partners and potential partners known, calculable, 
comparable and governable (Foucault 1977; Townley 1993a; 1994). That 
ecology: 
 
… allows for a range of seemingly disconnected practices to be 
integrated into a comprehensive whole which is not accessible using 
conventional classification systems of recruitment, appraisal, 
remuneration, etc. (Townley 1994, p.143) 
 
HRM and accounting practices are thereby “microtechnologies for 
producing a known and calculable subject, enhancing governmentality 
through constructing the individual as a more manageable and efficient 
entity” (Townley 1994, p.139). As such they form the basis of control, 
making the individual the object of discipline, backed by reward and 
punishment. HRM practices also operate to make partners known to 
themselves: the subject of power. These encourage partners to 
reconstitute themselves as Townley’s productive subjects (Townley 1994). 
 
In contrast to Townley (1994), who placed performance appraisal at the 
centre of discipline and punishment, in Hume Locke the firm’s 
remuneration committee stands at the nexus of disciplinary practices. This 
results from its role in the allocation of rewards, in the form of place on 
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the lockstep. Absent the ability to punish by virtue of connection to the 
firm’s lockstep remuneration system, partners regard appraisal as an 
empty vessel. The importance of lockstep progression to partners is 
returned to in Chapter 9. 
 
This chapter finds that the ecology of power operates to create the 
subjectivity of the performing and contributing partner. That subjectivity 
comprises Hanlon’s (1997) four main functions of a partner, together with 
a fifth and sixth function: that of the good citizen and the tool of strategy 
implementation. The good citizen complies with senior management 
diktats, and puts the interests of the firm, as defined by senior 
management, before his/her own interests. As tools of strategy 
implementation partners, in their divisions, and as individuals, pursue 
targets and objectives which are set down to meet divisional targets and 
which in turn feed into the firm’s measures of strategic success. This 
divisional collectivity contrasts with the atomistic environment described 
as applicable to large US law firms (Galanter & Henderson 2008).  
 
This articulation of the subjectivity of the performing and contributing 
partner is a significant extension beyond Brown and Lewis’s (2011) 
conception of the “productive legal professional”, something which, 
although insightful, placed too much emphasis on routine time keeping 
and billing. Citizenship and the tool of strategy implementation are 
additions to and a development of Hanlon’s four main functions of a 
partner (Hanlon 1997). They also give add colour to Faulconbridge and 
Muzio’s (2008) concept of “organisational professionalism”, as further 
specified in Evetts (2013).  
 
Finally, partners are no longer first and foremost the owners of the firm, 
and the principal means by which expert advice is dispensed (cf. Abbott 
1988; Freidson 2001), but rather, as the findings of Chapter 7 tell us, they 
are seen as a cost or expense to be accounted for in the same way as any 
other revenue producing asset. Only when divisional revenue generation 
supports the cost of all partners does appointment follow. This represents 
the triumph of financial logics over professional logics. 
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The analysis in Chapter 6 and this Chapter 7 have focused on accounting 
and HRM as agents and technologies of financialisation and management 
control. This leads to the fourth research question: How do partners 
experience the financialisation of the PSF? More specifically, do partners 
engage with the financialisation of the PSF and if so how do they 
experience the co-existence of financial and professional imperatives? 
These questions are the subject of the Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 6 demonstrated that partners are subjected to senior 
management’s chosen narrative of strategic purpose (Froud et al. 2006), 
and their expressions of success with reference to financial success and 
directory rankings. Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrated that partners are 
placed within a network of accounting measures and targets, and HRM 
technologies of discipline and subjectification. Collectively these seek to 
make each partner an agent of delivery of the firm’s strategic measures of 
success by shaping her/him into the performing and contributing partner. 
However, partners are also people who have experienced layers of 
socialisation through education, professional standards, and within the PSF 
(Abbott 1988; Anderson-Gough et al. 2001; Faulconbridge & Muzio 2008). 
Therefore, notwithstanding the disciplinary processes revealed in this 
thesis, it is reasonable to expect that partners may also be influenced by 
earlier stages of socialisation that place more emphasis on traditional 
professional logics (Erlanger & Klegon 1978; Larson 1977; Abbott 1988), 
focused in particular on autonomy, the public service ethos, and an 
emphasis on expertise and quality of service (Macdonald 1995; Freidson 
2001). 
 
This chapter addresses the fourth and final research question: How do 
partners experience the financialisation of the PSF? In particular, do 
partners engage with the financialisation of the PSF and if so how do they 
experience the co-existence of financial and professional imperatives? It 
draws out the fears, anxieties, tensions and contradictions that arise in 
the experience of partners as firm imperatives manifest meet traditional 
professions logics. Thereafter it examines unintended consequences, and 
seeks to explain why partners engage with the disciplinary technologies 
employed by senior management, employing Grey’s (1994) “career as a 
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project of the self” alongside work on status and identity by Costas and 
Grey (2014) and Gill (2015) as explanatory theories. 
 
The effects of financial imperatives 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 define the subjectivity of the performing and 
contributing partner. Such subjectivity has elements of financial 
performance and non-financial contribution. Left open is how partners 
experience the juxtaposition of the measurable and commensurable, so 
valued within the financialised PSF, with “soft” measures which do not 
readily reduce to comparable metrics (cf. Alvehus & Spicer 2012). The 
Remcom Criteria refer to both financial performance and non-financial 
behaviours as forms of contribution. When asked what good performance 
is, partners demonstrated their sensitivity to the Remcom Criteria set out 
in the PPR form: 
 
Declan {at interview}: [Good performance is] a combination of… 
financial performance, and… contribution in a non-financial sense to 
the partnership in terms of cross selling, or management of teams, 
business development, knowledge sharing. All the kind of, I guess, 
the non-financial parts of what is part of the performance regime. 
 
Declan’s reference to “the performance regime” shows partners regard 
the disciplinary elements identified in Chapters 7 and 8 as connected in 
a single regime designed to measure and judge their performance. 
However, notwithstanding the non-financial elements expressed by 
Declan, partners suggested at interview that financial performance is 
what matters: 
 
Rory: … [In] my review process they were pretty sympathetic to the 
fact that my numbers were really strong and therefore after that it 





Neil: I check my matter managed [fees] a lot, you know I will check 
them three or four times a month just to see where I am... Because 
to me that's the measure ultimately of what you are worth and your 
success here… And part of that is being driven by trying to move 
from being an FSP {Fixed Share Partner}. 
 
Hence Rory considered good numbers relieved him from the obligation 
to pursue non-financial aspects of the Partner and Remcom Criteria. 
And Neil saw his matter managed fees as vital in supporting his 
progression from fixed share partner to equity partner, part of an 
aspirational self linked to career outcomes. Neil’s financial focus can be 
seen as an investment in his career progression (Alvehus & Spicer 
2012; Grey 1994), and reflects a view that financial performance is 
valued over other, softer, forms of performance. 
 
But why would partners believe that what really matters is revenue 
generation, and that other aspects of contribution are secondary, if 
important at all? As demonstrated in Chapter 6, partners in Hume Locke 
are subjected to a narrative of strategic purpose, with associated metrics 
as measures of success. In addition they regularly receive financial 
information and commentary, as two members of the Operations Board 
confirmed at interview: 
 
Brian: The stats that go to the individual partners will show their fees 
as a matter manager, their profitability, their recovery level. And they 
get it across the firm so they can compare themselves with people in 




Casey: Stats are circulated with a view to informing people so that 
they know what's going on… I would have thought that if you are an 
owner/manager of a business, as all partners are, that you would 
think: right, I now have the raw materials that tell me what's going 
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on, what I must do is operate in a fashion which is appropriately 
profitable. 
 
This seems to be an unapologetic promotion of statistics as a means to 
drive intra-firm competition and profitability. When pushed on whether 
that was the true driver, both Brian and Casey appeared hesitant and 
uneasy with the stark focus on financial outcomes, preferring to cite 
“transparency” as the principal motivation for circulation of statistics. 
However my overall experience of discussions at the Operations Board 
was that statistics were not merely informational. Transparency was little 
more than a rhetorical cover for a financial focus. The intentions of the 
Operations Board were clear: that financial statistics should inform, and 
promote comparison and thereby competition between divisions and 
partners, all as a means to drive profitable revenue generation and 
delivery of the firm’s financialised strategy. At interview Jonathan, a 
Division Head, and Nathan, a line partner, gave their interpretation of the 
rationale and effect of the circulation of financial statistics: 
 
Jonathan: {Resigned tone, suggesting inevitability} [Financial 
statistics are] where the focus is… It's much more complicated to 
share the softer stuff. If you have brought in a client for the benefit of 
the firm, you have passed it on to so-and-so, or you have made cross 
referrals, that's probably more difficult. We are pretty ruthlessly 




Nathan {exasperated}: [I]f all you talk about is the numbers, and all 
you talk about is statistics… it causes people to think about that… And 
it comes from the top. And the people at the top drive what kind of 
comes down from that. 
 
Hence partners interpret the regular circulation of financial metrics as 
evidence of where senior management’s gaze is pointed, and hence what 
is to be taken to be important: financial performance rather than non-
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financial or “soft” elements. Like other partners at interview, in ad hoc 
meetings, and in informal settings, the demeanor of Jonathan and Nathan 
during this stage of interview suggests a discomfort on their part with the 
firm’s focus on financial outcomes without a balancing narrative on non-
financial matters. Partners further perceive a connection between statistics 
and the sense of being watched to the response of partners, and the 
equity points review undertaken by Remcom: 
 
Jake {at interview}: It really depends on the drivers which the 
business is forcing upon us… I think a lot of our response, our 
behaviours, our attitudes, or our externalisation of what we think… is 




Rory {irritated and angry}: It's all about the stats. And the fact that’s 
obviously the main thing at partner review and in Remcom. People 
want to progress to the top of equity, and they see the figures of 
others such as Donald and Alex, and feel that they have to match 
that. 
 
I: But Remcom has six or seven criteria that are supposed to be given 
equal weight? 
 
Rory: That's right, but you don't see those things. You only see the 
stats every month. So it's obvious that's what gets looked at. That's 
how you can compare. 
 
Hence, for partners, Remcom sits at the centre of a disciplinary matrix, 
having the power to reward and punish through the allocation of equity 
points. The personal values and motivations of partners are rendered 
subservient to the need to perform to the requirements imposed by those 
standing in judgement (Remcom), a tension which leads to dissonance, 
discomfort, frustration, irritation and sometimes anger. The link is made 
by Rory between being a top equity partner, and the matter manager 
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numbers posted by those partners at the top of the matter manager 
league table circulated by Brian, confirming commensurability is king. As a 
result, partners are drawn to think about and focus their actions on 
improving their performance against the metrics that are circulated and 
respond accordingly. Non-financial aspects of the Remcom Criteria are not 
reported on and are regarded as opaque and immeasurable: 
 
Alex: [W]hen… I can’t see what a… partner… [is] doing to build the 
business, what clients they are bringing in… or how they are scored in 
the 360° appraisals, when my only visibility of how they are doing is 
the monthly report that shows their matter [manager] numbers, 
and… how big debts they've got, and how much WIP {work in 
progress} they are carrying, if that is the only measure I am seeing 
then that is how I am gonna class them. And likewise if that is the 
only measure that those… partners… can see of me then it is going to 
be quite important that I show that I am working hard, and that I am 
justifying my position as being a top equity partner… because you 
don’t want people saying: well why is this guy on top equity? … If 
that's the only thing that everyone sees that’s uniform then it's 
important to me that those are good figures… 
 
In keeping with the purpose expressed by Brian and Casey, Alex has 
responded to statistics as a means of comparing and classifying his 
partners, but also as the means by which his own performance is 
presented to his partners. He links this to the occupation of top equity, 
feeling pressure to continuously justify that position by posting “good 
figures”. Jake commented on that pressure at an informal partners’ lunch: 
 
{Frustrated and exasperated} It changes how I feel about some of 
what is perhaps my perception of pressure in some of these things, 
personally. I think one becomes very conscious of the numbers in 
terms of the scrutiny, and needing to keep up with the Joneses… And 




So the perceived scrutiny translates into a necessity for partners to 
continually prove their worth on a relative financial basis, commensurable 
with their partners. They feel the need to keep up: to work harder and 
produce more. This is experienced as a deliberate disciplinary intention, 
implicitly understood as imposed by senior management {cf. Brian and 
Casey: above}. However this need to keep up also characterises another 
reaction that partners have to their experience of life in the financialised 
PSF, that of fear and anxiety. Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart’s (2016) 
define tension as: 
 
Stress, anxiety, discomfort, or tightness in making choices, 
responding to, and moving forward in organizational situations 
(Putnam et al. 2016, p.69) 
 
And contradiction is defined as: 
 
Bipolar opposites that are mutually exclusive and interdependent such 
that the opposites define and potentially negate each other (Putnam 
et al. 2016, p.70) 
 
Hence tension is a "feeling state", resulting from things such as work-life 
balance trade-offs (Putnam et al. 2016; Wieland 2011), whereas 
contradiction arises from exclusive opposites which are bound together. 
An emotion closely related to one of the triggers of tension (Putnam 
2015), anxiety, is fear, described by Ohman as “overlapping” with anxiety, 
and denoting a “dread of impending disaster and an intense urge to 
defend oneself” which results from an “identifiable external stimulus” 
(Ohman 2008, p.710). As Epstein (1972) put it: 
 
If there were no restraints, internal or external, fear would support 
the action of flight. Anxiety can be defined as unresolved fear, or, 
alternatively, as a state of undirected arousal following the 
perception of threat. (Epstein 1972, p.311; in Ohman 2008, p.710) 
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These definitions are adopted for the purpose of the analysis in this 
chapter. 
 
Jordan’s comments at her PPR reference fear: 
 
James: [S]omething you are recognised for being really good at… [is] 
business development. Being out there… 
 
Jordan {animated, almost visceral, “bursting” to explain her actions}: 
It's fear! It's the fear! I've been there, I've had no work… You might 
think I'm joking, I'm not! It's the fear. When I started at {firm X} I 
had no clients, I had no work. Necessity is the mother of invention. 
 
Jordan’s pursuit of business development initiatives, understood as the 
means to winning work and thereby generating fees, is her reaction to a 
fear, and associated anxiety: that she may have “no work”. By having no 
work (or an insufficient amount), Jordan would fail to generate sufficient 
fees to support her position as an equity partner in the firm. As a financial 
asset {Chapter 7: above}, her cost would exceed her revenue generation. 
Hence, as alluded to by Jake {above}, such fear and anxiety produce 
disciplinary effects, prompting Jordan to pursue an ever more rigorous 
regime of business development.  
 
At interview Terry, a line partner, describes fear as associated with 
punishment, inherent in the firm’s disciplinary regime: 
 
{Opening hands in front as if to signal what is said is revealing 
himself and his fears} [Y]ou never know quite what is coming next. 
You know, you could be tapped on the shoulder and told: you are 
doing really well. Or you could be tapped on the shoulder and told: 
you are doing so badly that you are coming down the [equity] ladder. 
And where is the next place going to be? That is a structure which I 
think Ken would say, and James would say, drives performance. It’s 
fear that… drives performance… That's my reality… 
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The fear of failure described by Jordan and Terry is experienced as a 
“feeling state” (Putnam et al. 2016), and in it’s unresolved form gives rise 
to a continuing anxiety (Epstein 1972; Jackall 1988; Gill 2015). Because 
senior management have the ability to procure a material change in a 
partner’s status, indicated by the metaphorical “tap on the shoulder”, they 
also have the ability to deny or remove part of that partner’s aspirational 
identity (Alvesson & Karreman 2007; Grey 1994; Thornborrow & Brown 
2009), a point explored further below under Explanations and outcomes: 
pursuit of career progression. At interview Lesley explained how this had 
worked in the past: 
 
[I]f you were an outlier you would get the tap on the shoulder from 
Ken or James and a "chat"… presumably your equity is about to be 
chopped or “here's the door”. 
 
Equity being “chopped” is a reference to a partner having equity points 
removed, and thereby coming down the lockstep ladder, a career 
regression. “Here’s the door” is a metaphor for removal from the 
partnership, involving a loss of not only the position on lockstep, but also 
the first aspirational identity, that of partner. The result, as Donald 
described it at interview, is a continuous insecurity, a haunting threat, and 
therefore fear, of the prospect of the loss of partnership: 
 
{Wide eyed, speaking quickly and passionately} The partners that 
know me well know that my biggest driver is insecurity. It's fear of 
being out of a job and not earning money. And others think that 
sounds very odd. Ken said to me recently: fuck sake Donald, you just 
need to relax a bit more! And I can't. I genuinely can't. Fear of not 
performing and coming unstuck haunts me. 
 
Therefore even partners who have been regarded as high performers for a 
number of years experienced fear and anxiety associated with losing 
position as a result of “underperforming”. They are, to use Donald’s term, 
haunted by the fear of failure. This is a temporal anxiety (Costas & Grey 
2014) reflecting the fact that performance rapidly becomes historical; it is 
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fleeting, quickly replaced by a need to perform again and again, and to 
ever higher standards, leading to a fear of what is to come: 
 
Jake {at interview}: If I hit £{X} [in fees] I'm a couple of hundred 
[thousand] up on last year so… The tricky thing is the recurrent 
theme that we have the dread of what's coming – what’s the bar 





Zak {at interview}: {Shaking head, as if trying to shake out an 
unwelcome thought} I got an email [confirming performance against 
budget at year end] and I saw we had done really well. Rather than 
thinking, terrific, that's a great thing, I thought, shit! What's going to 
happen when I get back is that somebody is going to be saying we 
want you to do even more! 
 
Partners are caught in a recurrent cycle of targets, achievement, and the 
resetting of targets that require more. They dread what is coming next, 
fearing hitting a ceiling of performance (the “Sergey Bubka height”, 
above), beyond which which no one can go. Whereas partners may 
currently see themselves as fulfilling the conditions to secure their 
position, they have a temporal anxiety (Gill 2015; Costas & Grey 2014) 
that, in future, and for reasons that are either beyond their control, or 
simply a manifestation of a hitherto well hidden weakness, they will fail to 
do so. 
 
The above analysis introduced insecurity, fear, anxiety, tension and 
contradiction as features of the partners’ experience of working in the 
firm. Having done so, the following sections explore other contradictions, 
and associated fears and anxieties, which manifest in the partners’ 
experience of the financialised PSF. 
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Tension and contradiction: financial imperatives and professional 
logics 
 
The previous section drew attention to how partners experience and react 
to the visibility of individual financial statistics. The circulation of such 
statistics is understood to be associated with the firm’s strategy, and the 
imperative of growth in revenue, profit, profit margin and improved 
Directory rankings. But how do partners experience the pursuit of these 
metrics and rankings as a matter of logics? On the one hand financial 
logics are apparent in the firm’s narrative of strategic purpose, with the 
growth imperative supported by a discourse that associates growth with 
the necessity to strive, compete and survive. On the other hand, 
traditional professional logics place value on autonomy, quality, and the 
application of knowledge for the benefit of others, albeit coupled with a 
desire to earn a good living. 
 
As part of the firm’s focus on profitable revenue generation, it encouraged 
partners to supervise greater numbers of fee earners (known as “gearing” 
or “leverage”), and to delegate more work to them to reduce costs and 
increase profitability: 
 
Declan: [O]ver the past couple of years… [there has been an] 
intention to improve the leverage… [I]t's recognising that there are 
more effective ways… of… delivering good performance, which is 
having a team who charge at less, and they are fully utilised, rather 
than you doing the work which allows you to go and have time to 
think about, well, you know, business-related things. 
 
Here Declan is referring to the assumption that more profit can be made 
from work where it is discharged by junior lawyers rather than partners, 
allowing partners to concentrate on other things, such as business 
development. To enable partners to understand the profit effect of who 
does the work, Brian provided partners with a tool to calculate the 
anticipated profit on work to be done, known as the “gross profit model”: 
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Please find attached an updated version of the profit model. You 
should use this version… [T]he overall guidance is… you should be 
aiming to achieve {X}%+ gross profit. 
 
Hence partners were not only instructed to use the model, but also given 
a target to achieve. However, a contradiction arose. In accordance with 
traditional professional logics partners are the foremost experts, those 
with the knowledge that clients seek, and thereby the guardians of 
quality, suggesting a high level of partner input may be required. The 
gross profit model on the other hand looks solely to financial outcomes, 
putting service and quality to one side, and suggesting partners should 
delegate work: 
 
Lesley: {Interspersed with forced smile and raised shoulders, 
indicating tension} It's meant to be about discharging the work at the 
appropriate level… But when I'm looking at a piece of work I don't 
think “Oh I'll better get X to do all this work because [it’s more 
profitable]”… I think I’ll better get the person who is most appropriate 
to discharge this work. 
 
Lesley describes the contradiction between the appropriate level, being 
the person who can discharge the work profitably, and the appropriate 
person, being the person with the experience and expertise to ensure the 
quality of what is produced. The two appear, at least in some instances, 
mutually exclusive (Putnam et al. 2016), causing Lesley to feel tension 
and anxiety. At interview Terry described how he experienced this as a 
tension, wanting to do what he became a professional to do, to be a 
working lawyer, ensuring quality and meeting client expectations, while at 
the same time being pressured to delegate: 
 
[W]hat really did attract me to law [was]… I wanted to {heavy 
emphasis} be a lawyer. Well there is a tension there… [b]ecause if 
you want to do a job really well then you want to be involved… [But] I 
quite like… us being successful as a division. And so I know that I 
need to do less of the coalface work… 
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This shows how, seeing themselves as the gatekeepers of profit, and a 
cost to be avoided, partners also experience themselves as pariahs, 
excluded from the role which they assumed when becoming professionals, 
that of the expert dispensing advice. Partners, rather than being the most 
experienced practitioners in the firm who should be at the front line of 
advising, something Terry associates with being a lawyer, are now 
regarded as costs to be managed and reduced. Their role is overseer of 
the work of others, ensuring profitability. This is experienced as a 
contradiciton, denying partners the role that they craved when joining the 
profession, and causing tension and existential anxiety. 
 
The wider problematic of the juxtaposition of the firm’s growth focus with 
traditional professional values was raised at an informal partners lunch 
shortly before a partners’ conference at which strategic options, including 
the possibility of pursuing a merger to deliver growth, were to be 
discussed. During the discussion the air was thick with a heady mix of 
tension, skepticism and frustration: 
 
Jake: {Questioning tone, expressing skepticism} [W]hat is the 
fundamental assumption that is being made… in terms of the values 
of the firm… [o]n which you then try to apply this strategic 
approach…? You know, the direction of travel is higher turnover, 
better PEP, more bits in Chambers and Legal 500… 
 
Jordan: … [T]here are two ways of looking at it. If you look at the 
strategic question in a divorced sense from your personal feelings… 
{Animated} [I]f you want to grow because you want to make more 
profit, what is the thing that the firm, the business should do? And 
that gives you a particular answer… [B]ut that doesn't take into 
account that we are all individuals, who own this business, {Pleading 
tone and body language} and we all have our own individual 
requirements, which may well be different from what's good for the 
business as an abstract thing… 
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Megan: … [A]ll of the books will say: bigger is better. The bigger the 
law firm, the more profit you will make… 
 
Nathan: {Frustrated} And the other problem is that sometimes [being 
less interested in growth or more profit] is perceived as being 
unambitious. 
 
Lewis: That’s right. 
 
Jordan: A-ha. And that's what I’m trying to say. People won't say: 
well I'm not that bothered about making more money because I'm 
happy with what I have and I don't want to have loads more pressure 
on {heavy emphasis}. But people are scared to say that because they 
think that goes against what… 
 
Nathan: The corporate image and… 
 
Jordan: {Moving to anger and exasperation} The corporate image 
and the high performing business, the overall strategic value and all 
that shit that we get… But if we don’t know what the underlying 
values or ambition of the individuals that comprise the partnership is, 
how can we know the answer to the… questions we are being 
asked?… No one has ever asked: is making more PEP the important 
thing for you? Because that is what is being driven here. It's all been 
driven to make more PEP. But no one has actually said: is that the 
most important thing for you?… So you have to get off the bus if you 
are not in line with that. 
 
The above exchange brings out both tension and contradiction. When 
contemplating saying “this firm is big enough”, or “I/we make enough”, 
partners fear being cast as unambitious and thereby out of alignment with 
attitudes implicit in the subjectivity of the performing and contributing 
partner. Rather, the high performing firm is one which aggressively 
pursues growth, and the partners within it both act so as to deliver that 
performance, and believe that pursuing high performance is a valuable 
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end in itself. Hence, there is a contradiction between individual values 
(Garrety et al. 2003; Lynch 2009; Real & Putnam 2005; Townsley & Geist 
2000) and the values of the financialised PSF driving a strategy based in 
financial logics (Abdallah et al. 2011; Putnam et al. 2016). Whereas 
individual values are largely undeclared here, what is said suggests some 
partners feel the firm is “big enough” and they are “making enough”, and 
have a preference not to assume more pressure in the form of increasing 
financial targets. Moreover, there is a fear that by declaring you are happy 
with the firm’s size, and existing profit shares, you are expressing views 
that are anathema to the position of partner such that you should “get off 
the bus”, a metaphor for leaving the firm. The result in terms of process 
outcomes is that partners suffer double binds and paralysis (“damned if 
you do and damned if you don’t”) (Putnam et al. 2016), in that keeping 
quiet means acquiescing in ever increasing pressure, while objecting 
means the loss of partnership. As it turned out {Chapter 6: above}, the 
partners rejected the strategic option of merger, and I gained the 
impression that the exchange above was one of several confabs among 
small groups of partners before the partnership conference, where 
partners shared their views, and emotions, and gained a certain spirit of 
resistance that was carried into the group discussions at the conference. 
 
However, conference aside, the fear of being characterised as unambitious 
was not unfounded, as evidenced in an exchange at the Operations Board: 
 
James: Brian and I discussed whether we should talk about lowering 
the budget level and telling the partners they will be earning less if 
we make that lower amount. But we thought we might get some 
saying "that's okay". 
 
Casey: {Emphatically} What? Who would say that? We need more! I 
remember when Caroline Martin said once it would be okay for 
partners to earn £{X} less. That branded her forever in my mind. I've 
been a bit suspicious of her ever since. We should always be going for 
more! Into infinity! 
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Brian: {With playful tone} And beyond! 
 
This demonstrates how questioning the logic of growth is regarded by at 
least some in management positions as worthy of suspicion that leads to 
“branding” as a dangerous and subversive thinker. As a result partners 
avoid challenging the financial hegemony in its many manifestations for 
fear of receiving a “black mark”, and are thereby left silenced, disavowed 
and disconnected. For my part I was somewhat repulsed by the idea of an 
individual being branded due to having a value system that does not 
privilege money above all else, and wondered how it had come to pass 
that a partner being comfortable with earning less was somehow 
anathema to certain members of the Board. Further, I wondered how 
others who had expressed similar views outside of the Board setting 
remained silent, and concluded that they did not want to become branded 
themselves for fear of how the potential othering might adversely affect 
their future. However, the pursuit of performance does not only lead to 
contradiction in terms of professional values, there is also a contradiction 
with other aspects of life, considered next. 
 
Tension and contradiction: high performance and work-life balance 
 
For organisational actors, tensions and contradictions may arise when they 
negotiate their identities over activities related to the interface between 
work and personal life (e.g. Coupland 2001; Pratt & Foreman 2000; 
Whittle 2003). In the PSF it is the labour of the partners and other fee 
earners that is sold to clients (Alvehus & Spicer 2012). All fee earners, 
including partners, record the time they spend on client work, referring to 
that as “chargeable hours”. In simple terms, revenue growth comes from 
selling more hours. However partners also have lives outside of their 
work, most obviously family life and leisure activities, none of which is 
recognised in the subjectivity of the performing and contributing partner. 
This section examines that in terms of the firm’s so-called “high 




At interview senior people in the firm characterised the firm’s culture as 
high performing: 
 
James: I describe {the firm} as, an open and collegiate environment. 




Charles {Governance and Strategy Board member}: [I]t's a high 
performance culture. But where people feel supported… There is an 
element of pressure on people to perform but it's not unduly onerous 
to the extent that they are very stressed or unhappy or feel that 
there is nowhere to turn. 
 
The description of the firm as being collegiate and supportive stands in a 
potential contradiction to references to “pressure to perform”. The 
juxtaposition of “high performance” and “hard-working” implies long 
hours, manifest in the setting of chargeable hours targets, and an 
expectation that partners and other fee earners work whatever hours it 
takes to deliver the required service and meet client expectations. As 
Lesley stated at a meeting of Division Heads: 
 
It's a balance. If you come to a top commercial law firm… you aren't 
going to be able to come in at 9 and leave at 5. 
 
This interpretation is supported by closing remarks made by the Chairman 
in the firm’s newsletter: 
 
In a high performance culture like ours, we do have to work a hard 
shift. In return, we should have fun while we are at it, be proud of 
what we do as well as the firm and have colleagues whom we really 
like and care about. 
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Here hard work is associated with pride in both the firm and the work 
done, and caring for colleagues, part of traditional professional logics, 
providing a heady mix of “social goods” and rhetorical support to what 
might otherwise be seen as little more than a drive for long hours by 
those holding the whip hand. Statements such as this operate so as to set 
normative expectations, seen to provide back up to the desired culture: 
 
Sinead {HR Director, at Operations Board}: If you look at Gallup and 
Q12 and what makes a high-performance firm, it's about being clear 
about expectations. 
 
Gallup and Q12 are employee engagement consultancies who advocate 
engagement as a means of improving performance (e.g. MacLeod & Clarke 
2009). Hence references to being “open and supportive”, “having fun” and 
working with people “we really like and care about” appear little more 
than a gloss on normative expectations set by management, as a means 
to deliver the firm’s measures of success. Jake referred to this at an 
informal partners’ lunch: 
 
{Frustrated and angry} [M]y impression of the leadership… [is] that 
the only thing that really matters is the PEP… [a]nd the profitability… 
All the rest of this stuff, honestly, we’re talking shite! All the work-life 
balance: bullshit! All of the “great place to work”, yes fine, we want to 
recruit people on that basis, but the reality is “keep the PEP up”. 
 
Here Jake is drawing attention to the contradiction between rhetorical 
references to the “great place to work” and the drive for profit through 
long hours. Neil, another line partner, touched on this at interview: 
 
{Resigned tone, suggesting inevitability} [F]inancial measurement is 
unavoidable I think, but I don't think that should be the sole measure 
of success… I think wherever you work should have a high happiness 
quotient… I think people need to be satisfied… [and] a decent work-
life balance. But those two are sometimes mutually exclusive. 
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Hence Neil, like most partners, sees financial measurement as inevitable, 
suggesting a perfomative hegemony (Cushen 2013), but recognises that 
the expectations that go with it impact on work-life balance such that one 
can only come with a sacrifice of the other, they are mutually exclusive 
(Putnam et al. 2016). This manifests in comments made by partners in 
their PPR forms, for example: 
 
{Jordan PPR} There are times when I have been stretched in terms of 
the amount of fee earning work I have done… [I]ncreased resource 
and growth of the team should help with… [a]chieving an acceptable 
work-life balance. 
 
Given other comments made by Jordan the reference here to being 
“stretched” is a euphemism for a very high level of stress, a form of 
tension (Putnam et al. 2016). And while partners see that increasing fee 
earner numbers, referred to above by Jordan as “resource”, helps to 
spread the burden, it remains the case that these additional team 
members require to be supervised by partners. The result is partners 
simply have to work even more hours: 
 
Kyle: The only thing you could do to improve what we are doing is to 
add another 10 or so hours into every day. {Laughs nervously}… We 
work harder and harder… And that adds more and more pressure. 
 
These data touch on both pressure and anxiety, forms of tension (Putnam 
et al. 2016) that arise as individuals seek to reconcile and negotiate their 
working and family/home identities, where pursuing one detriments the 
other (e.g. Coupland 2001; Pratt & Foreman 2000; Whittle 2003). This 
gives rise to a form of mutual exclusivity and interdependency 
experienced as contradiction (Putnam et al. 2016). It also reflects Putnam 
and colleagues’ (2016) presence of multiples, where tensions arise due to 
the different levels and aspects of working and home life at which 
individuals operate. The presence of multiples also manifests in the case 
of Division Heads for whom success equates to delivery of fee budget, 
encouraging them to seek to spend time managing their divisional 
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partners so as to achieve that goal. However, at the same time as 
undertaking that management task, they are expected to maintain their 
own practice and profile, including their own fee levels. James, the 
Managing Partner, raised the point with Lesley at her PPR: 
 
James: You seem to have been too busy? 
 
Lesley: It's… really difficult for me to pass everything on… You see, 
my [personal chargeable hours] target has come down but the work 
doesn't go down. I'm at 183% of target. 
 
James: That's not sustainable… [D]o you need…to say no to work? 
 
Lesley: Hmm. {Forced smile, conveying sense of being in a catch 22} 
Maybe I need to say no. But that's a fear isn't it? Turning people 
away? I just take them on… [T]o make budget I need to do a lot… 
[T]he structure of {division} means that I have to do more 
chargeable hours even if my target is lower. But I just can't work any 
harder! 
 
So Lesley experiences competing priorities as a contradiction: she both 
requires to do more chargeable work to make the divisional budget, but at 
the same time is expected to dedicate more time to managing the 
division, also to deliver the budget. The budget in a sense demands both, 
even though arguably mutually exclusive. Separately Lesley explained that 
she resolves this by eating into time which would otherwise be her life 
outside work, leaving her with a sense that she has no other option but to 
sacrifice family time to fulfill her duties, causing stress and anxiety 
(Cushen 2013). Moreover, although James is suggesting that Lesley 
should consider turning away work, no offer is made to reduce Lesley’s 
budget, perhaps because to do so would prejudice delivery of the firm’s 
metricised goals. James thereby fails to acknowledge that financial targets 
have negative consequences (Cushen 2013). This tends to suggest that 
for those seeking greater work-life balance that option is only available if 
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they are prepared to go “off track” (Galanter & Henderson 2008, p.1873), 
meaning outside of partnership. 
 
Having identified fears, anxieties, tensions and contradictions that arise in 





The firm’s financial focus does not only result in fears, anxieties, tensions 
and contradictions but also results in what are characterised by some as 
negative behaviours: 
 
Finlay {at interview}: I sense within partners that, because reporting 
is very heavily matter manager [fee] driven, that's the thing you 
see… the partners look at that as a league table… leading to what I 
think of as negative behaviours, which is aggressive matter manager 
bloating… aggressively seeking to get their share of the divisional pie 




Rory {at ad hoc meeting}: {Frustrated and exasperated} The 
business model we are operating isn't right. All you ever see month 
on month are financial statistics. So I compare myself to others and 
say: I'm ahead of him, him and him, great, but behind him. Others 




Jake {at partners’ lunch}: {Frustrated, but resigned} [T]he existing 
system rewards empire building… And that suits some of these guys 
down to the ground. 
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Finlay, Rory and Jake are reflecting here on how the Foucauldian mathesis 
(Foucault 1973; Townley 1994) formed by statistics not only encourages 
partners to compare themselves to one another, and compete with 
reference to a financial league table, but also promotes behaviours that 
may be contrary to the firm’s citizenship requirement for partner 
contribution (cf. Alvehus & Spicer 2012). That requirement was explained 
in context by the Chairman at interview: 
 
{Matter-of-factly, as if describing an ideal type rather than a real 
person} Good citizens means that they are not elbowing other people 
just to achieve their own ends. That they work in a supportive 
collegiate way with people in their team, and with other partners in 
the firm. That they don't grab work. But they will genuinely support 
the right person in the firm to do a piece of work, even if it means 
that it impacts adversely on their own figures. 
 
Whereas on the one hand Partner and Remcom Criteria, and the firm’s 
financial focus, are experienced as encouraging the maximisation of 
personal and team fees, on the other part of the same criteria encourage 
the handing on of chargeable work to others. This juxtaposition is part of 
an “optimistic financial and HR narrative… [which is] contradictory to… 
lived experience of the performative interventions…” (Cushen 2013, 
p.327). It is experienced by partners as a contradiction: seen as mutually 
exclusive and negating (Putnam et al. 2016). The good citizen, by passing 
on work, is sacrificing performance against a hard financial metric by 
which they know they are to be judged, and which supports the firm’s 
chosen growth strategy, in favour of a soft requirement which is not 
measured. Matter manager silos, bloating, and empire building are the 
result as partners seek to maintain client relationships for their own 
exploitation (Hanlon 2004). This is the practice where a partner keeps 
work irrespective of that work falling fully within her/his specialist 
knowledge, and is thereby credited with the fees, supporting her/his 
position in the league table. Hence, in the financialised PSF, the quest for 
the aspirational identity, leads some partners to pursue actions that 
privilege numerical outcomes at the expense of other behaviours (Alvehus 
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& Spicer 2012). The contradiction is resolved in favour of metricised 
outcomes; an unintended consequence (Putnam et al. 2016). 
 
Actions contrary to the good citizen requirements also included partners 
protecting their patch so as to close off participation (Putnam et al. 2016) 
from up-and-coming talent, as contemplated at an informal partners’ 
lunch: 
 
Jake: People are very protective of their own positions. Terry 
Carpenter was fighting tooth and nail to make sure that Jennifer 




Jake: … Jennifer is already doing virtually all of the {specialism} work 
that comes out of {location}. And basically Terry is lagging behind 
the rest of us this year in terms of his numbers. And that's the 
bottom line. He was passively aggressively trying to block it. 
 
So in addition to grabbing work, irrespective of whether best placed to 
discharge it, partners may block the way for others as a means of 
ensuring their own numerical success. Jake contemplates that, in Terry’s 
case, “lagging behind”, a metaphor suggesting an impending likelihood of 
failure, increased his fear and anxiety. This is associated with the 
perceived need to “keep up” in a continuous race between partners to 
prove their relative financial value to the firm, leading Terry to block the 
path of another. These actions suggest a double bind and paralysis 
(Putnam et al. 2016); if one protects one’s patch then one fails to be a 
good citizen. But if one does not, one fails to produce the all important 
good figures, lags behind, and risks being categorised as a problem.  
 
A further consequence arises from the encouragement of “stretch” 
budgets. Partners query the logic and react by cynically distancing 
themselves (Mueller & Whittle 2011; Kosmala & Herrbach 2006): 
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Jade {at interview}: … {Exasperated} I find these budgets really 
difficult… What comes out in terms of revenue and profit at the end of 
the year very much depends on what goes in at the top of the 
sausage machine. And you actually have a relatively small degree of 




Rory {at ad hoc meeting}: {Frustrated and angry} We didn't really 
buy into the budget at the start. We challenged it, so after that I 
never really felt bought into it. We will do our bit, or I will do my bit, 
but what happens after that is up to others. It didn't really feel right 
at the time and it looks like we will fall short of it. 
 
I: Would you prefer to fall short or make it? 
 
Rory: Well if they are just going to add more on next year then yeah. 
 






Terry {at interview}: {Resigned tone} [O]n one view, if you are 
being Machiavellian about it, you would try to do not too well. So we 
just bust a gut, die in a ditch, every day, night and weekend. And 
then you get to the end and they say: that's fantastic, now can you 
do another 10%? If you do that you just die eventually, or you have 
to leave, or you just burn out. 
 
Each of these demonstrates feelings of powerlessness, frustration, 
exasperation and resignation partners experience as a result of being 
forced to pursue a budget that they did not propose or buy into, and the 
achievement of which they is not in their control. Their only means of 
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wrestling some form of control is one that feels inherently contrary to 
their sense of self as achieving individuals, that of contemplating acting 
deliberately to fail, and thereby limit future exposure to a further 
increase for the coming year. Whereas neither Rory nor Terry actually 
confirm taking any active or passive steps to bring about a failure to 
make budget, the thought process that contemplates such steps is both 
a coping strategy that allows them to distance themselves (Mueller & 
Whittle 2011) from a goal set at management level and an unintended 
consequence. Indeed, on hearing this I recalled my own rejection of 
budgets when first introduced, rationalising my unease as a reaction to 
them being targets detached from reality. However, in hindsight I 
wonder whether I was more concerned with the fear of being seen to fail 
to make budget, and how that might affect my view of my self as an 
achieving individual. I saw such fear in the comments and reactions of 
many partners. 
 
On the other side of the coin the question arises: in the financialised law 
firm, are partners who bring in significant revenues penalised for bad 
behaviours? Jake thought not: 
 
Jake: I'm sure citizenship is important but … [t]he reality is that if 
you are a complete tube and you are bringing in £{X} million a year 
then nobody is really going to give too much of a monkeys that you're 
not… As long as you're not doing illegal drugs on the premises. There 
is an awful lot of acceptance of bad behaviour… You wouldn't be 
binning the stars. 
 
Here Jake categorises very high revenue partners as the stars who are 
immune to sanction by virtue of their rainmaking abilities. The departure 
of stars upset by sanction would damage the firm’s revenue generation 
(Hanlon 2004; Galanter & Henderson 2008). This reflects Ken’s candid 
admission: 
 
I: Does financial performance trump behavioural issues? 
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Ken: {Matter-of-factly} Unfortunately in some instances it does. 
That's not something I'm proud of… I think it's a minority… 
 
So in the financialised PSF, where success is measured by metrics, 
performance which significantly contributes to those metrics brings 
privileges. “Soft” performance – that which does not reduce to metrics – is 
regarded as of secondary importance. The contradiction between the 
measurable and the immeasurable is resolved by a focus on numbers. 
 
Having dealt with tensions and contradictions, this chapter now turns to 
the question of why partners in the PSF acquiesce despite such tensions 
and contradictions and why they engage with the technologies of power 
used to promote the firm’s financial imperatives. 
 
Explanations and outcomes: pursuit of career progression 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrated that, through Foucualdian technologies of 
power, norms for partner skills, attributes and behaviours are set out in a 
taxinomia, and combined with an accounting mathesis (Foucault 1973; 
Townley 1994) to render partners known, comparable and governable. 
However that analysis is not sufficient to explain why partners, as the 
owners of the firm and its principal workers, assume the subjectivity of 
the performing and contributing partner, and acquiesce in the firm’s 
pursuit of strategies and tactics that bring about the tensions identified 
above, and engage with the technologies of power employed. To address 
that issue it is necessary to examine the career path of the partner. 
 
In many PSFs progress to partnership happens through a highly structured 
hierarchical career progression. In Hume Locke individuals begin as 
trainees (the last leg before they are qualified, in regulatory terms, to 
practice in the jurisdiction), then progress in stages through five further 
job levels before partner. This evidence of the “more complex and 
elongated tournament structure” for appointment to partner is described 
by Galanter and Henderson (2008, p.1867) and Ackroyd and Muzio 
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(2007). Arguably, once an individual has made partner, a process 
described in Chapter 8, the outside world considers the individual to have 
“made it”. There is no higher achievement that is readily apparent to 
those outside the cohort of partners within the firm. This achievement of a 
desired identity, that of partner, is an indicator of recognition, status and 
personal success (Brown & Coupland 2015; Gill 2015). However, partners 
do not only occupy a subject position vis-à-vis the outside world, they are 
also partners among a cohort of partners, and are acutely aware of a 
secondary hierarchy of career progression, based firstly on the distinction 
between equity (profit sharing) partners and fixed share partners, the 
“core and mantle” structure (Galanter & Henderson 2008), and secondly, 
once brought into equity, the profit sharing hierarchy of the firm’s lockstep 
remuneration system. Kyle, a Division Head and on top equity, described 
this at interview: 
 
Once you are a partner, and then you are an equity partner, you've 
achieved those sort of badges of honour if you like. Equity is invisible 
to most people apart from the other partners. It’s your progression 
isn't it? It's your mark of progress…  
 
Here Kyle is suggesting that the “badge of honour”, that of partner, is not 
enough to satisfy partners. Rather, as part of their project of the self 
(Grey 1994), partners seek the next progression (Pratt 2000; Karreman & 
Alvesson 2004; Karreman & Alvesson 2009), to equity partner as the next 
badge of honour (Gill 2015). This reflects the fact that, within progressive 
career structures, each promotion is said to create an “identity deficit”: 
further progressions are necessary to achieve the ultimate goal (Karreman 
& Alvesson 2004; Karreman & Alvesson 2009) and hence to win the 
tournament (Galanter & Henderson 2008). Hence, even once equity 
partners, partners focus upon progression up the lockstep ladder: 
 
Jonathan {Division Head, at interview}: [T]here is a certain status 
which I think is more important to [partners]… They really do want to 
be seen as top equity. Apart from the money that comes with that 
there is the status that comes with it…  
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So the desire for career progression continues as partners seek the 
desired status (Gill 2015) of “top equity partner”. In order to obtain such 
status partners are aware of the skills, attributes and behaviours expected 
of them, and their financialised underpinnings: 
 
Donald {line partner, at interview}: And the one big job change that 
I've made in my life which was moving from {firm X} to Hume… 
Being able to arrive at a better firm and feeling that I've been a 
success by their standards. Increasing fees, making relationships, 
feeding some of my other partners, and I suppose believing that I'm 
an asset to the organisation. 
 
The reference to “standards” here is a reflection of Donald’s interpretation 
of the norms for partners within Hume Locke, him picking out some of the 
main features of the Partner and Remcom Criteria. Although Donald had 
been recruited as a partner, and hence was regarded as being suitable for 
the role based on what he had done at another firm, he nevertheless felt 
his success had to be re-adjudicated according the norms of Hume Locke, 
the new site of “organisational professionalism” (Faulconbridge & Muzio 
2008). References to increasing fees, winning work (a proxy for feeing), 
and being “an asset”, align with a financialised view of success for the firm 
as a whole, and Donald as an individual partner. Donald, in his quest to be 
an asset, regards himself as meeting the requirements of his role by being 
a rainmaker in economic contribution terms, and with that status goes the 
highest reward, top equity status, the pinnacle of the career as a project 
of the self (Grey 1994). 
 
But this begs the question: is the pursuit of equity and climbing the 
lockstep ladder really about career, or is it merely avarice? Indeed, a 
corollary of the financialised PSF might suggest a view of the firm’s 
owners as themselves driven by financial returns. A Weberian (1949) 
ideal-type “financialised partner” would be a profit driven animal, building 
an identity, and measuring her/his own success, in terms of the monetary 
returns received in that role. Lockstep positioning would mean little in 
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itself, being only a precursor to take home pay. By extension, if a 
financialised partner were to receive more pay, but with less points, that 
would be regarded a better outcome. However, contrary to what the ideal-
type financialised partner might suggest would be the motivation, climbing 
the ladder does not appear to be a proxy for the desire to receive more 
money, but a desire for something more qualitative, as partners confirmed 
at interview: 
 
I: [I]f you could have a situation whereby you'd go up the lockstep, 
but profits had dipped a bit so actually you weren't earning any more, 
or you could stick where you are and profits had increased, so you 
are actually getting a little bit more, what would be more important? 
 
Neil: Progression of the lockstep. From a recognition point of view 
that what I am doing is valued by others… [T]hat type of recognition 
is important to me. It doesn't necessarily have to be monetary but to 
me that's a reflection of appreciation and reward from your fellow 




I: So what do you think is more important to you: being top of 
lockstep or the absolute monetary return? 
 
Ken: It's being top of lockstep. It's being recognised. Someone saying 
that: gosh, within the framework that we've got here, I recognise that 
you are top performing. 
 
Here two partners at opposite ends of the equity ladder and equity 
career progression, Neil and Ken, are as one in adding the concepts of 
value and recognition to the identity equation. Lockstep positioning is 
seen as a lead indicator of intra-partnership recognition of each 
partner’s value to the firm, relative to other partners, and thereby 
conveys a desired status, and mark of career progression (Brown & 
Coupland 2015; Gill 2015). Hence value and recognition are not 
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absolute, but relative. Whereas it would clearly be naïve to suggest 
monetary returns are irrelevant, partners at all stages nevertheless seek 
confirmation that they are either at, or progressing towards 
achievement of, that most aspirational identity (Alvesson & Karreman 
2007; Grey 1994; Thornborrow & Brown 2009), that of top lockstep 
partner. At the same time the fear of not achieving this status, or 
achieving then losing it, is created (Alvesson & Karreman 2007; 
Thornborrow & Brown 2009; Costas & Grey 2014): 
 
Kyle: … But then [once you make top equity] how do you motivate 
yourself if you are at the top of lockstep? I suppose the motivation, if 
you are at the top of lockstep, is staying there. 
  
This challenge of continuing to perform at the highest level in order to 
maintain position reflects Galanter and Henderson’s (2008) 
characterisation of the “elastic tournament” for partnership, where “the 
duration of the tournament can now be expected to last one’s entire 
career” such that “the only finish line is death or retirement” (Galanter & 
Henderson 2008, pp.1871–1872). It represents the other side of the 
coin from the perceived pressure on senior management to make 
strategic and structural decisions, including as regards who should 
continue to be an equity partner, in order to place the firm in the 
necessary position in the race against its competitors (Ackroyd & Muzio 
2007; Galanter & Henderson 2008). 
 
For others who do not make top equity, being “stuck” on the rungs 
below amounts to a denial of their aspirational identity (Alvesson & 
Karreman 2007; Thornborrow & Brown 2009) which was hard to accept 
for two line partners, Sonya and Terry: 
 
Sonya: {Indicating frustration and disappointment} I think there is a 
perception of some partners being more important and contributing 
more to the firm than others… a team of super partners who are the 
full equity partners… 
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Terry: {Resigned tone} [I]f I never make the top lockstep then it's 
not the end of the world. But the reality is because we do all measure 
things, we do see it as a measure of our success… [I]f I leave Hume 
Locke, not having made top lockstep… I will think: well I didn't quite 
make it. I wasn't quite one of the top guys at Hume Locke. Of course, 
that's the whole point of setting up these structures. To get people to 
strive for these things. 
 
These statements from partners further reveal how the aspirational 
identity is understood – top lockstep partners being the “super partners” 
and “top guys”. This identity is a manifestation of an intra-firm social 
position, the “elite” (Brown & Coupland 2015; Gill 2015), the denial of 
which leads to frustration and disappointment, even anger, in some, and 
resignation in others. However, notwithstanding such reactions both 
Sonya and Terry clearly continued to harbour the ambition to become top 
equity, something that survived disappointment and continued to motivate 
their actions. 
 
The conclusion here it that, in contrast to the ideal-type financialised 
partner, position on the lockstep as a mark of status relativity to others, is 
more important to many partners than absolute monetary returns. 
Indeed, the pursuit of career progression and desired identity is used by 
some partners as a coping strategy to manage the tensions and 
contradictions they experience. For example the discourse of career 
progression as a form of “striving”, “betterment” or “growth”, is used as a 
means to sanitise the firm’s relentless pursuit of growth reflected the 
budget process, as partners described at interview: 
 
Peter {Department Head}: {Pressured and defensive} [W]hat I did 
say [when I was challenged on the budget]…is: look we have to 
strive, surely, for growth, and to better ourselves every year. Of 





Nathan: [I]f you don't push people, people get comfortable and don't 
bother… [W]e should always strive to be doing better, we should 
always strive to be getting in more business. We should always strive 
to be making more and bringing in more and getting the biggest 
share of the market that we can, than we were the year before. And a 
logical place to start with that is to say, well, where's the budget? 
 
For Peter this gives rise to a tension arising from the presence of multiples 
(Putnam et al. 2016). As Department Head he is caught in the middle of 
his duties to the Operations Board (in this context to maximise a division’s 
budget), and his role as a partner in that same division, being one 
resisting aggressive budget increases in the context of a challenging 
market. As a result he feels the need to defend his position as against 
other partners in his division who saw his role as ambiguous: whose side 
is he on? Nathan, a partner in that division, and one openly critical of 
budgets, is similarly trapped between competing narratives. Whereas on 
the on hand some partners, including Nathan, take issue with the setting 
of budgets {e.g. “I find these budgets really difficult”, Jade: above}, on 
the other, some see them as motivational, driving partners to strive to do 
better, and something regarded as a “good” {Peter and Nathan: above}. 
Indeed, partners, including Nathan, express both views at different times, 
indicating a level of ambivalence (Pratt 2000). This suggests comments on 
the need to be “striving” may be a response to such tensions, a coping 
strategy that allows partners to rationalise budgets. At the same time 
such a strategy is perhaps little more than a gloss on partner anxieties 
leading to a form of fake or forced optimism in light of financial targets 
being seen to be a fait accompli (Cushen 2013), or an unavoidable 
inevitability {Neil: above}. 
 
These sentiments can be viewed through the lens of the pursuit of career 
as a project of the self (Grey 1994), a temporal state which looks to a 
better future (Costas & Grey 2014), in terms of progress towards equity 
and thereafter towards top lockstep. On the one hand it is possible to 
associate “striving” with having the correct mindset and motivations to 
enable the project of the self to be fulfilled with the help of divisional 
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success: the disciplined partner seeks out means to demonstrate 
performance, understanding their contribution is metricised terms (Cushen 
2013). On the other hand, a partner such as Jade exhibits anxiety (Gill 
2015) and insecurity (Cushen 2013; Giddens 1991; Knights & Clarke 
2013) in bemoaning how market conditions are out of her control, 
reflecting on how that might impact on a key measure of divisional 
success. Both can be regarded as a reaction to the same stimuli, and are a 
concern based in the possible impact on career progression. 
 
Summing up, it is clear that partners see lockstep progression as a 
measure of their career, and their value to the firm, connecting that with 
an aspirational identity to be pursued or held onto: that of top lockstep 
partner. Whereas partners are not detached from the positive effect on 
their income by climbing the lockstep, few appear to put that outcome 
first. Pursuit of career progression as a project of the self (Grey 1994) 
drives partners engage with firm mechanisms of control as enabled by 
accounting and HRM technologies. At the same time partners are haunted 
by a fear that their desired status will be removed from them, and the 
presence of Remcom working on a continuous cycle of review means that 
what is feared is potentially never far away from being realised. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
This chapter has addressed the fourth research question, namely: How do 
partners experience the financialisation of the PSF? In particular, do 
partners engage with the financialisation of the PSF and if so how do they 
experience the co-existence of financial and professional imperatives? It 
reveals how financial logics, control and identity interact in the 
financialised PSF. 
 
This chapter demonstrates that, for partners in Hume Locke, career 
progression, and the status and recognition that goes with it (Gill 2015; 
Thornborrow & Brown 2009; Karreman & Alvesson 2004), are pursued as 
a project of the self (Grey 1994). They pursue career progression 
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primarily as a means of achieving an aspirational identity (Thornborrow & 
Brown 2009), ultimately translated into the achievement of a position at 
the top of the firm’s equity lockstep, and the identity of top lockstep 
partner. Whereas the use of an ideal-type “financialised partner” as an 
explanatory mechanism might suggest top equity is a proxy for the pursuit 
of ever increasing financial returns, a form of avarice, this chapter shows 
that the desired identity is much more about recognition by the immediate 
peer group. Such recognition is vested by proxy in Hume Locke’s GSB, as 
the body which determines entry to equity, and Remcom, as the body 
which oversees progression in the firm’s lockstep. What is considered 
important to GSB and Remcom is therefore considered important by 
partners in determining their career progression, and makes partners 
engage with the subjectivity proffered by those bodies, that of the 
performing and contributing partner. 
 
This chapter further shows that, notwithstanding partner appointment and 
review criteria that emphasise citizenship, the primacy given to metrics 
and rankings in management discourse and provision of information mean 
partners experience financial performance narratives as a hegemony 
(Cushen 2013) which stifles and overwhelms those aspects of partner 
contribution that do not directly relate to financial outcomes (cf. Alvehus & 
Spicer 2012). The result is that partners feel stifled from challenging 
senior management’s quest, reflected in the strategic measures of success 
narrated in Chapter 6, for ever greater revenues and profit for fear of 
being cast as unambitious, a characterisation inconsistent with the 
subjectivity of the performing and contributing partner. They feel forced to 
adopt work practices that impact adversely on other aspects of their lives, 
experienced as pressure and anxiety, forms of tension (Putnam et al. 
2016). 
 
This pursuit of such career progression as a project of the self, and the 
fear of loss of career progression once achieved, explains a number of 
outcomes revealed in this thesis. Firstly, it explains why partners, who 
might otherwise be expected to speak out against the contradictory nature 
of their experiences in the firm, engage both (a) in forms of fake optimism 
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(Cushen 2013) in terms of the setting of “stretch” budgets and associated 
narratives of “striving”, and (b) with the disciplinary technologies of the 
firm embodied in HRM practices set out in Chapter 8. 
 
Secondly, it explains why partners perform to metricised outcomes which 
result in ever higher levels of work, and an intensification of insecurity 
(Cushen 2013). In so doing partners assume the role of gatekeepers of 
profitability, clashing with their traditional role as the foremost experts, 
and gatekeepers of quality, in the firm. Moreover, they contribute to the 
firm’s metricised goals, notwithstanding a certain ambivalence that 
partners feel towards those goals (Pratt 2000; Cushen 2013).  
 
Thirdly, it explains the finding in this chapter of an intensification of 
economic competition within the firm. Partners fear failing to keep up with 
their peers, and the disciplinary expectations placed on them within the 
ecology of power described in Chapters 8 and 9. As part of this escalation 
of economic competition, partners engage in behaviours that are 
inconsistent with the firm’s appeal for collegiality that is represented in the 
firm’s good citizen contribution criteria. They build a client base and 
specialism, empire building, and fight to protect that, protectionism. 
Moreover, they keep work that is beyond their specialism in order to feed 
revenue generation. Such behaviours are understood to be acceptable by 
reference to them going unpunished when exhibited by rainmakers and 
stars (Hanlon 2004; Galanter & Henderson 2008). Both empire building 
and protectionism are experienced as contradictions to the collegial firm 
partners crave on some level, but are experienced as the necessary 
corollary of the financialised PSF. This adds to the findings of Alvehus and 
Spicer (2012) by demonstrating that behaviours they observed at levels 
other than partner appear also to apply even once individuals become 
partners, reflecting the elastic tournament (Galanter & Henderson 2008).  
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This thesis is set in two key contexts: change in the professions, and 
financialisation. In the UK, change in the professions has been driven by 
two sources. Firstly, state sponsored re-regulation has removed market 
protections, thereby opening up the market for professional services to 
increased competition, with the intention of driving efficiency and lower 
pricing for the benefit of consumers (Abel 2003; Kirkpatrick et al. 2005; 
Muzio & Flood 2012; Mayson 2009; 2011; Peck 2010). Secondly, an 
increasingly savvy cadre of commercial clients, emboldened by new 
technologies, and a re-casting of the role of PSFs as the equivalent of 
other service providers, have led initiatives to derive greater transparency 
of PSF pricing and thereby value (Hanlon 1997; Abel 2003; Ackroyd & 
Muzio 2007; Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009; Muzio & Kirkpatrick 2011; 
Lawrence et al. 2012). PSFs are said to have responded by adopting a 
commercial outlook, coupled with managerial structures and systems akin 
to those used by their corporate clients (Cooper et al. 1996; Brock et al. 
1999; Hanlon 1998). 
 
Change in the professions, and PSFs in particular, has been the subject of 
comment for some decades. However only recently has the phenomenon 
of financialisation gained currency in academic literature (Zwan 2014). 
Financialisation, in its most general sense, is the name given to an 
increasing dominance of financial measures and outcomes as key 
imperatives in business and life more generally (Epstein 2005; Martin 
2002). Within the corporation, financialisation is said to manifest as the 
pursuit of shareholder value as the measure of success, expressed in 
metrics measuring return to shareholders (Krippner 2005). Within the PSF 
it has been suggested that metric is replicated in the measurement of PEP 
(Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009). Some research has addressed the effects 
of financialisation in professional services (Faulconbridge & Muzio 2009; 
Alvehus & Spicer 2012). However, these studies relate primarily to the 
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period before the 2008 financial crisis and are limited in their application, 
lacking micro scale and the empirical richness of a study of financialisation 
is it applies in practice across the PSF, reflected in the call each makes for 
further in-depth studies. This thesis responds to that call through an in-
depth examination of financialisation as it manifests in a UK PSF. The 
research aim was to explore the effects of financialisation on the strategy 
and governance of the contemporary PSF and the lived experiences of its 
partners. 
 
To inform this aim, a review of three areas of the literature was 
undertaken. Firstly, literature on the professions and professionalism was 
examined. This set context for the study, and identified four key 
conceptualisations of professionalism that inform the study: (a) traditional 
professionalism (Carr-Saunders & Wilson 1933; Abbott 1988); (b) 
commercialised (Hanlon 1994; 1997; 1999; 2004) and organisational 
professionalism (Faulconbridge & Muzio 2008; Evetts 2013); (c) 
professionalism as a component of identity (Ibarra 1999; Brown & Lewis 
2011) and subjectivity (Foucault 1982); and (d) related to but informing 
the third component, a Foucauldian view of professionalism as a means of 
control (Covaleski et al. 1998; Grey 1998). 
 
Secondly, the concept of financialisation was explored (e.g. Epstein 2005; 
Krippner 2005; Froud et al. 2006), and a cultural economy perspective 
adopted to allow an examination of how the discourses of financialisation 
inform social practice, and thereby become performative (MacKenzie & 
Millo 2003; MacKenzie 2006). This facilitated an examination of how 
financial discourses and logics manifest in the strategic decision-making 
of, and operational controls adopted by, senior management. Strategic 
decision-making was viewed through a theoretical lens applied by Froud 
and colleagues (2006), in particular the concepts of the “narrative of 
strategic purpose” and “narrative and numbers”, the former a strategic 
management discourse and the latter its relation with numbers (metrics) 
as post hoc measures adopted to demonstrate success. Miller and Power’s 
(2013) critical accounting framework was adopted to consider how 
accounting practices create or utilise the spaces in which financial controls 
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can be applied, how accounting mediates the discourses and logics of 
finance into the firm, how success and failure is adjudicated, and how 
individual subjectivities are created that carry overtones of 
financialisation. 
 
Thirdly, consideration was given to literatures that view HRM techniques 
as Foucauldian mechanisms of control (Townley 1993a; 1994; 1995a; 
1997; Legge 2005; Foucault 1977; 1978). This allowed an examination of 
subjectivities built to suit organisational purposes, and the applicability of 
commercialised professionalism (Hanlon 1999), and organisational 
professionalism (Faulconbridge & Muzio 2008). In turn the theory of 
career as a project of the self (Grey 1994) was adopted as a means to 
understand the motivations of partners and their engagement with 
management processes of discipline and control. Finally, using the work of 
Putnam and colleagues (2016), tension and contradiction were 
conceptualised to assist in explaining partner experience . 
 
Based on this review research questions were developed and are 
addressed in the next section. 
 
Key findings and contributions 
 
This section reviews the findings and contributions of this thesis with 
reference to the research questions posed, and then presents an 
overview. 
 
Has PSF strategy been financialised? 
 
This thesis finds that Hume Locke adopted a strong narrative of strategic 
purpose (Froud et al. 2006). However, in contrast to Froud and colleagues’ 
(2006) theory of narrative and numbers, measures of strategic success 
were applied ex ante, as pre-defined measures of success, rather than ex 
post, as a rhetorical means of demonstrating success after the event. 
Hence the measures adopted by Hume Locke were used as a means of 
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creating a financialised strategy. Thus, in this alternative construction, 
narrative and numbers co-exist in a mutually symbiotic relationship, each 
relying on the other to find its expression. Measures added substance and 
a sense of objectivity to what was otherwise a nebulous concept – being 
“top” or “the best”. In turn the achievement of these measures was 
painted as an essential element in delivering the firm’s strategic vision of 
becoming the “top commercial law firm”, lending rhetorical appeal to 
otherwise sterile numbers and rankings. 
 
In Hume Locke, strategy consultants (Kipping 1999; McKenna 2006), the 
legal press and the legal ranking agencies, played a role in determining 
the choice of strategic measures by connecting such measures with other 
narratives, creating and mediating what this thesis conceptualises as 
narrative-metricised categorisations. They created rhetorical devices such 
as “regional heavyweights”, the “£{X}m club” and the “top table”, 
defining them with reference to measures including revenue, number of 
lawyers and number of tier 1 rankings. In so doing they constructed a 
market for comparison and benchmarking (Callon 1998; MacKenzie & Millo 
2003; Muniesa 2014) of firms. In turn, senior management set strategy 
and defined firm success and with reference to such narrative-metricised 
categorisations, a form of ex ante narrative and numbers (Knights & 
Morgan 1991; Froud et al. 2006). The result was twofold. Firstly, the 
reconstitution of the firm in terms of its claimed location in such narrative-
metricised categorisations, with the firm becoming both that which is 
measured or ranked (Erturk et al. 2008; Du Gay & Pryke 2002; Sauder 
2008; Sauder & Espeland 2009), and that which is described in such 
narratives. Secondly, such narrative-metricised categorisations, become 
performative when senior management proposed and pursued strategies 
that are designed to meet the requirements of the same. 
 
The foregoing advances our understanding of the choice of strategic 
measures of success in the PSF. In particular it takes us beyond (a) 
reference to the specific financial market metrics identified by Froud and 
colleagues (2006), none of which were adopted by Hume Locke (b) the 
naming of PEP as the PSF equivalent to financial market metrics as 
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suggested by Faulconbrige and Muzio (2009), that being a metric which 
did not feature in Hume Locke’s strategic measures of success, and (c) the 
micro-level focus of Alvehus and Spicer (2012) on chargeable hours 
recorded by individuals in the PSF, something which played a tactical 
rather than strategic role in Hume Locke. Instead, this thesis has 
demonstrated that in order to understand the effects of financialisation on 
firm strategy and the choice of strategic measures of success we must 
appreciate that these are an outcome of an interaction between significant 
external agents, the rhetorical devices they create and their relation to 
certain measures which are commensurable with the peer group, and firm 
narratives and visions for the future. In combination these form narrative-
metricised categorisations which inform firm strategy and measures of 
success. 
 
Further, this thesis shows that directory rankings are referred to in firm 
discourse, and in actions taken to improve rankings, demonstrating that, 
in the field of law, rankings, and those who complile them, have become 
performative, suggesting the findings of Sauder and Espeland (2009) 
apply not only to law schools but also in legal PSFs, and confirming the 
role of ranking agencies as significant field actors (Sauder 2008). 
 
How do the logics of financialistion enter and take effect in the PSF? 
 
This thesis finds that accounting plays a significant role in the 
financialisation of Hume Locke as an entity relative to its peers, and its 
internal processes of performance measurement. Exemplifying Miller and 
Power’s (2013) framework of territorialisation, mediation, adjudication and 
subjectification, it shows how accounting enables and/or makes use of an 
organisational structure to facilitate the use of metrics (territorialisation), 
and in the choice of such metrics mediates the logics of growth and 
efficiency into the firm (mediation). In using such metrics accounting 
determines the success or failure of divisions and individuals in the firm 
(adjudication). Finally accounting renders individuals comparable and 
calculable, offering them an economised subjectivity (subjectification). 
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Accounting acts as the agent of financialisation through the creation of an 
integrated ecology of measures which work towards delivery of the firm’s 
strategic measures of success. A distinction is made between strategic 
measures of success and tactical measures. Strategic measures are those 
explicitly named as measures of success within the firm’s strategic 
narrative. Other measures are tactical in that, while not specifically named 
as success measures, they have tactical effect in contributing to strategic 
measures. In addition this thesis reveals that rankings, a form of quasi-
metric, were used as a strategic measure of success, something hitherto 
overlooked in studies of PSF strategy. 
 
More particularly, this thesis contributes by showing the extent to which 
accounting, through the use of divisional revenue budgets, the 
measurement of net contribution, and the measurement of individual 
statistics such as partner fees operates as a governance mechanism. 
These operate as Foucauldian matheses (Foucault 1973; Townley 1994) 
that render both divisions and individual partners knowable, calculable, 
and commensurable, thereby operating as a form of management control 
by encouraging partners to take steps which contribute to the delivery of 
the firm’s strategic measures of success. By extension, and connecting to 
Miller and Power’s (2013) Foucauldian inspired work on the subjectivity of 
partners, this thesis contributes by showing the extent to which 
accounting defines partners in the PSF as financial assets: revenue 
generators with associated costs. This is taken to its logical conclusion in 
the operation of the firm’s partner remuneration system, where revenue 
generated and costs are weighed up. This financial logic stands in contrast 
to traditional professional logics which value partners based on their 
expertise, reputation and contribution to public service (Abbott 1988; 
Freidson 2001) something which goes to the heart of the partners’ 
experience of life within the financialised PSF, a subject returned to below. 
 
The foregoing advances our understanding of the PSF in its marketplace, 
and the changing role of its partners. Since Hanlon’s (Hanlon 1994; 1997; 
1999; 2004) conceptualisation of commercialised professionalism, and 
 252 
Cooper and colleagues (1996) characterisation of the MPB (Managed 
Professional Business) archetype, studies have recognised the 
commercialisation of the PSF. This thesis delves further, exploring the 
effects of accounting, acting as the agent of financialisation, in recasting 
both the PSF and the role of its partners. Accounting technologies, and the 
commensurability such technologies introduce, fundamentally change the 
nature of the PSF from an entity known by repute, to one relativised by its 
position in league tables based on metrics. Moreover, the partner role has 
changed from the time served professional, contributing to the PSF by 
expertise, reputation and client connections, into a measured, calculable 
and commensurable financial asset, the worth of whom is determined with 
reference to a cost-benefit analysis carried out by accounting. 
 
How are professionals managed to deliver the financial imperative implied 
by financialisation? 
 
This question connects the findings above on the operation of accounting 
as a governance mechanism to the firm’s HRM technologies. In Hume 
Locke the accounting ecology of metrics is combined with HRM 
technologies designed to establish behavioural norms for partners, and to 
reinforce the same. In combination accounting and HRM form an ecology 
of power which renders partners and potential partners knowable, 
calculable, comparable and governable: the object and subject of power 
(Hanlon 2004). The result is the creation of a new partner subjectivity, 
that of the performing and contributing partner.  
 
Analysis in this thesis shows that the subjectivity of the performing and 
contributing partner comprises Hanlon’s (1997) four main functions of a 
partner together with additions to and developments of them into a fifth 
and sixth function: that of the good citizen and the tool of strategy 
implementation. The good citizen complies with the diktats of senior 
management, and has an outlook that privileges firm before individual. As 
tools of strategy implementation partners are the means by which targets 
and objectives are met which in turn feed into the firm’s measures of 
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strategic success. That articulation goes beyond Brown and Lewis’s (2011) 
conception of the “productive legal professional” which, although relevant 
to describing part of the performance regime as it applied to non-partner 
lawyers, placed more emphasis on routine time keeping and the recording 
of chargeable hours than is applicable in the case of the partner. 
 
This thesis contributes by demonstrating how, in contrast to Townley 
(1994), who placed performance appraisal at the centre of discipline and 
punishment, the remuneration committee is the nexus of disciplinary 
practices in a PSF operating a managed lockstep. Partner behaviours, 
including engagement with HRM technologies such as the performance 
appraisal, show significant signs of alteration in light of the powers of the 
remuneration committee. This is explained further in relation to the next 
question.  
 
How do partners experience the financialisation of the PSF? 
 
This thesis contribututes to our understanding of PSFs by revealing how, 
as financial imperatives meet traditional professional logics, partner 
experience of the ecology of power in which they find themselves is 
characterised by fear, anxiety, insecurity, tension and contradiction. The 
firm’s chosen strategy, and the application of accounting in performance 
measurement, lead to a hegemony of financial performance narratives 
(Cushen 2013). Partners perceive a need to keep up with the financial 
performance of other partners, resulting in an escalation of inter-partner 
economic competition, an elastic tournament which lasts the entire tenure 
of partnership (Galanter & Henderson 2008). This is experienced as a 
constant threat of removal from partnership, or sanction of the firm’s 
remuneration committee. That leads to ever higher levels of work, an 
adverse impact on other aspects of their lives, and an intensification of 
insecurity (Cushen 2013). 
 
Tensions and contradictions arise in how partners experience working 
practices in the financialised PSF. The partner role has become one of 
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gatekeeper of profitability, and stands in tension with the traditional role 
of gatekeeper of quality. The need to maximise profitability through 
delegation is experienced as contradictory to the partners’ desire to 
maintain quality, part of traditional professional logics. 
 
Further, notwithstanding the subjectivity of the performing and 
contributing partner including citizenship, something which appeals to the 
traditional professional logic of collegiality (Freidson 2001; Ouchi 1980), 
financial performance narratives mean citizenship obligations are put to 
one side by partners who pursue empire building and protectionism. Such 
behaviours, while understood to contradict partners’ citizenship 
obligations, are experienced as acceptable, the latter in part by reference 
to such behaviours going unpunished when exhibited by high performing 
partners, the rainmakers and stars (Hanlon 2004; Galanter & Henderson 
2008). This extends to the partner level Alvehus and Spicer’s (2012) 
findings that in the face of such contradiction the measurable is favoured 
at the expense of the immeasurable. Hence this thesis contributes by 
theorising that contradiction is an inherent part of the financialised PSF, 
with empire building and protectionism corollaries of the hegemony of 
financial performance narratives (Cushen 2013) which manifest in the 
financialised PSF. 
 
This thesis takes our understanding of the motivations of partners further 
by finding that, for partners in the financialised PSF, career progression is 
pursued as a “project of the self” (Grey 1994); a means of achieving an 
aspirational identity and the status and recognition that goes with it 
(Karreman & Alvesson 2004; Thornborrow & Brown 2009; Gill 2015). In 
contrast to the avarice that would be a characteristic of an ideal-type 
“financialised partner”, the pursuit of career progression and its link to 
identity explains why partners continue to engage with processes designed 
to deliver ever greater financial returns as a measure of the success of 
firm strategy, even when they consider actual returns to be satisfactory: 
fear of the loss of an aspirational identity, a form of temporal anxiety 
(Costas & Grey 2014). This further explains why partners exhibit fake 
optimism (Cushen 2013) in terms of the setting of “stretch” budgets, 
 255 
adopt associated narratives of “striving”, and engage with the disciplinary 
technologies of the firm. 
 
In so doing this thesis contributes by (a) relating financial logics, control 
and identity, thereby adding to our understanding of the development of 
the professions within an era of financialisation (b) exposing the 
financialised PSF as dominated by a performative hegemony (Cushen 
2013) in which contradiction inheres, and (c) explaining the acquiescence 
of PSF partners to such developments. By bringing these themes together 





Whereas the foregoing narrates specific findings and contributions, the 
principal contribution of this thesis is a holistic one. By revealing and 
analysing the effects of financialisation at the levels of the strategic and 
the tactical or operational, alongside the experience of the partners, this 
thesis presents a multifaceted view of financialisation across the firm. In 
so doing it connects and explains how the influence of financialisation 
pervades decisions made at the strategic level, and is then operationalised 
within the governance and control mechanisms adopted by management. 
Further, it ventures into the hitherto unexplored area of the effect of 
financialisation on the lived experience of partners, the owners and 
principal workers of the firm. 
 
More particularly the thesis shows how senior management, as strategic 
decision-makers, find themselves slaves to the performativity demanded 
of them by the chorus of commentators that comprise the legal press and 
ranking agencies, making decisions and pursuing strategies designed to 
place the firm within the structures created by league tables and rankings. 
It investigates how financialisation plays into and exploits professional 
logics, motivations and identity, unpacking how each informs and 
contradicts the other, resulting in unresolved tensions, contradictions, 
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fears and anxieties. In investigating partner fears and anxieties this thesis 
takes the lid off the otherwise steely impenetrability of the partner 
persona, and in particular the view that partners, as owners within the 
PSF, control their own destinies and the direction that their firm takes.  
 
Whereas elements of the foregoing have been addressed in scholarly work 
to date, as referred to above, no study has put all of these elements into a 
comprehensive whole. This thesis makes a contribution by doing so, and 
in seeking to explain how each element relates to the other, and how that 
informs existing work carried on within each area. 
 
Limitations and evaluation of this thesis 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, the focus on financialisation emerged during data 
collection. Although I had considered it, I had began in the field of 
managerialism, and envisaged that could be seen as clashing with 
professionalism at the partner level. As such data collection proceeded 
with my seeking exposure to forms of management across the firm, and 
the interviews I conducted sought to explore multiple aspects of 
management. Financial imperatives were therefore not an initial focus but 
became so as the study progressed. Nevertheless, even then I continued 
to seek to cover the full gamut of available opportunities to observe 
management in action in order to obtain a complete data set. Whereas on 
the one hand that meant I collected and coded data that was not directly 
related to financialisation, on the other it uncovered vestiges or influences 
of financialisation in places I might not otherwise have looked. By keeping 
the lens wide I believe I saw more than I may have otherwise. That said, I 
missed some opportunities in earlier interviews to explore in more depth 
those partners’ experience of financialisation, and hence data collected 
was limited in that respect. Likewise, the study was a less efficient means 
to the ultimate end than might otherwise have been the case had I 
developed what became the research questions before the study started, 
or earlier in its infancy. From that perspective it was perhaps a mistake to 
delay fixing on a theoretical framework. On the other hand, the study has 
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generated a rich seam of data that gives many opportunities for other 
research angles to be taken. 
 
Chapter 5 refers to the subjective aspect of the interpretations set out in 
this thesis. Such subjectivity is considered inescapable in the context of 
qualitative research of this nature. The pursuit of “reliability”, expressed 
as the ability for another researcher to repeat the study and get the same 
results (Matthews & Ross 2010), is not applicable to an ethnographic case 
study which, by its nature, cannot be repeated. Alongside reliability, 
validity relates to the strength of the description derived from the data; 
the trustworthiness of the findings (Davies 2008; Grbich 2012; Kvale 
2002). By virtue of the depth of access gained in the study, coupled with 
the methodological approach narrated in Chapter 5, a claim to reliability 
could be made. However, trustworthiness is itself a difficult concept when 
viewed through the lens of social constructionism. I appreciate my 
presence had an impact on participants on some level, and hence what 
was then constructed was different from what would have been had I not 
been there. That notwithstanding, constructed it was, and through 
transcription, summary, reflection and analysis what is presented here is a 
faithful representation. At the same time, it is also partial and incomplete. 
Indeed, I am struck by the amount that is unsaid, and how the pursuit of 
academic theorisation converts what happened into something that might 
be little recognised by those who actually participated in it. On one level 
that makes me uncomfortable: how can this be a faithful presentation if 
the participants would not see it as such? On another I am comfortable 
that the theories applied bring an insight that would otherwise be unseen, 
and that my understanding of the bigger picture, not presented here, was 
enhanced. Unfortunately it is not possible in a thesis to present all aspects 
of that wider understanding. Indeed, there is much more unsaid here than 
is said. 
 
This thesis, being based on a single case study, is not empirically 
generalisable. However, Flyvberg (2006) argues that studies such as this 
are principally about depth of understanding, rather than empirical 
generalisation, and I tend to agree. With sufficient depth and description, 
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other researchers and practitioners may recognise similar features in their 
own context, and use findings to inform their studies. 
 
Given the role of power assumed in this thesis, it might have been 
considered pertinent to review its nemesis: resistance. Foucault’s (1978) 
suggestion that with power always comes resistance is a feature of the 
data but space limitations meant that sacrifices had to be made and 




Following on from the concluding remark in the last section, future 
research on the effects of financialisation would enhance our 
understanding by looking closely at how resistance to financialisation 
manifests. With that in mind it is important to remember it is in the little 
things that make up social life (Flyvbjerg 2004) that resistance may show 
its face. Examples of resistance and coping strategies already identified in 
the literature are cynicism, irony and jouissance (Kosmala & Herrbach 
2006; Hodgson 2005; Fleming & Spicer 2003; Dent 2003), humour 
(Collinson 1992), scepticism (Knights & McCabe 2000; 2002), distancing 
(Mueller & Whittle 2011), parody (Trethewey 1997), and articulating 
alternative identities (Bergstrom 2006; Collinson 2003; Costas & Grey 
2014; Mumby 2005). 
 
Of particular interest would be research that couples financialisation with 
Kosmala and Herrbach’s (2006) envisaging of “jouissance”. Jouissance is 
the abiding by organisational norms of conduct while at the same time 
distancing from them. This may provide insight into how partners maintain 
a pretense of compliance with firm definitions of professionalism, while 
holding on to their own values as a means to deal with ambiguity and 
maintain self esteem. It may be fruitful to investigate how cynicism, 
distancing, and jouissance utilise a front-stage and back-stage division, or 
“dramaturgical” self, which gives the appearance of compliance as a 
means of self-protection within a disciplinary regime (Collinson 2003; 
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Goffman 1969; Kosmala & Herrbach 2006). Kosmala and Herrbach’s 
(2006) study would suggest that, in so doing, individuals still contribute to 
firm performance, and that apparent contradiction is worth exploring both 
in its own right and in the context of how that affects their identity.  
 
Hodgson (2005) and Brown and Lewis (2011) found that the achievement 
of professionalism was considered a release from formal rules i.e. a true 
professional knows when rules do not need to be applied and hence, by 
extension, the practices associated with those rules. This supports the 
notion of professionalism as something that is distinct from acting in 
accordance with formalised rules and prescribed practices. Rather, it 
introduces an element of discretion or autonomy which might be seen as 
empowering; allowing the professional to do things “his way”, even if not 
in strict compliance with rules and practices set by management in a 
regime of organisational professionalism (Faulconbridge & Muzio 2008). 
Investigation of this element, in light of financialisation, may be fruitful as 
an area for future research. 
 
Taking a different angle, research using multiple and comparative case 
studies may further our understanding of financialisation in the 
professions, as would research which moves beyond law and accounting, 
the focus to date having been on the Big 4 accountancy firms (and their 
forerunners) and large law firms. By extension, we should seek to 
understand how financialisation is affecting smaller PSFs, and look at the 
experience of those working within new forms of organisation envisaged 




I described my personal history in the introduction. Prior to this study I 
worked as a trainee, a junior professional, a partner and a managing 
partner. During that I experienced many changes as the firm moved 
towards an increasingly managerialised and financialised model of 
operation which placed increasing authority and power in the hands of 
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senior and functional management. That process was accelerated in 
reaction to the fall out of the 2008 financial crisis, and the fear of firm 
failure that arose as a result, hence legitimising greater levels of 
managerial intervention into domains previously within the autonomy of 
partners. The case study in this thesis represents a further progression of 
these themes, a progression that manifests throughout the firm. I came to 
this study in part because of Friedson’s (2001) defence of professionalism, 
something that appealed to my professional values, and speculating that 
managerialism and professionalism were caught up in a conflict that 
required deeper academic scrutiny. In conversations during the study it is 
clear that many partners in Hume Locke still adhere to traditional 
professional values, but feel that the imprint of financialisation is indelible, 
irreversibly changing the nature of what it means to work as a 
professional. It is difficult to resist such a conclusion. Nevertheless, by 
revealing how financialisation is affecting the professions, and indeed 
workers more generally, that may give some pause for thought, and 
encourage the like minded to rethink and challenge the current financial 
hegemony. Any rethink need not seek to supplant financial imperatives 
entirely, after all professions have always been a means to earn a living as 
well as a vocation. Rather the aim should perhaps be to bring back into 
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